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The assessment of early-stage, technology-based ventures is a high-risk endeavor, 
cornplicated by the fact that typically there is very Iittle information on which to base 
analysis. The complexity of this evaluation problem is fûrther compounded by a lack of 
decision tools specificdy intended for this evolutionary stage. 
The objective of this research is the development of decision aids for screening and 
assessment of very-early stage ventures. Specificaiiy, for ventures entering the product 
development stage, not having yet reached initial market introduction, and having at 
most an initial proto-. To achieve this end, two paths are explored, presented as 
three separate but reiated studies. 
The fkst two studies consider the decision behaviour of venture assessment experts, and 
have implications for tool development through increased understanding of the 
concepts utilized and their application. The third, and perhaps the most signincant 
study of the three, considers the assessment problem fiom a dament perspective. 
Rather than considering the decision process of experts, this study poses a basic 
question. What parameters influence the potential of an early-stage venture to 
successfidly evolve through to the market introduction phase? The h a 1  study considers 
ventures as complex systems evolving under uncertainty and the application of 
concepts fiom viability theory. An assessment fiamework is proposed, and an initial 
examination of validity and reliability is undertaken. 
Implicit in this approach is the understanding that inveshnent oppomuiity assessment is 
an ongoing activity. At any instant in time, the issue k i n g  the investor is whether to 
exercise an option to support the venture M e r .  Thus, the prospective assessment tool 
must w t  only be applicable for screening and assessment, but also for tracking venture 
development. The proposed assessment b w o r k  is shown to have potential w t  only 
in this monitoring role, but also as a means to fàcilitate expert assessment panels. 
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Chapter 1 
Introduction 
It is generally accepted that srnail aod medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) are 
important contri'butors to Canadian economic growth. However, as discussed by 
Rothwell and Zegveld (1982), simply measirring their share of economic oiaput and 
employment does not reflect their tme economic significance. They appear to be an 
important part of the overall economic infiastructure, and play a key role in economic 
evo lution. 
In terms of economic inûastnicture, these ventures tend to operate in market 
segments where economies of scale are not especially important, capital intensity is 
low, skill intensity is high and demand is highly specific and variable (Rothweil and 
Zegveld, 1982). Typically, established finns in mature markets tend to adopt srnall, 
inmemental product improvements. Entry of new, small fïrms into these markets have 
a significant impact on market dynamics, often becoming the catalyst for evolutionary 
or revolutionary change (Rothwell and Zeg~eld, 1982; Benson et aL, 1993). 
Studies have suggested that small, techno logy-based, high gro wth companies 
are more innovative and O fien more effective at the creation of jobs and wealth than 
are larger ventures (Capon et al., 1992; Kassicieh et al., 1997). This appears to be the 
case in the United States and Canada, and indeed for most capitalist economies. As 
discussed by Kassicieh et al. (1997), in the United States, approximately 60% to 80% 
of job creation and sales growth can be accounted for by 3 0% of the firms, primady 
small to medium sized, in the economy. Further, as the primary driver of these high- 
growth ventures is new technology, it may be argued that technology-based ventures 
are a significant factor for economic growth. 
This SME role is becoming increasingly important as Canada moves towards 
a so-called 'knowIedge-based economy'. But what is meant by a knowledge-based 
economy and how did it evolve to have a role in the current economy? 
1 Macroeconomic View Pre-1970s 
In the nineteenth and into the twentieth centuries it was customary for economists 
to classiS. the firm's factors of production in temis of either land, capital or labour. 
Within this fiamework, technology and knowledge was assumed to be an economic 
constant, only changing in the 'long-nm' (e.g.: Dombush and Fischer, 1978; 
Mansfield, 1979; Rabino and Wright, 2993). Further, technology and knowledge were 
assumed to be generally available to all participants within a market and as such were 
not perceived to be a major source of cornpetitive advantage. 
Macro-economic growth modek prevalent prior to the 1970s post.&ted that 
growth in the economy was the result of either an increase in the availability of 
factors of production or through improvements in their productivity (Dombusch and 
Fischer, 1978). In temis of factor growth, the key factor was considered to be labour. 
Spec i fdy ,  over time the labour force grows and the average output of labour 
changes. Within this fiamework, increased labour productivity could occur through 
two mechanisms. Firsf labour has more capital in terms of machines and factory 
space applied to it. Alternatively, there is technological progress resulthg in higher 
skiued labour and more sophisticated machines. However, if the economy is at full- 
ernployment there are only two ways of obtaining growth, increase the contribution of 
other factors of production a d o r  use those fàctors more effectively. hcreasing fàctor 
effectiveness may corne about either fiom more efficient resource allocation or 
because of more effective technology. 
This view of economic growth c m  be formalized mathematically by expressing 
economic output as a fùnction of capital and labour. A key assumption is constant 
returns to scale. In other words, economic output increases in direct proportion to the 
quantity of hctors applied. This also implies that the output per unit of labour, labour 
productivity, depends on the amount of capital per worker. As a r e d t ,  the greater the 
amount of capital applied to a unit of labour, the higher its productivity. Another 
underlying assumption is diminishing retums to capital intensity. As the capital per 
worker increases, the worker becomes more productive and economic growth rises, 
but at a diminishing rate. The result of this fiamework is the notion that the more 
'capital-intensive' the econorny, the higher the economic output. 
1.2 Recognition of the Role of Technoiogy and Knowledge 
As discussed by Dombush and Fischer (1978), it can be seen when examining 
production functions that there is a constant term definhg the ratio at which 
combining labour and capital creates economic growth, One source of growth is to 
simply increase the factors of production The other source of long-term growth is 
through a change in the production constant. Such changes are considered to occur in 
the 'long-m', and reflect the impact of technological progress on fhctor productivity. 
While technological progxess is considered to be a long-nui effect, in 'short term' it is 
considered to be an economic constant. 
This view of technoIogical progress implies only that more output can be 
produced with the same inputs (Dombusch and Fischer, 1978). That is, the marginal 
productivity of all factors are increased by the same ratio. Other fonns of 
technological progress, however, impact the relative productivity of each factor of 
production A 1970 study by Robert Solow found that over 80% of US economic 
growth in the period fkom 1909 to 1949 was due to technological progress 
(Dombusch and Fisher, 1978). Critical reviews of this work at the time contended 
that the large contribution of technology codd be explained through omitted fàctors 
and poor measurement of economic inputs. 
Later work tended to support Solow's findings regardin. the significance of 
technological progress on growth, Further research indicated that the contribution of 
labour to economic growth was greater than what would be expected simply fiom 
labour force growth (Dombusch and Fischer, 1978). Examination of the fàctors 
contri'buting to increased labour productivity found advances in knowledge to account 
for a signincant portion of the technological progress contribution to economic 
g r o d  
1.3 The Impact of Technology on Cornpetitive Advantage 
So fiir, the discussion has been on the macro-economic impact of 
technological change. As discussed by Roberts and Mayer (1 99 1), during the 1970s 
technologies were considered to be a peripheral issue when developing a fkmts 
product strategy or making strategic investment decisions. Technology issues were 
usually considered to be a business unit characteristic and were often not considered 
when restructuring occurred. As a r e d ,  companies often had to deal in an 
environment complicated by unstable engineering capabilities, ineffective product 
development and difficulty developing areas of cornpetence (Roberts and Mayer, 
1991 ; Prahalad and Hamel, 1992). 
For a micro-economic perspective of the impact of technology and 
technological change, consider the work of Porter (1991). In his discussion of 
techno logy and its roie providing the firm with competitive advantage, Porter (1 99 1) 
describes technological changes as one of the most important drivers of cornpetition. 
Accord'ng to Porter, the reiationship between technology and competition is often 
misunderstood. Technological change in itself is not critical. Rather, it is the way in 
which technological change affects industry structures and relationships at a macro- 
economic level and h n  competitive acivantage at the micro-economic level that is 
important. In tenns of the M s  competitive advantages, it is technologyfs roie in 
dinerentiation and reducing costs to the firm that are important. 
To understand the role of technology as a source of competitive potentid, one 
must begin by examining the five forces of competition and the value chain of the 
firm (Porter, 1991). In bis discussion of strategy, Porter d e s m i s  the five 
fundamental economic forces as the threat of new entrants, the relative strength of 
buyers and sellers, substitution and the structure of the industry in which the firm 
cornpetes. Ml of these forces can be signincantly impacted by technological change. 
In ternis of industry structure, technological change c m  have a wide range of 
impacts, nich as changing economies of scale or making new interreiationships 
possible. Further, even ifa technology does not provide cornpetitive advantage to any 
one fïrm, it may affect the pro& potential of  all firms in the industry. It is here that 
the distinction between base and distinctive technologies must be made. When 
considering M e r s  to entry for new cornpetition, technobgical change c m  act to 
either increase or decrease barriers. This may result through such mechanisms as 
lowering the cost of product designs, increasing or decreasing the capitalization 
required to enter an industry or through its influence on switching costs (Porter, 
1991). 
The innuence of technological change on Nntching costs has a major impact 
on buyer and supplier relationships. Another important factor of buyer and supplier 
bargaining power is technology substitution This is the most common eEect of 
technology change, and is a function of the relative value to the price of cornpethg 
products and switching costs (Porter, 1991). 
In the value chah model, the finn is viewed as a collection of activities that 
may be classified as primary value activities and support actidies. Porter describes 
five genenc primary activities that contribute to the creation of value. These are 
inbound logistics, operations, outbound logistics, marketing and sales and senrice. 
Support activities associated with the firm are classified as inûastructure, product 
development, human resources and procurement. 
Technologies will be associated with all aspects of the value chah, not simply 
the technologies that are embodied in the venture's product or service. Further, any 
technology associated with a value activity has the potentid to have an impact on 
fhm competitive advantage. In general te=, technology affects cornpetitive 
advantage through its impact on relative cost and the h ' s  abilj. to differentiate 
itself fiom its cornpetition. Technology affects cost or differentiation if it influences 
the drivers of  CO^ or Miqueness associated with each of the firm's value activities. 
1.4 An Assessrnent Challenge 
Technology cannot be treated as a k e d  quantity. Rather, technologies must 
be considered as  dynamic entities that are an important source of competitive 
advantage (Porter? 1991; Rabino and Wright, 1993). Further, zs discussed by 
Kassicieh et al. (1997), the primary basis for high growth ventures are new 
technologies and their associated knowledge and skills. 
The traditional physical assets of the firm have become less c e n t 4  with the 
critical element for the firm becomïng the knowledge base associated with the 
creation and application of its technologies (Dnicker, 1986; Ford, 1988; Benson et al., 
1993; Alvesson, 1995). As the economy evolves towards one in which technology 
and its application are the major source of competitive advantage, the associated 
knowledge and skilk become important factors of production This leads to an 
economic structure that is less capital-based and increasingly knowledgebased. 
A trend associated with the evolution towards an increasingly knowledge- 
based economy is the emergence of srnall, young enterprises that tend to introduce 
novel products based on new or unproven technologies. Ofien their products or 
services are based on non-standard production containmg a significant problem- 
solvhg component (Benson et al., 1993). As a result, there is sigdïcant d a c d t y  
assessing either the firm or its potential market because of hi& uncertahty in both 
the associated customer needs and the cornpetitive environment. While uncertamty 
and risk are inherent in ali business ventures, technology-based ventures often fàce 
higher risk from unsolved scientinc and technical challenges (Sonneborne and 
Wiemon, 1990). Further, when the venture is signincantly kwwledge-based, there is 
often little or no physical assets or inventory that may be used to evaluate the venture 
in terms of capital and collateral (cg.:  Stewart, 1991; Stewart, 1994; Alvesson, 1995). 
The focus of this research is the assessrnent of new, smd,  knowledge- 
intensive, technology-based ventures at an early stage in their development. 
Typically, these ventures have been in existence for not more than three years and are 
at the pre-market introduction, prototype-development stage. Further, technology- 
based ventures are considered to be a subset of knowledge-based enterprises. This is 
based on the assertion that knowledge is a key element of the teçhnology-based 
enterprise, both in the development and application of technology. In this research 
these new, small, knowlecige-intensive, technology-based ventures wil l  generally be 
referred interchangeably as technology-based or knowledge-based ventures. 
Given the considerable investment of resources these fkms require, and the 
faiure rate, the chdenge fàced by lending and investmeat orgaaizations is how to 
assess 'technolo gy- based' and/or ' kno wledge-intensive ' ventures (e-g. : Stewart, 1 99 1 ; 
Cooper, 1993; Stewarî, 1994; Aivesson, 1995; Liberatone and Styliarou, 1995). The 
risk these institutions face is immense. As discussed by Hofer and Sandberg (1987) 
and Slatter (1 992) estimates of start-up venture Wure vary fiom 65%' in the first five 
years to 80% within the fkst three years. Further, Balachandra and Fria. (1997), 
found that of the approximately 16,000 new products intmduced in the United States 
in 199 1, almost 90% fàiled to meet their business objectives and could be classified 
as fàilures. 
Many researchers (e.g.: Johne and Snelson, 1988; Rabino and Wright, 1993; 
Stewart, 1994) bave discussed the shortcomings of traditional venture screenhg and 
accomting practices when considering knowledge-based firms. A central difficulty is 
the rneasurement of the venture's intellechial capital, especially as this becomes an 
increasing component of the cost of production. As discussed by Johne and Snelson 
(1988), traditional new venture screening rnodels do not adequately handle non- 
financial aspects such as human and organizational behavior. 
When dealing with kno wledge-based enterprises, the venture's intangible 
assets may be more important in assessing the associated investmeat risk than hard 
assets (Stewart, 1994). As a result, measures of the non-hancial qualities of the 
venture, the intangibles, are increasingly of interest. The banking industry, for 
example, has recognized a deficiency in their operations when psoviding s e ~ c e s  to 
these ventures, and have responded by the creation of specialist groups within their 
organizations. These groups, sometimes refmed to as %nowledge-based banking', 
are comprised of experienced individuals whose focus is on the provision of banking 
services to this segment of the market. 
The principle objective of this research is to improve the .understanding of 
early-stage, technology-based venture assessment and to provide a h e w o r k  for 
irnproving this process. The focus is theory- and model-development, the goal of 
which is not to provide a single, all encompassing tool, but rather to lay the 
foundation for development of a 'toolbox' of intelligent decision aids. This stems fiom 
a philosophical belief that such toolboxes provide the necessary flexibility to a 
decision-maker that a single tool must by its nature restrict. As these tools will 
generaily focus on intangibles, the assessments will be Linguistic in nature and hence 
the application of fuzzy techniques wiu be the principal approach expbred. 
This research is not intended as a large-scale empirical study of venture 
assessment. Two reasons for this: &st, it is impractical to obtain large samples of 
experts for in-depth interviews'. Secondly, the points of interest are the concepts used 
during the assessment process and the unique ways these may be combined during the 
assessment process. This information is not readily available in large studies using 
aggregated data, 
This is highlighted by a .  attempt to obtain data using a general questiamaire outlined in A p p d i x  F. 
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As illustrated in Figure 1.1, this objective may be thought of as having two 
major issues associated with t. Fkst is the question, how do experts assess these 
ventures? Here, the goal is to better understand the decision process of assessment 
experts. The second issue seeks to better understand many key aspects of venture 
assesment, and hence, the development of decision aids through the question: What 
parameters d e h e  the success or fàilure of these ventures? 
Figure 1.1 
Research Issue Diagram 
This research has k e n  conducted, and is presented, in three related studies as 
s h o w  in Figure 1.1. In the fïrst study, a group of lending experts is examined and 
their assessment process explored through identification of the concepts used and 
their relationships. As discussed, it is impractical to obtain large samples of experts 
for in-depth in te~ews.  Indeed it is often impractical to obtain t d y  in-depth 
i n t e ~ e w s  because of their own time constraints - these are busy people. This can be 
rnitigated to some extent through the application of fuzzy cognitive maps, which as 
discussed by MacNeill et aL (1994) and Kosko (1997) permit the aggregation of 
knowledge fiom a variety of potentially incoqlete sources that leads to a consensus 
map. This approach is used to create a simple, fuzy cognitive map and an experiment 
devised to demonstrate the potential of this approach to devise a decision aid. 
The first study also raises an interesthg question. When the concepts used by 
lenders are considered in the overall context of the investment and venture assessment 
literature, it becomes apparent that they do not use any unique set of assessment 
concepts. In view of thkY what is the underlying assessment model? The second study 
considers this question through the application of a model based on attribution theory- 
The goal is to provide insight into what leads a venture to be accepted or rejected, as 
well as what may differentiate investor groups- Specifically, if it is assumed that an 
assessor is initial& neutral to a venture, what 'drives' it to become accepted or 
rejected? In terms of tool creation, this has implications for understanding how 
assessment information is king interpreted as it is acquired, and hence, how to 
structure potential decision aids. 
While the fïrst two studies strive to understand the decision process of experts, 
the third study retunis to the initial objective and explores the second issue posed in 
Figure 1.1. Wbar parameters determine the success or fidure of early-stage, 
technology-based ventures? Although the prior studies provide usehl Lzormation, 
two issues remain. First, why can dif5erent experts use different assessment criteria 
sets and be equally successful? Second, how can the decision process be improved? 
In study three, rather than simply searching for more success factors, a model- 
based b e w o r k  is explored. This is a departure fiom an approach based on 
empirically drrived, aggregated success criteria. Instead, it attempts to understand 
very early-stage ventures as cornplex emergent systems and what constraints are in 
play as it evolves. Consideration of what makes such a system 'viable' leads to an 
assessment h e w o r k  with potential as a fiiture decision aid. 
As study three is specifically concemed with model- and theory-development, 
an important issue is internal validity. Thus, initial model validation is undertaken 
through a series of experiments. The first two experiments seek to h d  support for 
model concepts among assessoe. The next three examine the predictive validity and 
inter-expert r e l i a b i .  through the assessment of several cases. Again, the number of 
participants is selected to reflect a typical assessrnent team. This is an important 
consideration since application of these tools is not undertaken by a population 
permitting larger empincal stuclies. Thus the important issues of how the Eamework 
is used and agreement among members are not lost. 
Chapter 2 
Literature Review 
Increasingly, banks and other financiai institutions are faced with the problem 
of assessing ventures having a hi& level of intangible assets. Tradaionally the focus 
when assessing a new venture has b e n  on its financial attributes, typically 
examination of the proposed balance sheet and predicted cash flows. The various 
ratios that may be emplo yed in this analysis focus on the venture's assets and overall 
£hancial situation. In the case of new knowledge-based ventures, however, these 
financial indicators have a very high level of arnbiguity and uncertainty, and as such 
the assessment is often Little more than a guess. 
2.1 Venture Assessrnent Techniques - Current Practices 
Venture assessment may be viewed as a multiple criteria decision problem in 
which an opportunity is evaluated against a set of criteria. There are a wide range of 
methods and techniques that may be employed in the evaluation and selection of 
investments. As dirmssed by Schilling and Hill (1 998), these techniques range fkom 
informal, based largely on the analyst's experience, to highly quantitative. 
Methods such as net present value (NPV) provide a concrete financial 
estimate of the potentid investment that can facilitate plaMing and trade-off 
decisions. A difficulty with this type of approach when utilkd as an investment- 
planning tool is that it tends to fàvour platform or derivative products (Schilling and 
Hill, 1998). As a result, there can be a bias against advanced research and 
development or breakthrough technology projects. This tends to preclude investment 
in fùture products or ventures that have high potential payback. 
Some research suggests (e.g.: Schilling and HiIl, 1998) that investment 
decisions based on a cal1 option approach may be more suitable for high uncertainty 
project or venture investment decisions. Using a stock market analogy, the investor is 
essentially buying a right to exploit a technology in the hture if it becomes valuable. 
As pointed out by Schilling and Hill (1998), while it may provide a usefül fiamework 
for evaluating investment alternatives, it bis shortcornings. It is based on the 
assumption that the investor can acquire and retain the option at a relativety low cost. 
Therefore, for an incremental investment the uncertainty can be lowered sufficiently 
to detennine the eventual viability and market potential of the technology or venture. 
In the case of a venture, however, this may not be possible and may requke a large 
investment to detennine the technological viability. Hence, if the venture technology 
is found not to be viable then the investment is lost. 
A fbrther difficuky is the assumption that the option can be exercised 
(Schilling and Hill, 1998). This rnay be especially problematic in emerging 
technologies where there is significant uncertainty and new technologicd trajectories 
may still be emerging. The potential risk is that by the t h e  the venture technology 
has been developed to the point that it is commercially viable it cm be locked out of 
its target market, resulting in the loss of the investment. This barrier may r e d t  fiom 
the switching cost associated with competing technologies that have estabLished 
themselves (Porter, 199 1 ; Schilling and Hill, 1998). 
Typically, the venture assessment process occurs in stages that c m  be defïned 
by their the-scaies. Initidly a venture proposal will be screened in a matter of 
minutes. This assessment is performed at a relatively high level and generally results 
in a y e s h  acceptheject type of decision Venture proposais that are accepted for 
M e r  assessment rnay next be assessed in a period of hours. In this case the venture 
is examined in more detail before acceptance or rejection. The final stage of 
assessment takes piace in a period of days and weeks. This stage often includes a . 
signincant level of research and 'due diligence'. 
A key consideration when evaluatïng a venture's investment potential is its 
risk (Souder, 1983; McNamara and Bromiley, 1993). Determining the risk associated 
with a venture is a complex topic, with the major issue often king the identification 
of sources of relevant risk. Often confused with the concept of uncertainty, risk is the 
state in which likelihoods of hown alternative outcornes can be specified. 
Uncertainty, on the other hand, is the state in which neither the outcornes nor the 
likelihoods of their occurance are known. In terms of venture assessment, risk is often 
taken to be the venture's probabihty of fàiiure, and is often reflected in measures such 
as the anticipated M i m e  profits versus the probability of acbievment. 
As discussed by. Souder (1983), distinguishing between a good and bad 
investment or lending opportunity depends on the availability of valid and reliable 
data conceming the potential of the proposed ideas. Given that data are available to 
the decision-maker, several statistical approaches have been put forward to aid in the 
decision process, such as regressim and discriminant analysis, cluster aaalysis (e.g.: 
Seaver and Kostas, 1992) and data envelopment analysis (e.g.: Camm and Downs, 
1992; ReWaff-Roberts, 1992; Talluri and Sarkis, 1997). Of these approaches, 
discriminant and regression approaches are the most prevalent and are examined 
M e r .  
2.11 Discriminant and Regression Models 
Perhaps the most common statistical approach for the d y s i s  of lending and 
investment data with the goal of providing assessment tools is through the application 
- - *  
of regression analysis and discriminant models. 
Discriminant analysis may be either a statistical or a non-parametric h e a r  
programming technique and has the objective of classiQing an observation into one 
of several possible groups (e.g.: Aftifi and Clark, 1990; RetzlafT-Roberts, 1992; 
Zikmund, 1994). In the case of loan evaluation, the objective may be to classi@ a 
potential loan into different risk chsses or into acceptance or rejection groups. The 
goal of discriminant analysis is to identify a set of factor weights that will m i .  
the amount of misclassification given a data set for which the membership in the 
classification groups is knowe The resulting fàctor weights can then be used to 
predict to which classification goup a new entity will belong (Retzlaff-Roberts, 
1992). 
Much research has been conducted on new venture evaiuation models, 
especidy in the areas of credit and loan risk (e.g.: W i n ,  1992; McNamara and 
Bromiley, 1993). The vast majority of these models focus on determining if the 
venture is a good credit risk, or if it has a high likelihood of bankruptcy. In addition, 
as discussed by McNamara and Bromiley several models have been developed which 
a t t e q t  to ident* when a small business loan may be deteriorating, rather than 
determining possible banhptcy. 
Development of these models requires access to a large database of historical 
records concerning the characteristics of the business and the state of the venture at 
the time the mode1 was developed. In essence these models attempt to predict the 
likelihood of a fùture outcorne based on past experiences (WiLkinson, 1992). In 
discrimbnt and regression models, the state of the firm is most often described in 
temis of a success or Mure, based on some predetermined set of criteria. For 
exarnple, fàhe of a smal l  business loan could be defhed in terms of the number of 
loan payment periods that the borrower is delinquent. 
An example of this type of assessrnent tool is the Small and Medium-sized 
Enterprise Assessrnent Model developed by McNamara and Bromiley (1 993). It 
consists of six financial metrics: prontability, cash flow, iiquidity, leverage, collateral 
margin, and size. Of particular interest when viewed fiom the perspective of assessîng 
knowledge-intensive enterprises is the operational dennit ion of these rnetrics. Each 
requires measurement of the venture's total assets, which is problematic in these 
ventures. 
A complication in the development of these models is that they are prone to 
selection effects ( M c N a ~ ~ r a  and Bromiley, 1993). Contributhg to this is the lack of 
data fkom ventures which were initially rejected or who have ended their relationship 
with the financial institution before the end of the model development period. 
Additional difficulties may arïse fiom concepts such as the definitions of 'good' and 
%ady ri&, differences within the set of ventures, and small  shifts in the 
characteristics population over time (Wilkinson, 1992). As c m  be easily seen, the 
statistical approach may encounter difficdties when dealing with new knowledge 
enterprises, because of the rapidly changing economic environment and relatively 
srnall database. 
2.1.2 Intelligent Systems 
Another potential source of venture assessment tools is through the 
application of intelligent systems. These include expert systems (e.g. : Bouwman, 
1983; Firebaugh, 1989; Gonzalez and Dankel, 1993; Liberatone and Styliarou, 19951, 
fllzzy systems (e.g.: Hnischka, 1988; Chen and Hwang, 1992; Kosko, 1992; Duna, 
1993; Cox, 1994) and neural networks (e.g.: Nelson and Ihgwoah,  1991; Kosko, 
1992; Lin and Lee, 1996; Li et al., 1997). As discussed by Khurgin and Polyakov 
(1 98S), expert methods are ofien used when dealing with complex decision problems 
with high levels of uncertainty. Several expert system tools have been proposed for 
application in venture assessment. 
Liang (1 992) describes an example of the application of intelligent systems 
for bankruptcy prediction In his work, he compared the relative performance of an 
expert system implementation based on a data set to the performance of a 
discriminant model and a neural network using backward propagation. In this case it 
was found that the expert system implementation performed marginally better than 
the other appro aches, correctly ident-g the bankruptcy cases approximately 8 0% 
of the time. 
2.2 Tecbnology Evolution 
As discussed by Henderson (1 Wl), the evolutionary theory of ventures has 
similarities to population evohtion models in mathematical biology. These models 
have their ongins in the work of Gause during the 1930s (Henderson, 1991), and 
demonstrated that in a constrained resource environment, organisms of the same 
species would eventually become extinct. Further, when organisms compte for 
resources, one will eventually displace the other. If: however, the species were 
complementary then they wodd both survive. In an enviromnent in which one 
species has a local competitive advantage over another competing for the same 
resources, the orgdsm having the advantage should prevail It is easy to see the 
p d e l s  to the business environment. 
This work on evolution leads to the concept of variety (Beer, 1985; 
Henderson, 1991). In essence the richer the environment, the greater the number of 
potential outcornes or states and the greater the areas of differentiation and hence 
competitive advantage. This leads to the concept of business strategy, without which 
the development of ventures would follow the path of D e a n  evolution 
@encierson, 1991). In this view of a k m ' s  evolution, natural selection operates as 
poorly aligned firms will be eliminated and the mest fkms will be the best 
performers (Lefebvre et al., 1996). As further discussed by Lefebvre et al. (1996), 
hrms operate in dynamic and turbulent extemal environments and must continuously 
adapt to these circu~zlsfances if they are to remain viable. An implication arising fiom 
the evolutionary theory of the firm is that the ability to adapt and survive in its 
environment is a fiinction of past experience. 
Ventures tend to be more successfùl when they enter markets that are in the 
early high growth stages of evolution (Ho fer and Sandberg, 1987). Possible reasons 
for this including less intense competition and the ability to recover fiom strategy 
experimentation. One fàctor that has the potefitial to greatly influence the stability of 
these evolving markets is new technologies and the Pace of technological 
development (Robert and Mayer, 199 1 ; Norton and Bass, 1993). Technology-based 
ventures faced with rapid advancement of their product technologies, and hence very 
high rates of new product introduction, must commit significant resources to research 
and product development to remain viable (Roberts and Mayer, 1991). 
There are two major components of technological evolution that are acting on 
the venture and its markets: technological diaision and substitution Technological 
diffusion may be defineci as how a technology is adopted over time while substitution 
is how it displaces the curent technologies (Norton and Bass, 1993). In their research 
into technological evolution and the impacts of displacement and substitution in high- 
tech markets, Norton and Bass (1993) examine how new technologies take over the 
demand fiom earfier generations. In their model the new generation will eventually 
drive the sales of the earlier technology generation below its level of sustainability. 
However, at the time of introduction, the earlier technology will continue to 
experience growth for some period as diffusion occurs and then it will begin king 
displaced. 
Technological Decomposition Theory examines the evolution of a product or 
techno logy fiom the 'inside-out' through examination of the constituent technologies. 
In his discussion of technologicd decomposition theory, Hilbrink (1990) identifies 
three characteristics of technologicd change. These are initial effects, rnanufacturing 
constituents and the concavity of tecbnological change. The initial ef5ect of 
technological change is to create a short period in which the rate of change is high 
This is followed by a comparatively long period in which the rate of change slows to 
a more or l e s  constant rate. The third characteristic discussed by Hilbrink (1990) is 
the 'concavity' of technological change. This reIates to the rate of change of 
technological change, which slows over time. 
As described by Hilbrink (1990), research has found that there are periods 
during which fields of techno logy develop rapidly, often including discontinuities 
where one technological trajectory has been abandoned in favour of another. 
Examination of these periods of rapid technological change indicates that they occur 
when technology constituents improve simdtaneously. 
2.2.1 Venture Evolutioa 
Bell (1991) desmbes the evolution of new ventures as having five 
£undamental stages: concept, seed, product development, market development, and 
finally steady state. Further, these evolutionary stages of ventures may be grouped 
into three p h e s :  formulation, development and deployment. During the formulation 
phase the venture attempts to match the perceived oppomuiities fiom a technology 
with perceived market needs. Having defïned a product concept, the venture must 
make the transition fiom a concept into a viable product for market deployment. 
At this phase, the product concept must be defined sdficiently so that 
development can begh This implies that the objectives and requirements of the 
product must be clearly specined. If there is signiocant uncertninty and ambiguity in 
these requirements, a high potential for development faitme may be expected. This is 
also the stage where many startup ventures seek inves?or financing, and at which 
si@cant levels of resources begin to be allocated. As the venture moves into the 
deployment stage, another transition occurs. Now the dominant focus becomes the 
venture's abiiity to successfully manufacture and support the new product in its target 
market. 
2.3 New Venture Success 
While many tools are employed in the assessrnent process, the issue of what 
factors are important to new venture success must be considered. Several researchers 
have examined the criteria leading to new venture success (e-g.: Hofer and Sandberg, 
1987; Ayal, 1990; Somebom and Wilemon, 1990; Roberts and Mayer, 1991; 
Meldnim and Miliman, 1991 ; Slatter, 1992; Bell and McNamara, 1993; Hall and 
Hofer, 1993; Baldwin, 1995; Shepherd, 1999). 
Meldnim and Millman (1991) examined the problems and risks associated 
with marketing new 'high-tech' products, while Slatter (1992) examined factors 
contributhg to the high fidure rate among 'high-tech' startups. Bell and McNamara 
(1993) identified several key dimensions that should be considered when assessing 
the viability these types of startups. Hall and Hofer (1993) examined the various 
critena that venture capitalist consider when making investment decisions concerning 
these ventures, while Baldwin (1 995) discussed the role of innovation in the success 
of small ventures. 
As discussed by Sonneborn and Wilemon (1990), it is common for high-tech 
ventures t9 direct a si@cant hction of their resources towards developing interna1 
expertise and building a stmng technical foundatioa According to Roberts and Meyer 
(1 99 l), the best oppomuiity for venture growth cornes through the development of a 
critical mass of engineering talent related to a core technology. This rnay result in the 
development of a distinctive area of cornpetence that rnay evolve to provide the 
venture with a sustainable cornpetitive advantage and become the basis of fbture 
product development. The foundat ion for compet itive advantage in techno logy-based 
ventures ofien occurs very early in their development (Slatter, 1992). It is the focus 
on a single technology or a group of closely related technologies that results in the 
development of areas of excellence, coqetencies, and an understanding of its 
markets, the basis for the creation of core cornpetencies (Prahalad and Hamel, 1992). 
2.3.1 Entrepreneurs 
When examining the creation and success of new small ventmes, the role of 
the entrepreneur must be considered. Some consider the characteristics of the 
entrepreneur to be among the most important fàctors to be considered when assessing 
the potential for success of a new venture (e.g.: Hofer and Sandberg, 1989). As 
discussed by Kassicieh et al. (1997), there are three major schools of thought 
conceming entrepreneurs: traits, environmentai and behavioral. 
The first of these schools, the traits approach, attempts to identify potential 
entrepreneurs through the personality traits of the individual. The attri'butes that are 
considered include locus of control ambigu@ tolerance, risk attitudes, and the need 
for achievement. This approach has generally been unproductive, however some of its 
proponents argue that it has relevance when applied to specifïc subsets of 
entrepreneurs (Hofer and Sandberg, 1987; Kassicieh et aL, 1997). 
The second school, the environmental approach, includes issues such as the 
entrepreneur's fàmily background, experience and educational characteristics. Here 
the propensity to become an entrepreneur is considered to be a function of the 
individual's environment. Fn other words, situational effects have aa impact on 
entrepreneurShip. 
The third school of thought, behavioral, is derived fiom social psychology 
research into the relat ionship between attitudes and behavior of individuals. Issues 
that are examined fiom this perspective include initiative, self-confidence and 
persistence. One area where this approach has had success is in the examination of 
teclmical versus non-technical entrepreneurs (Kassicieh et aL, 1 997). 
As discussed by Ho fer and Sandberg (1 987), environmental and psychological 
factors focus on trying to predict who will become an entrepreneur, while behavioural 
factors attempt to explain the success of entrepreneurs. Further, some research has 
found that many demographic or environmental factors were poor predictos of 
venture success even though they were indicators of who may attempt a venture. The 
primary link to new venture success appears to be related to behavior (Hofer and 
Sandberg, 1987). Specincally, the ability to recognize needs of a changing 
environment, the motivation to act, abiïty to take effective action based on 
perceptions and the ability to motivate others are critical attributes of a successfid 
entrepreneur. 
2.4 New f roduct Success 
The product is possibly the most important factor contributing to the success 
of a new high-tech venture (Bell and McNamara, 2993). Therefore, the factors that 
lead to new product success may be viewed as synonymous with new venture 
success. Simply stated, without a viable product there cannot be a viable venture. 
Robeas and Mayer (1991) point out that new ventures that focus their new products 
as an extension of a single core techology are more Iikely to be successful than more 
diverse ventures. In the case of very s d  technology-based ventures, this focus 
becomes even more important (Sonneborn and Wilemon, 1990). A wlnerability that 
can arise due to this level of focus is "technological myopia", where the individuals in 
the venture fàil to recognize emerging oppominities or tbreats. To cornter this, it is 
important that the venture has an ability to maintain an exterrd view and 
technological "intelligence". This leads to the concepts of boundary sparming and 
absorptive capacity (Cohen and Levinthal, 1990). 
Cooper (1988, 1993) has wntten extensively on the new product development 
process and the factors that are important for new product success. Many other 
researchers have investigated the factors which lead to successfùl new products (e.g.: 
Cooper and Kleinschmidt, 1987; Cooper and Kleinscbmidt, 1988; Johne and Snelson, 
1988; Wind and Mahajan, 1988; Ayal and Raban, 1990; Shilhg and Hill, 1998; 
Sobek et al., 1998; Ozer, 1999). Further, as the ventures of interest in this research are 
dependent on the success of their product or s e ~ c e  for sumival, financial niccess 
may be assumed to be the dominant success metric (Bell and McNamara, 1991, 
Astebro and Bernhardt, 1995). 
A wide range of factors effecting the success of new products and new 
ventures have been discussed in the literature (e.g. : White, 1978; Johne and Snelson, 
1988; Cooper, 1988; Wind and Uahagan, 1988; Roberts, 1991; Benson et aL, 1993; 
Schilling and Hill, 1998; Calantone et aL, 1 999). As discussed by di Benedetto (1994) 
in his review of the NEWPROD research program (Cooper, 1986; Cooper and 
Kleinschmidt, 1987; Cooper, 1993), prominent among the critical success fàctors in 
new product development are the technological and marketing synergy between the 
proposed product and the fkm. 
In his discussion of new product evaluation, White (1978) looked at the 
concept of technological potential. White began by posing a set of questions 
concerning the nature of the technoiogical limitations that the innovation had 
removed or lessened. Next, the analysis focuses on the technology required to utilize 
the innovation effectively and e fficiently - Finally, issues reiated to the innovat ion's 
profit potential, market dynamics and impact on the consumer are examined. 
AS discussed by Schilling and Hill (1998), the creation of a viable product 
requires the venture to assemble a set of assets which includes direct technicd 
knowledge, complementary technical knowledge, market knowledge, manufacturing 
knowledge and financial ability. 
2.5 Project Success Factors 
In addition to the research into the fàctors that lead to the success of new 
ventures and products, another aspect of these ventures must be considered. Not only 
are the fàctors that may influence the future success of the venture's product 
important, so too are the steps comprishg the execution of the product development 
project. Several authors (e-g.: Slevin and Pinto, 1988; Pinto and Mantel, 1990, 
Cooper, KG. 1993; Kumar et al., 1996; Salachandm and Friar, 1997) have discussed 
the factors that c m  result in project success or Mure. 
A review of project / product success studies undertaken by Balachaxidta and 
Friar (1997) found that they tend to be non-uniform in their findings and in some 
cases are contradictory. For example, some studies found that an innovative product 
had a greater chance of success while other studies indicated that this had a greater 
chance of Mure. They argue that this difference is due to missing context variables 
associated with the innovation, market and technology information reiated to many of 
the success factors in these studies. 
2.6 The Rote of Synergy and Core Cornpetence 
From this discussion, a major problem when assessing venture potential 
becomes apparent. Successfbl deployment of an emerging technology, and hence 
venture success, is dependent on the venture's ability to manage and support that 
technology successfullyY In the case where the technology is either largely knowledge 
itself, or utilinng technologies requiring specialized knowledge, the issue becomes 
one of management of knowledge assets within the venture. This is complicated by 
the diaculties inherent in the memement  of a venture's laiowledge assets and 
developing strategies for its successful management. 
A key assessment area then is that of synergy, the extent to which the 
organization has the requisite skills to develop and provide its products and or 
services successfùliyY Effective new product development seeks to capitalize on 
synergies, or goodness-of-fit, among the skills and technologies possessed by the fïrm 
(Wind and Maharjan, 1988). As observed by Cooper and Kleinschmidt (1987), 
synergy is critical for achieving hancial success Ki new product development, and 
therefore may be considered to be a critical success factor for a new startup venture. 
Since synergy is related to the extent to which an organization has the skills, 
talents and resident knowledge required for successful development and marketing of 
its product, it can be thought of as describing the competencies of the venture. As 
ventures become more knowledge-intensive, the influence of these synergies, 
especidy those related to the technological competence of the enterprise, become 
more important M e r  accenting the shortfidl of traditional assessment metrics. This 
leads us to consider the concept of core competence described by Prahalad and Hamel 
(1 990). 
For a venture to remain viable in the long-tem it must be continualIy 
adapting and evolving Îts products. A venture that fails to do this is the proverbial 
'one-trick pony' and bas no long-term viability. As discussed by Prahalad and Hamel 
(1990), it is the core competence of the firm that facilitates this adaptation and 
generation of a continuing stream of new products. Further, as the venture's areas of 
core competence strengthen, so does 3s abiiity to estimate dong the market-product 
dimensio IL 
2.7 Intellectual Capital and Absorptive Capacity 
M e n  considering the assessrnent of technology-based ventures that are 
knowledge-intensive, the measurement of howledge assets has been ident ified as a 
major problem area This l a d s  to the issue of intellechial capitaL 
Two general categones of inteilectual capital can be identifïed in a fkm 
human and structural (Stewart, 1994). Human intellechial capital provides the source 
of innovation and renewal for the finn, while structural intellecm capital turns 
Imow-how into a property of the organization. The basis of human capital is the 
howledge and skiils possessed by the finn, and how they are used (Stewart, 1991). 
This knowledge may take many forms, ùicluding; patents, processes, management 
skills, technologies, information about customers and supplies, and ex@ence. 
Structural intellectual capitai, on the other han& may include information systems, 
knowledge of market channels, and management focus. S t m M  capital is important 
in the long term, as it amplifies the value of the human capital by providing a 
fiamework for the h to put ideas to work and can be used repeatedly to create 
value (Stewart, 1 994). 
Absorptive capacity is the ability of a fjrm to recognize the value of new, extemal 
information, assimilate it, and apply it to commercial ends. Thus it is critical to its 
innovative capabilities (Cohen and Levinthal, 1990). This ability is largely a fûnction 
of the W s  level of prior related knowledge, and is a critical component of the 
venture's innovative capabilities. Pnor knowledge includes basic skills, knowledge of 
the rnost recent scient& or technological developments in a given field or even a 
shared language. As a result, prior related knowledge provides an ability to recognize 
the value of new information, assimilate it, and apply it. This is essential if the 
venture is to be able to understand and evaluate technological advances tbat WU 
impact its viability. Further, it provides a basis for predicting the potential trajectones 
of these advances. 
Research into the cognitive structures and memory development of individuals 
suggests that accumulated prior knowledge increases both the ability to put new 
knowIedge into memory, knowledge acquisition, and it enhances the ability to recaU 
and use information (Cohen and Levinthal, 1990; Steers, 1991). Further, memory 
development is self-reinforcing in that the more objects and patterns stored the more 
readily new information about these concepts is acquifed. As a result, the breadth of 
categories into which prior knowledge is organized, the differentiation of those 
categories and the linkages across them permit individuals to make sense of and in 
turn acquire new knowledge. Further, prior knuwledge and skîü is an important 
component of creativity, permitting associations and linkages that may not have been 
considered before. 
At the organizational level absorptive capacity depends on the capacities of the 
individual members, and tends to develop curnulatively. However, a £irm's abscirptive 
capacity is not simply the sum of the absorptive capacities of its employees. 
Absorptive capacity also depends on the environment-organization and interna1 
communications structures. To fully understand absorptive capacity at the 
organizational level the character and distribution of expertise within the 
orga-tion must be understood (Cohen and Levinthai, 1990). 
Communications cannot be disentangled fiom the distribution of expertise in the 
organization, as s h e d  knowledge and expertise are essential for communications 
(Cohen and Levinthai, 1990). However, there may be a trade-off in the efficiency of 
i n t e d  communication with respect to the ability to assimilate and exploit 
informat ion. While sharing a specialized commo n language facilitates effective 
communications within the venture, it may result in the inabJIity to tap into diverse 
e ~ e d  knowledge sources. This rnay result when an intemal language, coding 
scheme, or particular body of expertise becomes nifnciently overlapping and 
specialized that it irnpedes the incorporation of extemal knowledge. A common 
manifestation of this is the so-called 'Wot-hvented-Here" Syndrome. Therefore, 
while some overlap in knowledge is necessary for comunications, there are benefits 
in diversity of knowledge structures, especially regarding the organization's capacity 
for innovat ion 
As discussed, absorptive capacity is not resident in any single ùidividual, but 
depends on the linkages across the capabilities of the individuais within the fïrrc~ The 
ideal knowledge structure for an organizational sub-unit should reflect ody partial 
overlapping knowledge complemented by non-overlapping diverse knowledge 
(Cohen and Levinthal 1990). Therefore there is a trade-off between knowledge 
diversity and commonality across individuals. At the extreme, very-high knowledge 
comrnonality and reduced diver*, may have a negative impact on communications, 
both within and external to the organization, as well as the organization's capacity to 
be innovative. Further, some amount of redundancy in expertise may be desirable in 
order to create cross-functional absorptive capacities. 
From this discussion of the importance of intelkctual capital, cornpetencies 
and absorptive capacity, it becomes apparent that when assessing ventures, expert 
decision making, and dealing with the high degree of intangible assets, will be key 
components. 
2.8 Expert Decision Making 
Many researchers have examined decision-making in terms of individuals 
(e.g.: Fischott; 1990; Kahneman and Tversky, 1990a; Kahneman and Tversky, 
1990b; Kahueman and Tversky, 1990c; Camerer and Johnson, 1991; Dorner and 
Scholkopc 1991; Mayer, 1992) and as groups (e.g.: Radford, 1977; Nuîî and Backoff; 
1986; Levine and Moreland, 1990; Prasad and Rubenstien, 1992). For example, 
Domer and Schokopf (1991), examined decisions associated with controlling 
complex systems, and discussed the role of cognitive mode1 development when 
determining a course of action When copiug with complex systems, the expert's 
ability to manage the information processing h o m e s  important (e-g.: Beer, 1985; 
Dorner and Scholkopc 1991) and may result in the phenomenon of "blocking out" 
information to reduce complexity. 
In their discussion of information processing, Sears et aI. (1988) define three 
stages; gathering information, deciding on the information's relevance, and 
integration of the information into a judgement. Each of these stages has the potential 
for bias, such as prior expectations. The net result of these biases is that the decision 
process may appear haphazard and irrati0na.L 
Another phenomenon often observed in decision-making is 'anchoring' (e.g. : 
Kahneman and Tversiq, 1990b; Cohen and Levinthal, 1990). #ahneman and Tversb 
(1990b) discuss the tendency for decision-makers to overlook distributional 
information and focus on case data instead. They then descri i  the use 'matching 
des ' ,  and suggest that intuitive predictions are generated as a result of matchmg a 
case's standing in a distribution of outcornes with its standing in a distribution of 
impressions. In other words, the anticipated outcome of an action will be based on 
how it relates to the decision-maker's pnor expenences. This leads to the concept of 
attribution and attribution theory. 
2.9 Assessrnent and Attribution 
Ultimately, the process of assessing a new venture results in a decision to 
invest or lend. While, as discussed, many tools and methods are avaiiable to aid in 
this decision process, in the end a practitioner must make a decision that may be very 
subjective. In essence this decision reflects an evduation of the potential for success 
or fàïlure of the venture, 
Attri'bution theory examines how people explain the causes of their own and 
other's behavior (e.g.: Gleitman, 1992). Simply stated, attil'butions are the 
explanation individuah generate to explain events such as success and failure. These 
attn'butions are based on the intemal cognitive mode1 of the person assigning the 
attribution. As these models are unique for each individüal, two people faced with the 
same information may act differently because they may attribute the potentiaI 
outcome to different factors. It can be seen that this has possible consequences for 
examining venture assessment. Specifically, two individuals, when provided 
information describing a venture will interpret this information and assign a unique 
expectancy of success or fidure to that venture. 
Many approaches have been put forward to explain an individual's behaviour 
(e.g.: Gleitman, 1992; Greenberg et ai., 1996). For example, one view maintains that 
a person's actions are the result of the present smiation's similarity to past 
expenences. From this perspective, actions are detennined e x t e d y ,  that is, they are 
reactions to extemal forces present in the individual's environment. In the case of 
decisions associated with new venture assessment, the decision may be strongly 
influenced by its sunilarity to past scenarios and priniarily influenced by factors 
external to the venture. 
A related view of behaviour is social leaming theory (e.g.: Gleitman, 1992). 
As discussed by Gleitman, this maintains that an individual's actions are a fùnction of 
both personality traits and situational factors. As a resuit, the factors influencing the 
decision-der ' s actions include cornpetencies, encoding strategies, and 
expectancies. In this h e w o r k ,  cornpetencies are the abilities possessed by the 
decision-maker (Gleitman, 1992). They are the 'kinds of things a person can do and 
understand'. 
Encoding strategies are how an individual interprets a situation and are a 
function of the individual's prior knowledge and experiences (e.g.: Gleitman, 1 992). 
Expectancies are the causal relationships perceived by the decision-maker. In t e m  of 
venture assessrnent, they are the perceived causal relationships between various 
concepts and the venture's potential success or Mure. As with the encoding 
strategies, these causal relationships are also a function of the decision-maker's pnor 
knowledge and experiences. Related to this is the assignment of values to the 
concepts or factors believed to be causal to süccess or fidure. Often, these values are 
not easily expressed as numerical values. Rather, they can only be expressed by the 
decision-maker iinguistically and are subjective in nature (e.g.: Wivschka, 1988; 
Kacpnyk and Fed- 1988; Gleitman, 1992; Dutta, 1993; Zedah, 1993). 
Another important aspect of social leaming theory is the perceived control an 
individual has over the situation (e.g.: Greenberg et al., 1996). This leads to the 
concepts of interna1 and external control. Externd control relates to the influence 
factors that are not under the individual's control have on an outcome. Interna1 control 
on the other hand relates to the degree of perceived influence the individual has on 
the outcorne. In terms of attributhg success or failure, a high level of perceived 
external control wouid imply that the outcome was the result of factors outside the 
individual's influence. A high level of perceived interna1 control hdicates that the 
individual perceived the outcome to be a result of the person's actions and abilities. 
Therefore, a key issue is whether to attribute the cause of a given behavior to intemal 
States or external conditions. 
A related issue is whether the cause of a given behaviour is stable or unstable 
(e.g.: Gleitman, 1992). Stabihty describes whether the factor is temporary or 
permanent. In other words, is the cause stable or changing over tirne? If an outcome is 
perceived to be the result of a stable cause then the outcome will be expected to 
reoccur, 
When considering the attribution process, several sources of error and bias 
must be considered Among these, and perhaps most relevant when considering the 
assessment of new ventures, is the tendency to rate intemal factors higher than 
external factors. This is the so-cailed fiindamental attriiution error, and leads to a 
tendency to under estimate the potential impact of situational factors (Gleitman, 1992; 
Greenberg et al., 1996). Further, as discussed by Gleitman, this tendency to under 
estirnate the importance of situational factors only occurs when trying to understand 
the behaviour of others. 
Abraham et ai. (1 988) proposed a simple, illustrafive model of attribution 
dynamics to examine an individual's behaviour, for example mood, consisting of a 
state space definhg the individual's 'decision' state. Abraham (1988) defines 
attri'bution as behavioural motivation that is dependent upon the expectancy of 
success or Mure. While this model was conceived to describe an individual's 
behaviour, it provides the inspiration for a slmilar view of venture assessment. 
Extended to venture assessor decisions, investment or lending behaviour may be 
viewed as the result of the decision-maker's expectancy of venture success or Mure. 
This expectancy is based on the subjective values assigned to concepts, represented as 
decision criteria, to which the decision-maker perceives a causal relationship with 
füture success. 
Abraham's proposed attribution model consists of two underlying state 
variables, intedization and specificity. Internaikation considers the degree to which 
the fàctors acting on the individual are perceived as internally or externally 
controlled. The specificity state variable has two constituent factors, situational 
specificity and information temporal stability. The fïrst of these, situational specificity 
concenis the specific-global aspects of attribution. The issue here is whether the 
attriiution factor is considered by the decision-maker to be applicable in a glsbaI 
sense to all cases, or whether there are a high degree of situation specific attributes. 
Therefore, the greater the perceived global applicability of a concept to the decision 
problem, the higher the perceived situationai specincity. 
In the case of information temporal stabïlity, the concern is whether the 
factors to which success or failure is k i n g  attriiuted wiU change over tirne. 
Therefore, a factor that is considered to be stable is expected to continue to impact the 
potential success or Mure of the venture. An unstable fàctor however, may be 
expected to change over time and as such increases decision uncertainty. Further, 
stability innuences both interna1 and extemal attribution factors (Abraham, 1988). 
These proposed variables, Figure 2.1, define the decision-maker state-space. 
As such, the decision-maker's date at any moment is described by the perceived 
quantity of each state-variable. As previously discussedy it is urneasonable to expect 
that any two decision-&ers will react in the same way to a set of information 
inputs. To account for this, Abraham (1988) introduces a control or moderator 
variable in addition to the state variables. Abraham identifies several potential 
moderator variables that may be introduced, such as individual and cultural bias, self 
confidence and risk aversion. 
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When assessing ventures at the end of the concept stage or early in the 
development stage, a key objective is to estimate its potential to successfully reach 
the market introduction stage. Further, it is at this point in a venture's evolution that 
the development of its areas of future core competence begins (Slatter, 1992). While 
it may have access to the techwlogy and knowledge that will eventually become the 
foundation of these competencies, they have not yet been integrated in such a way as 
to be t d y  a competency. 
In a macro sense, the objective of a venture is to convert inputs into a desired 
set of outputs or products. The continued effectiveness and efficiency of this 
conversion process is closely related to the ability of the venture to develop 
competencies in key aspects of the conversion process and to evolve and adapt these 
areas of competency as its environment changes. When viewed fiom this perspective, 
the issue when assessing the potential of a new teclmology-based venture becomes 
one of determining ifthe venture system is viable. 
2.10 Complexity Theory 
The traditional approach to understanding complex systems has been to 
understand individual system components and then to try understanding how- they 
work as a group (e.g.: Jenkins and Bella, 1993). When dealing with very complex 
systems, this approach has often had poor resdts (Jenkins and Bella, 1993; 
Rodeim, 2994). For example, no matter how much effort is expended in 
understanding the individual behaviour of an investor, the overd performance of the 
stock market is still extremely difKïcult to modeI. A recent approach to dealing with 
very complex systems is complexity theory (e.g.: Jenkins and Bella, 1993; 
Roetzheim, 1994), which de& with groups of interacting entities and has its roots in 
chaos and dynamic systems theory. 
As discussed by Roetzheim (1994), complexity theory may be defined as the 
study of emergent behaviour exhibited by interacting components operating at the 
threshold of stability and chaos. In other words, there is a region in which system 
behaviour can be modelled and predicted with a reasonable degree of accuracy. This 
system behaviour is typically referred to as stable, while at the other extreme are 
systems whose behaviour is completely chaotic and unpredictable. Complex systerns 
may exhibit complicitted behaviour that is often surprishg or unpredictable, referred 
to as emergent behaviour. 
A system that exhibits stable behaviour within a certain range of parameters 
and chaotic behaviour is said to have phases. The system transition fiom stable to 
chaotic is often where emergent behaviour is exhibited, and can be described as 
complex (Roetzheim, 1994). Once reached, this emergent behaviour can be quite 
predictable. As discussed by Roetzheim, complex systems often do not exist in this 
state by 'choice'. M e r ,  the systern exists in this state beîween stability and chaos 
due to the complex interaction of intemal and environmental factors. 
Further, an overall understanding of the structure of a complex system is not 
necessary to uniderstand emergent behaviour of a systexn M e r  it may be understood 
and modelled based on a relatively small number of d e s  describing the interaction of 
system components (Roehheim, 1994). This has important implications for the 
understanding of venture evolution and assessment. Rather than modelling ail of the 
intricacies of the venture and how it interacts with its environment, a simpler rule- 
based approacb, as used by assessment experts, has great potential- 
2.11 Viability Theory and Venture Assessrnent 
As discussed by Jenkins and Bella (1993), socio-technical systems geaerally 
cannot be effectively modelled as hea r  systems. In the case of venture evolution 
there is a complex system of intemal and external interactions. Activities associated 
with the venture must be viewed as occurring within a dynamic web of information 
and resource transfer that exhibits the characteristics of self-organilation and cbaos 
(Jenkins and Bella, 1993). As such, ventures are inherently unstable, and M e r ,  
when taking a cornplexity theory view of venture development it can be seen that if 
the venture t d y  reaches a stable state, that is no changes are occurring within the 
system, then the venture may be considered to be non-fiinctional, i.e. dead. On the 
other han& if the venture system is operating completely randomly, with no 
identifiable behaviour pattern then it is completely chaotic and is invariably headed 
for destruction. 
From this perspective, venture assessment d e r i a  are attempting to judge 
whether a venture is likely to move into one of these regions, either death, chaos or 
profitability. The question of interest is whether the venture system wil l  move into a 
region of viable behaviour and stay there. Therefore, the problem of new venture 
assessment may be viewed as identification of the viability constraints and then 
determining ifthe venture as constituted is within a viable region 
To examine this question of system viability fbrther, Viabiiity Theoryl 
(Aubin, 1991) is considered. As described by Aubin (1991), viabdity theoiy is a 
mathematical theory that considers the evolution of macro-systems such as those 
arising in biology, econornics and non-linear control theory under uncertainty. 
Obviously, not every potential evolutionary trajectory for a system is possible. This is 
referred to as viability and as discussed by Aubin (1991) implies that the state of a 
system must obey comtraints called viability constraints. Therefore, to understand the 
evolution of a system and its potential for further evolution, these constraints must be 
understood. Viability theory provides a fiamework for understanding the connections 
between system dynamics and constraints in the selection of viable evdutions. 
Further, its theorems provide the basis for understanding the regulation processes or 
feedback that maintain viability or improve the state according to some preference 
relationships (Aubin, 199 1). 
For a more detailed diswsion of viability theory the reada is referred to A p p d i x  G. 
The systems typicdy considered within the viability theory fkamework have 
three basic characteristics (Aubin, 1991). The first characteristic is a non- 
deterministic engine of change providing several possible evolutionary trajectories. 
This means that at any instant there are several feasible evolutionary paths that 
depend on the state and possibly the previous history of the system up to that tune. As 
such, the concept of evolution in which f k u e  states can be predicted is no longer 
sufficient to mode1 system behaviour. Further, even if there are detenninistic 
mechaniSm existing within the system, they are ofien inherently unstable. 
The second viability characteristic is that there are constraints that the system 
must obey at each instant under a 'death penalty'. In other words, if the systern 
violates the constraints it wiU cease to exist. In the venture conte* this may be 
manifested as bankruptcy. 
The third characteristic is referred to as the inertia principle. System control 
govemed by the inertia principle results in changes to the system control only when 
system viability is threatened. Unlike optimal control theory (e-g.: Bajpai et al., 
1980), viability theory does not require a decision-maker to guide the system by an 
optimality criterion. In the optimal control paradigm, the choice of controls is not 
static, but can be changed at each instant to take into account possible changes in the 
system's environment. The inertia principle of viability theory states that the system 
controls are kept constant as long as viability of the system is not at stake. As long as 
the system state lies in the interior of the 'viability sett, dehned as the states satismg 
the viability constraints, any control strategy will work. As a r e d ,  the system can 
maintain the control inherited eom the past. As the state of a systern may evolve 
while the control remains constant, it may reach the boundary of the viability region 
with an outward velocity (Aubin, 1991). This event corresponds to a period of crisis 
during which the system must h d  a new control strategy such that the trajectory is 
forced back into the viabiïty set. If this is not possible, the system 'dies'. 
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It is quickly apparent tbat this describes the intemal controls of most ventures, 
which place a set of operating controls and periodically updated strategks in place. 
These processes and procedures are often only modified when it becomes apparent 
that the continued survival of the venture is at stake. Further, it is not uricommon for 
ventures to experience periods of 'crisis' as they evolve. Often at these points in tirne, 
the venture must make major changes to its management and control structure to 
survive and continue to grow. 
As pointed out by Aubin (1991), as long as the system remains within the 
viability region and therefore satisfies its viability constraints, any control strategy 
will work. This has interesthg implications for understanding the assessrnent of new 
ventures. Perhaps rnost interestingly, the question of how different assessment 
practitioners can use dif5erent sub-sets of criteria, drawn from the set of assessment 
criteria, when assessing a venture and still have a 'correct' or 'satisfactory' outcorne. In 
other words, this may answer the question: Why is there no optimal set of criteria that 
au experienced assessors use? 
Chapter 3 
Study 1: Cognitive Models of Lenders 
As discussed in the introductory chapter, this research consists of three shidies 
having the overall goal of advancing our understanding during the assessment of early- 
stage, technology-based ventures. In the first of these studies, the assessment behaviour 
of a group of lending experts is considered. Several researchers have examined the 
criteria (cg.:  Hd and Hofer, 1993; Bachher et aL, 1999) and the assessment process 
(e-g.: Hall and Hofer, 1993) of investors. The goal of this study is to explore the 
assessment process when considering lenders. To this end, as illustrated in Figure 3.1, the 
cognitive models of a group of lendiug experts are examined. In terms of decision aid 
development, these cognitive models will then become the basis for the creation of fuzzy 
cognitive maps (e.g.: Kosko, 1992). 
Figure 3.1 
Study I Issue Diagram 
3.1 Methodology 
As the goal is to examine the cognitive models of a small group of lending experts, 
open interviews with seed questions and content analysis were utilized (e-g.: Ericsson and 
Simon, 1984)'. Each i n t e ~ e w  began with a general discussion of venture characteristics 
and lending decisions, and concluded with the expert king asked to recall a specific 
lending decision that was fünded and one which was rejected. When discussing cases 
which were accepted or rejected, no specinc information ident-g the venture was 
requested, and the questioning sought to identm those characteristics and attributes 
which the expert considered most important in their decision 
The experts were senior lending officers, identined fkom C d i a n  bank Intemet 
sites as being involved in lending to knowledge-based ventures. They were subsequently 
contacted by email and then contacted by telephone to arrange a suitable interview t h e .  
In the case where more than one expert was located at a site, o d y  one was selected. This 
was done to ensure that there was no bias introduced due to contact between experts. 
Each i n t e ~ e w  began with a statement of the broad research objectives, an 
overview of the planned interview format and an initial questionnaire to obtain 
demographic information. In three cases the i n t e ~ e w  was tape-recorded with the 
permission of the expert; tapes were subsequently transcribed. The other two are based on 
notes, and in one case the majority of the interview was conducted via email and fax. 
This was required due to the availability and geographic location of the expert. During 
the interviews, questions (Appendix C) were posed to the experts to begin discussion As 
the interview proceeded and topics developed, fûrther questions were posed in response 
to statements by the expert to delve deeper into topics. Details of the initial questionnaire 
and interview seed questions may be found in Appendix C. 
The interview transcripts and notes were then andyzed, as indicated in Figure 3.2. 
Typically, the analysis begins with a transcript of a set of verbal utterances that have been 
Approval was obtained ffom the University of Waterloo Office of Himian Research. 
O btained through inte~ew sessions (e.g. : Bouwman, 1983; Waterman and Newell, 197 1 ; 
Ericsson and Simon, 1984; Olson and Biolsi, 1991). Through analysis of  these 
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3.1.1 Sample Size 
A question that arises when conducting interview-based research is: when is 
enough? Unlike conventional statistics, this issue is often difficult to determine. There are 
several issues that contribute to this decision, specifically information contribution fiom 
adding additional experts and the 'economics' of collecting and analyzing the information. 
Several researchers (e.g.: Dutta, 1993; G o d e z  and Dankel, 1993; Sandri et aL, 
1995) have considered this problem when in t e~ewing  during knowledge elicitation for 
expert system development. In temis of the lending decision, a single assessor, or at most 
a small team typically undertakes this. As suc4 the unit of adysis  at the outset is the 
individual expert. Further, the expertise of interest pertains to the assessment of very 
early-stage, pre-market introduction, technology-based ventures, limiting the number of 
experts available. It is therefore impractical to undertake studies requiring large samples. 
An additional constraint is the inteniew tirne available, fûrther restricting the data 
collection method. 
The overall goal of the knowledge acquisition process is to identw the concepts 
k ing  utilized by the lending experts and the apparent relationships between them. An 
approach that addresses some of the problems resulting fiom the data collection 
constraints is the use of fuzy cognitive maps (e.g.: Kosko, 1992; MacNeU et al., 1994; 
Kosko, 1997). 
A common problem when using tree structures to represent expert knowledge is 
that generally they cannot be combined. This problem increases with the number of trees 
to be combined and as pointed out by Kosko (1 992) creates the paradoxical situatim Ki 
which larger s q l e  sizes produce less reliable knowledge structures. An important 
attri'bute of fuzzy cognitive maps is that they may be aggregated (Kosko, 1992; Kosko, 
1997), thereby permitting the development of a consensus map using several potentially 
incomplete sources. As a result, two or more cognitive maps c m  be combined to produce 
a new aggregate2 map. 
Ii; this research, the 'stopping-de' employed is based on the concept of marginal 
return. In other words, as each interview is d y z e d ,  the n m k r  of new assessrnent 
concepts, and hence new information, is monitored This is expected to decrease (e.g.: 
Nielsen, 1994) and is considered sutncient when the number of new concepts identified 
is less than two. This is reïated to the economics of data collection and the scarcity of 
experts. Each i n t e ~ e w  takes a minimum of one hour of the expert's tirne, followed by 
several days  of d y s i s  time to transcribe, segment and code. Thus, as the number of new 
concepts drop, the retum on effort is also reduced. Based on the work of Nielsen (1994) 
the number of lending experts is expected to be five3. 
The second issue to consider is the impact of the nuxnber of experts on the 
aggregate fkzy cognitive map. If it is assumed that the experts have equal and complete 
credibility, credibility index ( C l )  of 1, then the impact of adding one more sample to an 
aggregate map may be assessed4. 
3.1.2 Expert Characteristics 
An important issue that must be addressed is the suitability, or 'credibility', of the 
i n t e ~ e w  experts (e.g.: Sandn et al, 1995). Determination of credibility is of interest 
2 Several aggregaticm methods may be considered, such as for example, mean or 'min plus mead or 
optimistic (mm) aggregation. 
A recent article by Nielsen (2000) furthe supports this number of experts. 
This is based on a simple simulation in which a set of 10 relatimships, each with a fiequency of 
occurrence fÏom 0.1 to 1.0, was n m  through 10 interviews. This was repeated 15 times with different 
dicitation patterns and the impact on weights and the rnap assessed (Appendix E). Several scemrïos were 
considered based on the expected frequency of occurrence of the relationships, and the results indicate that 
after five experts the impact on the aggregate map is expe!cted to be less than 100/o. Fiather, at this sample 
size, concepts that occur more than 50% of the time have the greatest influence on the map, with the impact 
on their weights expected to be less than 15%. 
because it provides a method to weight the opinion of experts. As discussed, pnor to each 
interview a brief questionnaire was administered, Appendix C, to gather background 
information on each expert. This information is then used to develop a credibiIity index 
for each expert. 
The underlying premise is that credibility is a fùnction of exprieme. The initial 
questionnaire has two main areas: technology-based venture experience and general 
demographic information Experience is dehed as having four meanirement variables: 
reported years of technology-based venture evaluation, number of ventures evaluated, 
reportsd sïze of typical venture evaluated, and the value of the typical loan or investment. 
The reported number of years provides a direct measure of the experience level of 
the expert, while the number of ventures evaluated provides an indication of the 
'richness' of this experience base. The typical size of the firms being evaluated provides 
a check that the ventures the expext is familiar with jkll into the category of interest, 
specificdy, small ventures that are in the very early stages of their evolution If the 
typical size of the ventures is relatively large, then it may be that the expenence is 
focused on later stage ventures. 
The final issue to be considered with regard to experience is the value of loans or 
investments that are made in these ventures. This measurement variable is an indirect 
indication of the siZp of the ventures being considered, as well as their development 
stage. It is expected that early stage ventures will typically require smaller loans, less than 
SSOOK, during their seed and start-up stages. Therefore, subjects who are typically 
dealing with large loans may be dealing with larger more estabhhed ventures. This also 
provides an indication of the level of risk associated with that expert's decisions. The 
characteristics of the interviewed experts, based on the pre-interview questionnaire data5, 
are provided in Table 3.1. 
' The pre -mthew questionnaire elicited background mfmation frm the experts by providmg 
classification categories, -ged almg a &point scale. 
Based on the pre-interview questionnaire information, an expert credibility index 
is then developed. The issue then becomes one of definhg an ideal expert and defining 
the measurement variables to reflect this. Each of the measurernent variables was 
assigned a value based on the criteria provided in Table 3.2. 
Table 3.1 
Lending Expert Characteristics 
Years with Bank 
Education Level 
Years Since Finished Education 
Typical Venture Size (Emplo yees) 
Typical Venture Size (Sales) 
Period Involved with SmaU Ventures 
Number Assessed per Year 
Size of InvestmentLoan 
Greater than 20 years 
Honours Degree 
Greater than 15 Years 
11 - 20 Employees 
Greater than $500K 
Greater h n  3 Years 
Greater than 50 Ventures 
Greater than $500K 
Assignment of credibility scores is based on the following guidelines. 
Characteristics that aïe considered to be indicative of an ideal candidate are given a value 
of 1. Thus in the case of "years with the bank", those that are category four or higher are 
awarded a 1. The next step is to determine the penalty for the 'worst case'. Again using 
"years with the bank", subjects with very little experience were heavily penalized, 
resulting in a value of 0.25 for those in category one. The general guideline used for 
assigning the remaining score was to split the difference. This was modified slightly to 
adjust nurnbers up or down. For example, using 'lears with the bank", the remaining 
score would be 0.625, but was adjusted to 0.65. Similarly, in the case of "education 
levei", the intermediate score would be 0.875, but was adjusted to 0.85. 
Table 3 -2 
Credibility Index Variable Assignment 
Measurement Variable Credibility Measurement 
Score Variable Value 
Years with Bank 
Education Level 
Years Since Finished Education 
Typical Venture Size (Ernployees) 
Typical Venture Size (Sdes) 
Period Involved with SrnaIl Ventures 
Number Assessed per Year 
S ize of Investment 
The credibility index is a normalized, weighted sum of the individual 
measurement variables. The criteria weights, Table 3.3, have been chosen to reflect the 
relative weighting desired in the experience and general demographic iaformation The 
overall weighting assigned to expehce  is 75%, which is then evenly divided among the 
measurement variables. The remaining 25% are then divided equally among the 
remaining measures. The resulting crediiility indices are shown in Table 3.4. 
Table 3.3 
Credibility Criteria Weights 






Years with Bank 
Education Level 
k3 Years Since Finished Education 0.083 
-- 
Relevant ks Typid  Venture Size (Employees) 0.15 
Experience 
ks Typicd Venture Size (Sales) 0.15 
ks Period Involved with SmaU Ventures 0.15 
k7 Number Assessed per Year 0.15 
Table 3 -4 
Expert Credibility Indices 
3.2 Interview Coding 
Once the interview recordings have been transcnbed, or i n t e ~ e w  notes collected, 
they are segmented (e-g.: Ericsson and Simon, 1984), which is the basis of M e r  
analysis. The first step in the analysis is to examine the types of utterances that occur 
during the interview. This leads to segment classification and provides a qualitative 
assessment of the interviews. The results of this response classification are provided in 




Lending Decision Characteristics 23.4% 20.7% 20.1% 26.4% 29% 
Market Attribute 11.8% 17.1% 11.2% 17.4% 3% 
Product Attn'bute 7.7% 6.3% 4% 1.6% 6% 
Venture Attribute 38.6% 45.9% 52.9% 37.6% 45% 
Financing Considerations 18.5% 9% 11.2% 5.3% 15% 
Other Risk 0% 1% 0% 1.6% 2% 
The chi-square statistic is a simple qualitative check and in all cases indicated that 
the distribution of concepts is not random. The most fiequently occurring classification is 
utterances concerning characteristics of the venture, such as its size and characteristics of 
the management team The next most common group are segments regarding lending 
decision characteristics and considers information such as the size of the loan requested 
and various aspects of bank policy. 
3.3 Assessrnent Concept Identification 
The next stage in the analysis is to identfi the assessment concepts used by the 
banking experts. The overall approach to this problem is illustrated in Figure 3.3, and is 
simiIar to the analysis approach described by Bouwman (1983), and to means-end 
analysis discussed by Firebaugh (1 989). In both cases, the fiindamental idea is to ideatm 
the operators that convert an initial element into an output element. 
In this analysis, each segment corresponds to a statement, with encoding of each 
retaining the most semantic content. W e  it is desirable to encode the information 
containeci in the segment itself, in some cases it may be necesary to examine the 
preceding and following segments to determine context and remove ambiguity. As 
discussed by Ericsson and Simon (1984), the information reported consists primarily of 
knowledge elements required as inputs to a set of operators. These operators acting on the 
knowledge elements produce new knowledge. Therefore, the first step in the analysis is 
to idente  the knowledge elements present in an interview segment. The segment is then 
examined to identify the operator king apphed to the element. 
The next d y s i s  step is to standardize the rcsults such that synonyms are 
corrected where it is considered desirable. For example, one set of analysis may have 
coded an operator as "financing risk" whiie another has been coded as "financial risk". 
These would be re-coded across all analyses as "financial risk". While it is permissible to 
simplw the coding, this must be weighed against the possibility of loss of semantic 
content (Ericsson and Simon, 1984). As such, each case is considered to determine the 
potentid impact of the re-coding. 
Simply considering the concepts that are used by the experts does not provide a 
complete picture of the decision process. In this research, these operators are the 
assessrnent concepts employed by the experts when assessing a new venture. Based on 
these operators, the final analysis step is to examine how the concepts that have been 
identifïed are related. This is done through the application of fuzy cognitive maps (e.g.: 
Kosko, 1992; MacNeill et al., 1994; Taber, 1994; Kosko, 1997; Liu and Satur, 1999; 
Satur and Liu, 1999). Due to the complelcity of these maps, the various relationships 
between the concepts may be represented through the creation of comection matrices 
(e.g.: Kosko, 1992; Taber, 1994). 
As described by Kosko (1992), fuzs. cognitive maps are signed, directed graphs 
with feedback that mode1 the world as a collection of classes and causal relationships 
between the classes. The directed edges relate the various concepts and provide a 
measure of the causality between the concepts. While simple cognitive maps are 
restricted to edge values in {-1,0,1), edge values in fiiw cognitive maps may take on 
values in the interval 1-1, 11. Here a value of zero indicates no causal relationship. The 
sign of the connect ion indicated increasing or decreasing causal relationships. There fore, 
once the concepts have been identifieci, a simple cognitive matrix indicating the presence 
of relationships and the direction of the relationship may be developed. 
3.4 Elements and Operators 
The following tables, Table 3.6 through Table 3.10, list the elements and 
operators (e.g.: Waterman and Newell, 1971; Bouwman, 1983) identified for each of the 
experts who participated in this study. Definitions of these concepts may be found in 
Appendix E. For this d y s i s ,  a common set of eiement codes was dehed  as well as 
operatos. As the analysis proceeded, the list was augmented as required (Ericsson and 
Simon, 1984). Included wah the operators are lists of identified qualiners for the input 
element. For example, the operator Matudy {venture) was found to have the qualiners 
[established, new]. The output elements resulting fiom the application of these operators 
are examined in the next section. 
3.5 Fuzzy Cognitive Map Development 
The initial stage in the development of the fuzzy cognitive maps, Figure 3.4, is to 
develop simple trivalent {- 1, 0, 1 ) maps (Kosko, 1992). Hence, if a causal relationship is 
present, it occurs to maximal positive or negative degrees. The use of a trivalent set is 
valid as experts tend to provide information in this form, and reflects relationsbips more 
accurately than when requested to provide weighted evaluations (Kosko, 1992). Further, 
during analysis of the i n t e ~ e w  t r d p t s  the presence and sign of a relationship are 
more easily determined than its magnitude. When combined and normalized, these 
trivalent relationship maps are in the interval [-1,1] and approximate the underlying 
unknown population opinion of the relationship between concepts (Kosko, 1992). The 
connections between concepts in the expert's map are then represented as a causal 
connection matrix, for exampfe Table 3.13. This is a convenient format, as the 
complexity of the maps tends to make them awkward to represent graphicdy once there 
is a significant nurnber of concepts. 
Table 3.6 
Knowledge Element - Operator Analysis 
Expert SI 













Maturity {venture) [established, new] 
Crdiility (venture) 
Financial Strength (venture) 
Developrnent Risk (venture) 
Attractiveness (venture) @gh, low, acceptable] 
Cash-flow Potential(venture) 
Revenue Potential {product) 
Exist (pruduct) 
Maturi@ (product) [exïst, beta-testing partiaUy completed, cornpleted ] 
Market Potential (PToduct) 
Development aeqiiirement (product } 
Velocity (market) 





Access ( market) 
QuaW (mmw=nt) 
Experience (management) 




Type {indmtry) [software, entertainment, film, technology-based, çerYi4 
Growth Potential (industry) 
Type {financing) [debt, sub-debt, equity, personal, commercial] 
Required (financing) 
Credliility (development team) 
Financing (development requirernents} [not 1- cash-flow, equityj 
Available Resources (development requiremait) 
Credibility {cash-flow) 
Quality (business plan) 
Exist (business plan) 
Crediïïiw (business plan) 
Cwipleteness {business plan) 
Board of Directors Exist {BOD) 
Table 3.7 
Knowledge Element - Operator Analysis 
Expert S2 
Knowledge Element Operator 
Venture Vulnerabii (venture) 
Type (venture) mowledge-based, techology-based] 
Maturity f venture) W D  stage] 
Growth Potential {venture) 
Financial Straigth (venture) 
Crediiiiity (venture) 
Cash-flow Potential (venture) 
Attractiveness (venture) 
P otentid (product) 
Maturity {product) [market presence, product launch] 
Lifê-cycle (product) 
Ex& (product) 
Development Requkernents (product) 
Development Finauchg {product) 
Market Forecast Cr&'bili@ (fmecast) 
Market VeIocity (market) 
growth potential {market) 
Focus {market) [nichej 
Exist (market) 









hdustry Type (industry) [msurance) 
Development Team Credibility (development team) 
Cash-flow Required {cash-flow) 
Business Plan Quaiity (business plan) 
Exist (busmess plan) 
Crediility (business plan) 
Table 3.8 
Knowledge Element - Operator Analysis 
Expert S3 






Venture Type {venture) 
Rcvenue Potential (venture) 
Maturity (venture) [commercialization] 







Development Requirernent (product) 
Development Focus (product) 
Velocity (market) 
Potentiai (market) 
Focus (market) [niche] 







Indiistry Type (industry) [biotech, IT, service, software, h d t h  
pharmaceutical] 
Financing Requked (financing) 
Risk (fïnancing} 
Resources {hancing) 
Develcpment Team Quality {development team) 
Capability {develapment team) 
Business Plan Quzlity {business plan) 
Completeness (business plan) 
Table 3.9 
Knowledge Element - Operator Analysis 
Expert S4 
Knowledge Element Operat or 
- - 
Type mchistry1 
Market Velocity (industry) [rapid, f&, slow] 
Market Maturity (mdustry)[ emerging, mature] 
Required Capitalization (industry) Wgh, low] 




Board Of Directors 
Business Plan 
DeveIopment Team 
Familiarity (tatget market) wgh, low] 
Venture Understanding {target market) [bigh, low] 
Market growth potential (venture) 







Expehience {venture management) 
Receptiveness (venture management) 
Commitmait {venîure management) 
Cohesiveness (venture management) 
Crediiility (venture management) 
Compieteness (venture management) 
Quality (venture management) 
Quality (BOD) [Strong, Weak, W o w n ,  Absent] 
Exist (BOD) Ipefined, Undehed, Absent] 
Complete (BOD) 
Requirement (BOD) 
Exist(business plan) [Exists, Undefined, Absent] 
VuEnerabiIity (developrnent team) 
Experience (develùpment team) 
Quality (development t a n )  
CrediiiIity ( development team) 
Managemant (development team) 




Knowledge Element - Operator Analysis 
Expert S 5  
- 
Element 




Cash-flow Potential {venture) 
Market Potentiai {market) 
Focus (market) 
Famïliarity (market) [mvestor] 




hdustry Type {mdustry) [cornputer games] 





Investment Cycle (financial) @mg, short] 
Development Team Quaiity (development team) 
Capabilities (development team) 
Each expert has different sets of concepts they consider relevant to the decision 
process. Standardization, or conformation, of the connection matrices simply uivolved 
including the concepts that had not been identiiied in each map and assigning them zero 
connections. Once standardized, each map can be combined additively (Kosko, 1992). 
Further, as each expert has a different credibility relative to the others, this c m  be 
incorporated through the application of a weighted average. 
Figure 3.4 
Fuzzy Cognitive Map Development 
Concept 
Identification 
Dwelop Simple Cognitive 
Matrix for each Subject 




Based on the analysis of the interview transcrripts, a List of assessrnent concepts 
can be generated, Table 3.1 1. In this table, each of the concepts is assigned an identifier, 
i-e.: Ci, for simplined expression of the connection matrices. Table 3.12 provides an 
example of a trivalent connection mat& for expert SI. Each row in the nia& indicates 
the influence that a concept has on the others. The matrices for the remeining experts, as 






Table 3.1 1 
All Experts Concept List 
Concept 




Venture Market Understanding 

















Market Growth Potential 
Market Maturity 
Market Forecast Credibility 





















Development Team VulnerabiIity 
Development Team Q u m  
Development Team Management 
Development Team Expenence 
Development Team Credibility 





Cash-flow Potential Credibdity 
Cash-flow Potential 
Business Plan QualiSf 
Business Plan Existence 
Business Plan Credibility 






Concept Trivalent Connection Matrix - Expert S 1 
3.6 Discussion 
The objective of this study has been to examine concepts and relationships used 
by lending experts when assessing a new venture. To examine this, fuzzy cognitive maps 
(Kosko, 1992) have been employed as a tool for descnbing the cognitive models of a 
group of lending experts. In total, 65 concepts were identïfied fiom the interview 
analysis, and as illustrated in Figure 3.7, the number of addtional concepts diminished 
with each i n t e ~ e w  as expected. This result provides support for the interview sample 
size in that Ït is expected that additionai experts will add few new concepts. E-vamination 
of the concepts also indicates b t  there are a core group, consisting of approximately 
45% of the concepts, which occur ikquently, i-e. 60% or more of the cases- 
When coqared to the concepts identfied in the literature Ce-g.: Hofer and 
Sandberg, 1987; Roberts, 1991; Bell, 1991; Meldnun and Mïlhan, 1991; Shtter, 1992; 
Cooper, 1993; Hall and Hofer, 1993; Kassicieh et ai., 1997) it can be seen that there are 
no unique concepts emerging. Rather, the lender concept set is a subset of the various 
concepts and criteria put fonvard in the literature. W i  respect to the cognitive maps of 
the experts, a core group of relationships is apparent, related to the core concepts. It is 
expected that additional experts will reinforce the core relationships while slowly 
reducing any 'spurious' relationships. 
An interesthg fhding fiom the interview sessions was the perception of the 
difference btween knowledge-based and technology-based ventures. In al1 cases the 
experts inte~ewed responded that they would not assess these ventures difYerentiy. 
Further questioning revealed that the perceived diaerence between these venture types is 
related to the rate of change of evolution, referred to in the coding as velocity. In al1 
cases, the experts indicated that the higher the knowledge content of the venture, the 
greater the associated perceived rate of change. 
Figure 3.7 
Assessrnent Concept Elicitation 
In terms of development of decision aids, the examination of the core concepts 
indicates that they are generdy related to management issues. As such this may provide 
the bas& of a toolbox component for evaiuating a venture's overd  management quality. 
The observation that the elicited lender concepts are not unique, and may be 
viewed as a subset of concepts and assessment criteria found in the Merature sets the 
stage for the next study. This observation combined with the apparent similarity with 
Public Venture Capital Funds leads to an interesthg question. If the criteria are aln 
derived fkom the same macro-set of criteria, what underlying process is occurring? This 
question provides the starting point for the next study, which examines the d e  of 
attribution in the assessment process. 
Chapter 4 
Study II: Assessrnent and Attribution Theory 
In the previous study of lender cognitive models, it became apparent that the criteria 
used by the lending experts are strikingly s d a r  to what has been found for investor 
groups. This raises a simple but hdamentd question. If investor and Iender groups are 
using the same basic set of criteria, how do they differ? This study explores the question 
with the aid of a model based on attribution theory (e.g.: Abraham, 1988; GIeitxnan, 1992; 
Greenberg et al., 1996). The objective of this study is to investigate the model's 
effect iveness in daerentiating investor groups. 
Figure 4-1 
S tudy II Issue D m  
Regarding the development of decision aids, understanding the underlying decision 
process is an important nrst step in tool creation. Support for this model not only provides 
insight into how information is king processed during venture assessment. It provides a 
basis for grouping decision criteria and system architecture. 
To examine these questions, a data set i d e n t w g  the importance attached to 
different investment criteria is utilized (Bachher, 1994). In this data set', the subjects were 
in three groups of investors, defïned as 'business angels', private venture capitalists, and 
public venture capital h d s  were investigated. The approach used when collecting these 
data was to provide the participants with a questionnaire that was completed during an 
interview session. This data set is of interest because it provides information dong several 
dimensions. 
During the administration of the questionnRil-e, the subjects were asked to consider 
a technology-based venture in which they had recently invested. They were then provided 
with the criteria set and asked to rank the importance of each of the criterion on a 7-point 
scale anchored on hot very important' to 'very important'. Further, they were asked to rank 
their perception of each criterion for an accepted venture on a scde, ranging firom very 
negative - wutral - very positive. This process was repeated for a venture that had been 
recently considered for investment but rejected Additional information coliected for each 
of the investment scenarios included the venture stage, defined as seed stage, sîart-up or 
fxrst stage- 
4.1 An Attribution Theory Modei of Investor Behaviour 
To examine the question whether or not the application of attribution theory can 
explain the merences between different investor groups, a mode1 is deveioped that is an 
extension of the attribution dynamics mode1 discussed by Abraham et al. (1 988). Abraham 
describes the expectancy of success or fàilure as derived from factors associated with 
control and specificity. 
Refer to Appebidix A for more information on regardùig this daîa set. 
The Abraham model is of interest for several reasons- First, its simplicity, the model 
consists of a minimum set of decision inputs. Second, the original model was proposed as a 
basis for a discussion of what leads to phenomena such as mood changes and depression. 
m e  this rnay seem like a leap to investment decisions, its simplicity rnakes it easy to 
generalize. Further, in examining decision dynamics, it provides a basis for understanding 
how 'migration' between accepts or rejects decisions occur as well as such phenomena as 
indecision2. F W y ,  if this model can provide insigbt into the path to accept and reject 
decision, it should provide understanding of how ventures are different iated. 
The fnst issue to be considered when developing an attribution theory model of 
investor behaviour is what Abraham (1 988) Qescriis as 'internalization'. In tbis mode1 it 
will be referred to as the locus of causation, as it encompasses perceived control issues of 
the venture and the assessor. Factors that are perceived to be under the control of the 
venture are considered to be interna1 factors. Those not under the control of the venture, 
such as  market forces and competitor reaction, are considered to be external factors. A 
M e r  perspective that must be considered is the perceived intemal control of the 
individual performing the assessment. 
From this perspective, uniqueness in the business proposal may be viewed as 
tending to increase the perception that a venture is insulated fkom extemal, market related 
factors such as cornpetition. As such, the greater the degree to which the venture has unique 
market attributes the less the impact of competitors, hence higher control. On the other 
h d ,  if the venture product or s e ~ c e  is perceived as  comrnon place, then the venture will 
have a loss of externai control due to increased vuherability f?om competitors. 
The next issue to be considered is the stability state variable and its two 
components, 'situational specincity ' and 'infornt ion temporal stability'. In this model 
situational specincity is the degree to which the venture characteristics are defhed and 
* Abraham's model is hased on a the idea of explainhg behaviour using a set of differential equatims, and 
phenomena such as mood change as trajectories between attractm. In a similar fashicai, indecision may be 
viewed as rnovement between an accepts and rejects aüractor. 
includes the investor's f a m i l i e  with relevant market and technology issues. Stability is 
defïned as the perceived temporal stability of factors perceived as important to venture 
Within the model the moderator is considered to be the level of assessor risk 
aversion. There are several other possibilities, such as level of motivation and ambiguity 
intolerance. However, risk aversion will be the only moderator considered due to the 
evidence, both anecdotaily and in the Merature, that iî is a simcant dserentiating 
Figure 4.2 
Proposed Attribution Mode1 
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4.2 An Attribution Model of Venture Assessrnent 
Based on the proposed attribution model Figure 4.2, a fuzy model is developed, 
consisting of mernbership functions definhg the input and output variables. This approach 
was used to remove the necessity of defining the model's diffprential equations3. Each of 
the input mernbership iÙnctions4 was defined with five levels, corresponding to a set of five 
linguistic quaMiers for each variable. Further, at this stage in the model development the 
relative size and location of the memberships were assigned arbitrarily- 
The next task is to d e h e  the fùzzy rule base. As five levels of membership have 
ken chosen for each input variable, a fùzzy associative memory (MM) having s3 cells is 
required. Each cell provides an expected outcorne, as defined in the output membership 
function, based on the inputs. In this model the output is also defhed with five levels, 
corresponding to the expectancy qualifiers, reject, tend-to-reject, neutrai, tend-to-accept, 
and accept. 
The result of this attriiution model implementation is the decision suf f ie  show in 
Figure 4.3. This corresponds to the decisions generated by each possible combination of 
input variables. Although the decision surface is very general, it does provide some 
indication of how accept and reject decisions wodd be expected to cluster and provides an 
opportunity to examine expected behaviours. 
As discussed, a control or moderator variable in this model is the rkk aversion of 
the decision maker. It is assurned that the level of risk aversion is relatively constant within 
an investor group and therefore should cause them to cluster. As indicated in Figure 4.3, iî 
is expected that there will be an accept region in the upper right corner of the plane. The 
' The model as proposed by Abraham wouId require the researcher to develop a set of differential equationç 
defining the system. This approach takes advantage of the idea of FAMs as 'miversal approximators' (e.g.: 
Kosko, 1994; Kosko, 1997). As an experiment, a mode1 based on this FAM was created h MATLAE3 and the 
trajectories redtmg fiom different information acquisition profiles was examined. 
Modified Gaussian mernbaship fûnctions wae chosen; however, tnangular or trapezoidal memkship 
fllncticms wodd aIso be valid and are the fiinctional foms typicaily chosen for system implemeatation. 
reject region wilI be found in the Iower lefi and there is expected to be a region of neutral 
attribution, 
Given the assumption that the level of risk aversion is relatively constant within an 
investor group, it is also expected that the centroid of the accept region will tend to move 
M e r  to the nght as  the risk aversion increases. Similady, the bomdary for the reject 
region is expected to migrate to the right, indicating that the decision maker is more likely 
to reject a venture proposal. In ternis of the proposed model this movement to the right of 
the plane is expected due to the increased threshold for an acceptable level of specincity 
and locus of causat ion. 
Figure 4.3 
General Attribution Mode1 Decision Surfàce 
LOC 
4.2.1 Hypothesis Summary 
The importance attributed to criteria for accepted ventures d l  be equal to the 
importance attributed to criteria for rejected ventures. 
Based on the decision surface of the proposed model the accept decision region for 
each of the investor groups will be found in the upper right corner. 
Based on the decision surface of the proposed model, the reject decision region for each 
of the investor groups will be found in the lower left corner. 
Investor groups are expected to exhibit different centroids for their accept and reject 
regions. 
Investor group centroids are expected to migrate to the upper right corner of the surface 
as the inherent level of risk aversion increases. 
The 'Business Angel' group is expected to be the Ieast risk averse and will have their 
acccept region located -est to the left. 
Private venture capitalists are expected to be more risk averse than the business angel 
group and less rkk averse than the public venture capital fund group. 
Public venture capital fund investors are expected to be the most risk averse and will 
tend to have their accept region located furthest to the upper right of the surface. 
4.3 Anaiysis Methodology 
This study considers the criteria importance and impact data elicted £kom three sets 
of investors5 (Bachher, 1994). The importance assigned to each of the criteria provides an 
indication of its attribution to the fiiture success (accept cases) or M u r e  (reject cases) by 
the subject. Therefore, it is postulated that this data provides insight into the individual's 
attribution model. The impact data indicates how this model was made operational during 
Data ~Uected in accordance with the University of Waterloo Office of Human Research, 
the accept-reject decision. The question beco mes: what underly h g  structure exists for these 
reported d e r i a  importance? Figure 4.4 provides an o v e ~ e w  of the methodology, which 
is based on principal components analysis. 
Anaiysis begins with an assessmen+ of the quality of the importance and impact data 
using t-tests and general descriptive statistics. The objective is to identify any problems 
within the data set. Following this initial assessment, principal components analysis was 
undertaken to examine the underlying structure of the importance data The outoome is a 
set of orthogonal fàctors that explain a relatively high proportion of the variance. These are 
linear combinations of the original data, with only a portion of the Factor loadings king 
significant. Each was reviewed, and non-significant loadhgs, based on a minimum 
statistical power (Kraemer and Thiemann, 1987), are disgarded. This process provides a 
minimum number of factors that explain a signifïcant proportion of the variance, as weIl as 
reducing the nurnber of  criteria that must be considered. 
Having identified the factors, their impact on the accept-reject decision must be 
determined. This was done by constnicting impact scores for each factor on a case by case 
basis, using mean aggregation. This resulted in the creation 60 accept and 60 reject impact 
sets. Once derived, the fàctors were rnapped to the proposed attribution mode1 variables, 
and examined to test the hypotheses. 
4.3.1 Assessment of Data Quality and Importance Means 
Pnor to the analysis, several steps were taken to examine data quaüty. The data 
conskt of 60 accept cases and 60 reject cases, obtained from three investor groups, 20 
subjects in each group. General descriptive statistics were examined and in several cases 
%ad1 data, i-e. values out of range, were identified and eliininated fiom M e r  analysis. 
The first stage was to perform t-tests (e.g.: Keller at al., 1994) on the criteria 
importance data to determine if there were differences in the importance assigned to a 
criterion when considering an accepted venture as opposed to those rejected. This tests the 
study's £ira hypothesis: there will be no ciifferences between the perceived importance of 
the accept and reject case criteria. 
Figure 4.4 
Analy sis Methodolo gy 
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CulI 13ata to SignifiCdnt 
Factars and Q.iteria 
Accept-Reject Plots 
This analysis required the testing that the ciifference in the means for each criterion 
was zero, and resulted in 95 t-statistics for each of the three investor groups. A critical t- 
value of 2.724 (a = 0.005, d-e35) was used, and in al1 cases the nuil hypothesis, no 
difference, codd not be rejected (Appendix B). 
4.4 Principal Components Anabsis of Criteria Importance 
As the importance data t-tests indicated that there is no ciifference beween the 
accept and reject data, only the accept data were considered at this stage. This was 
considered to be a more wnservative treatment of the data and removed 'double counting' 
of the responses. For the principal components aoalysis a minimum eigenvalue6 of 1.0 and 
varimax rotation to obtain maximum orthogonahty between the factors (as per Mifi and 
Clark, 1990) was d. Of the remaining post-rotation fàctors, only those which accounted 
for at least 5% of the variance explained were retained (as per Ann and Clark, 1 99O), 
which tended to remove those consisting of a single criterion. To M e r  process the data, 
on@ sigdicant factor loadings were considered. As the fàctor loadings are the correlation 
of the criteria onto a factor (ABEifi and Clark, 1990), the approach oiitlined by Kraemer and 
Thiemann (1 987) for determinhg the statistical power as a function of sample s k  and 
correlation coefficent was employed. Therefore, for a sample size of N40,  a minimum 
factor load of 0.50 a: p = po: p,= 0) was selected. This provides a statistical power7 of 
95% for a one-tailed test at the 1 % cunfïdence level. 
The result of this processing was the identification of fou. factors (Appendix B) 
based on a pst-rotation variance explained of at least 5%. Further, of the original 95 
criteria found in the data set, only 36 (3 8%) remained. The total variance explained by 
Eigenvdues provide a masure of the variance explained by each of the components and are subject to 
variation based on sample size. A minimum eigeuvalue of 1 is d in this analpis to eliminate components 
that account for a variance of l e s  than 1/N*100%. As this sample size is approximately 60, this discards 
components accounting for less than 1% of the variance. 
7 The higher the statistical power, the lower the Likelihood of type Ii error, i.e.: wrmgly accepting or rejectiug 
a nul1 hypothesis. 
these for factors is approximately 30%. Conceptually, the objective of this step in the 
anabsis was to identi@ the underlying amibution structure when investors assess a new 
venture. The next task was to examine how these fhctors are applied in their assessrnent 
decisison-making. To achieve this, &or impact scores were constructed using the 
information regarding how strong a positive or negative influence each criterion was 
comidered to be when rnakuig the accept or reject decisioa 
4.5 Importance Factors and Decision Impact 
As discussed, to examine the role that each of the importance factors played in the 
accept-reject decision, impact scores were constnicted. Mean aggregation8 was employed 
to denve these scores, which is simply the aritbmetic average of the criteria impacts 
associateci with a factor. The implication of this fom of aggregation in temis of a decision- 
d e r  is that the various criteria impacts are assessed and integrated together with equal 
weighting. The mean, variance and sampie size for the impact scores are provided in Table 
4.1 for accept decisions and Table 4.2 for reject decisions. 
Table 4.1 
Impact Scores for Criteria Importance Factors 
Mean Aggregation Method --Accepted Ventures 
As shown, the mean values for the impact scores m e r  for accept and reject 
decisions. R d 1  that no signficant dserence was found between the importance 
attributed to the decision criteria in the accept or reject cases, and that the factors are 
* The issue of aggregation is of interest fiom a system design perspective, thaefore the impact of different 
aggregation qprmches was also examined. 
assumed to be indicators of an underlying attribution structure. The mean impact values for 
accept and reject decisions imply that these factors are king applied differentiy, and thus 
provide a better basis for discrimination than the criteria, 
Table 4.2 
Impact Scores for Criteria Importance Factors 
Mean Aggregation Method 
Rejected Ventures 
Factor Mean Variance N ~ E C T  
Table 4.3 
Importance Factor Impact Scores 
Dserence in Means F-Test 
Znvestor Group Criteria Impact Factor Impact Scores 
Discriminant Analysis (Mean Aggregation) 
Business Angel 0.57 4.5** 
Private Venture Capitalkt 0.49 5.52** 
Public Venture Capital Fund 0.49 6.75*** 
*** p < 0.001 
** p < 0,005 
To examine the performance of this approach, a discriminant d y s i s  (e.g.: Affifi 
and Clark, 1990) was perfomed first with the overall criteria impact data and then using 
the factor impact scores. As indicated in Table 4.3, the perfomuuice as measured ushg an 
F-test (ndl hypothesis that the group means are different) is better with the factor impact 
scores. While the discriminant adysis  performance was comparable when ail groups were 
. . -  
considered together, it has poor discrimination power when the accept-reject decisions 
within an investor group are considered. This is an indication that the underlying 
assumption regadhg the analytic approach is sound- Specifically, the importance fàctors 
provide insight into how the criteria are attri'ited to success or fdure while the impact 
scores indicate how the investors apply these attri'bution factors in their decisions. 
4.6 Investor Decisions and the Attribution Mode1 
W e  the previous analysis found thzt the factors and impact scores were able to 
dserentiate the accept-reject decisions, how effective is the proposed attriiution rnodel in 
explaining the behaviour of the heerent investor groups? To explore this question, the fist 
step is to map these Mors to the amiaution model. This was achieved by e2aminhgg each 
As a &ezk cm the classification ofthe hctors, two independent judges were asked to classify these criteria. 
These judges were graduate students k the department of management sciaices fàmiliar with mauy of the 
concepts d e s c r i  by the mdividual aiteria However, they were not fàmiliar with the attribution model or 
its associateci theory. Ezch judge was given a set of c d g  defjnitions, with the objective of detennining if 
they would code the caiteria, and hence tend to defhe the hctors, in a similar manner. Thae are two levels of 
coding to be considered. First, whether they code a criterion as belonging to locus of causation (LW) or 
specificity, and then the cûding within those dimensions. Of these two levels, the fkt wodd have the greatest 
impact on fùrther analysis. Fairly good agreement with the coding at the first level was found. The combined 
agreement is 78%, wifh and average individual agreement of 72%- The implication is that the definition of 
factors does not appear unreasonable when umsidered by extemal judges. At the next level in the &g, 
there is, not swsingly, l e s  agreement. This is largely due to the differences in opinion as to wfiether a 
criterion reprsents either a situational or stability issue in the case ofspecificity. 
Agreement t-statistic @-value) 
Level 1 Expaimenter - Judge 1 67% 4.30 (p = 0.0000) 
P(randorn)=û.3 Experimenter - Judge 2 78% 5.71 (p = 0.0000) 
Experimenter - Judge 1 gr2 78% 5.71 (p = 0.0000) 
Judge 1 - Judge 2 83% 6.42 (p = 0.0000) 
Level2 Experimenter - Judge 1 50% 4.50 @ = 0.0000) 
P(random)=0.2 Experimenter - Judge 2 64% 6.58 @ = 0.0000) 
Expaimenter - Judge I gr2 67% 7.00 @ = 0.0000) 
Judge 1 - Judge 2 69% 7.42 @ = 0.0000) 
of a factor's criteria and deterinïning which model parameters best descnie it. The results 
of this process are presented in Table 4.4. 
Based on the mapping, the mean value for specificity and locus of caut ion @OC) 
were calculated, with LOC king the mean of the impact scores of factors one and three. 
Similarly specificity was taken to be the mean of fàctors four and five. As shown in Table 
4.5, Merence in meam F-tests indicate that the attribution model provides good accept- 
reject decision separation for the difYerent investor groups. The ne- question is how does 
the separation within accept and reject decisions compare. In Table 4.5, the hypothesis 
tested was if the means between accept and reject decisions withlli different groups was 
significant. In temis of a decision d a c e ,  the issue is if the centers of the regions 
c o n ~ g  accept and reject regions are different. 
At first glance it would seem that all is required is to meanire the differences in the 
means for each accept and reject group and determine if the means are significantly 
different. This however assumes that the regions are normally distributed, and therefore 
this assumption must be tested, as shown in Table 4.6. Each of the distriïutions was 
examined to determine its kurtosis and skewness. This provides an indicaiion of the 
distribution's shape and specifically the presence of long tails that would lead to misleading 
evaluations of the centers if the mean were used. 
As indicated in Table 4.6 and Figure 4.5, the accept-reject regions tend to be located 
as expected, with accept in the upper quadrant. Also apparent is overlap areas between 
accept and reject. These overlaps will be examhed further in terms of the moderator's role 
in the model. As a result, simply rneasuring the distances between means may be 
misleading, and several transforrnati~ns~~ were cunsidered in an attempt to reduce the 
impact of the distributions. To determine the mean distance between within the reject and 
accept decision groups in the attribution modei, all Euclidean distances were calculated and 
then averaged. The renilts of this approach are provided in Table 4.7. 
log (x), exp(x), reciprocal and power transfmsticms were umsidered. 
Factor 
Table 4.4 
Factor to Attribution Mode1 Mapping (By Author) 
Environmentai Extemal Control 
1 The entrepreneurs' familiarity with customer 
requiranents 
Quality of cornpetitor analysis 
The entrepreneurs' tamiliarity with business 
drivers 
Track record of ceinvestors m the deai 
Proposed venture will mate a new market or 
niche 
Quality of product analysis 
There are other c~-hvestors present in the 
investment 
A hcticmmg prototype has already been 
developed 
The entrepreneurs' familiarity with product and 
market 
Ease to evaluate proposal by investor(s) 
Venture Interna1 Control 
3 Clarity of comminiicatim in proposal 
Overall qudity of proposal 
Completeness of venture proposal 
Effectiveness of graphies, tables and figures in the 
proposal 
F i c i a l  skiils of the entrepreneur(s) 
Marketing research skiils of the enîrepreneur(s) 
Clear emphasis on key points 
Production skiils of the aitrepraieur(s) 
Quality of financial analysis 
Quality of market andysis 
Sales force and/or distribution skills of the 
entrepreaeur(s) 
Advatismg and promotion skiils of the 
entrepreneur(s) 
The entrepreneurs' demmsûated leadership abiiity 
in the past 





Table 4.4 Continued 
Factor to Attribution Mode1 Mapping (By Author) 
Investor Familisrity 
4 Investofs familiarity with the technology of 
the venture 
Investor's hiiïarity with the industry of the 
venture 
Investor's familiarity with the market 
targeted by the venture 
Investor's fiidîarity with the offering 
(product a service) of the venture 
Ability to aiûact a viable investor group 
The venture's stage of development (e.g 
seed, start-up, first-stage, second stage 
Venture SituationaI Specidicity 
5 The entrepreneurs' familiariîy wîth 
techology enablers 
The entrepreneurs' ability to react to 
changing risk 
Proposed venture is s a t i e g  an existing 
market need 
The entrepreneurs' ab* to anticipate need 
for &ange 
Venture can demonstrate a defendable 
cornpetitive position 
The entrepreneurs' management cornmitnient 
to success 
Expected market risk to the investor(s) 
Table 4.5 
Investor Group Attribution 
DZference in Means F-Test for Accept and Reject 
B y Investor Group 
All Groups 22.4*** 
Business Angels 6.0' 
Private Venture Capitalists 5.6' 
Public Venture Capital Funds 11.7*** 
4.7 Attribution Mode1 and Lenders 
So f'at the discussion has centered on the behaviow of investors. However, what can 
be said about lenders? To briefly consider thisy the concepts eiicited nom the lender 
subjects in the first study are revisited. As these may be thought of as the attributions 
assigned to the venture lending decision, how do they nt with the model? To explore this, 
the concepts are f k t  mapped to the attribution modell', as shown in AppendUc B. 
I1 As a check on the concept classification, two independent judges were asked to classi@ these criteria 
These judges were graduate studeats m the department of management sciences. Two levels of coding are 
considerd Firsf whetfier they code a critericm as belonging to locus of causation &OC) or specificity, and 
then the coding withm those dimensions. 
Agreement t-statistic @-value) 
Level 1 Experimenter - Judge 1 60% 6.32 @ = 0.0000) 
P(random)=O.3 Experimenter - Judge 2 70% 7.91 (p = 0.0000) 
Exparnienter - Judge 1 &2 73% 8.30 (p = 0.0000) 
Judge 1 - Judge 2 83% 9.88 @ = 0.0000) 
Level2 Expermienter - Judge 1 48% 4.35 (p = 0.0000) 
P(random)=0.2 Expaimenter - Judge 2 55% 5.53 (p = 0.0000) 
Expaimenter - Judge 1&2 60% 6.32 @ = 0.0000) 
Judge 1 - Judge 2 78% 9.09 @ = 0.0000) 
Figure 4-5 
Attriiution by Investor Group 
BA,Accept BA, Reject 
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Table 4-6 
Assessment of Accept-Reject Regions 
By Investor Group 
Investor Group Specificity Locus of Qualitative Assessment of 
Causation Distribution 
Business Angel Mean 0-59 0.60 
(Reject) Skewness 1.35 1.55 Tails to nght. 
Kurtosis 1.6 3.3 LOC has long tail. 
Business Angel Mean 0.72 0.71 
(Accept) Skewness 0.10 -0.35 LOCTailtoleft. 
Kurtosis -0.84 1.5 LOC has longtail. 
Private Venture Mean 0.59 0.60 
C a ~ i t w  m e . 4  Skewness -0.48 -0.73 Tails to lefi- 
Kurtosis -0.66 0.699 Spec. distribution is Bat. 
LOC has tail. 
Private Venture Mean 0.69 0.72 
(Accept) Skewness -0.51 0.30 S ~ C .  tail t0 lefi. 
Kurtosis -0.28 0.85 
- -  
Public Venture Mean 0.57 0.59 
Capital Fund Skewness 0.07 0.06 
(Reject) 
Kurtosis 0.39 -0.46 
Public Venture Mean 0.75 0.73 
Capital Fund Skewness 0.30 0.25 Spec. and LOC tail right. 
(Accept) 
Kurtosis -0.45 -0.07 
With this mapping as a new protoco:, the interview data were reviewed and coded 
in terms of the attribution modeL The results of this revised coding are presented in 
Appendix B. As shown, the dominant considerations arnong the lenders are stability and 
situational specificity. Of secondary importance are control issues. As expected due to the 
nature of lending, investor influence on the venture is not a major consideration. However, 
both external and venture interna1 control occur with a relativeiy high fiequency. 
Overall, these results are consistent with what is expected fiom the attribution 
modeL From this analysis, combined with the cornparison to public venture capital fûnds 
(PVCF) in the first study, it can be expected that the Iender group will be located in the 
upper right. While they are likely to be near PVCF, it can be specdated that lenders wiU 
have a high mean specificity coordinate and a mean LOC coordinate slightly less than 
PVCFs due to the low Ulvestor influence role. 
Table 4.7 
Between Group Distances (Euclidean) 
1 Group Cornparison 1 ~ e a n ~ u c l i d e a f l  1 Variance / 
1 1 Distance 1 1 
Private Venture Capitalist Accept vs 
Public Venture Capital Funds Accept 
Business Angel Accept vs 
Private Venture Capitalists Accept 
Business Angel Accept vs 
Public Venture Capital Funds Accept 
1 Private Venture Capitalists Reject 1 1 1 
0.204*** 
0.179*** 




Business Angel Reject vs 
Public Venture Capital Funds Reject 
O. 185*** 
Private Venture Capitalkt Reject vs 
Public Venture Capitai Funds Reject 
0.012 
0.191*** 0.019 
'** p < 0.001 
0.206* * * 0.015 
Table 4.8 
Lending Expert Attriïution Coding 
Situational Specificity 34% 19% 36% 32% 40% 
Stability 38% 40% 23% 21% 7% 
Environment Control 11% 13% 10% 20% 13% 
hvestor Influence 5% 9% 2% 3% 3% 
Venture Intemal Control 12% 19% 29% 25% 37% 
4.8 Discussion 
Several hypotheses have been proposed concerning the expected investor 
behaviour. First, it was expected that the accept decision region for each of the investor 
groups WU be found in the upper right corner. The reject decision region for each of the 
investor groups is expected to be in the lower left quadrant. Furber, different investor 
groups are expected to exhibit different centroids for the5 accept and reject regions. These 
centers should migrate to the upper right quadrant of the surface as the inherent level of 
risk aversion increases. Finally, it has been hypothesized that Business Angels' should be 
the ieast risk averse while the Public Venture Capital Funds will be the most risk averse. 
The analysis supports the hypothesis that the accept decision region tends to be 
found in the upper right quadrant. This is seen through visual examination of the S-L 
planes, Figure 4.5, and the coordinates of the group centers, Table 4.6. Similady, the reject 
region tends to be the lower left quadrant. The hypothesis that investor groups are expected 
to exhibit different accept and reject centroids is also supported. Examination of the F-tests 
and the mean distances, Table 4.7, between clusters support distinct investor group regions. 
It has also been hypothesized that the investor group centers should migrate to the 
upper nght corner of the phase plane as the inherent level of risk aversion increases. This is 
based on the assumption that rkk aversion wilI be the dominant moderating variable 
between these investor groups. From the analysis, it appears that Business Angels and 
Private Venture Capitalists are the most similar. The Public Venture Capital Funds are 
found to be Iocated -est to the upper right, as expected, iridicating that relatively high 
levels for specincity and control are required for an accept decision. 
When the tender experts are cunsidered, it can be seen that their prhmy consideration 
is specincity. This is seen in the high fiequency of occurence of concepts related to 
situational speciflcity and stability. Locus of control appears to be less of an issue, with 
investor influence king of less concem. This r e d t  is not surprishg given the nature of 
lending, which does w t  place the assessor in a position of asserthg a signincant level of 
control over the venture. Considering an ofken heard statement fiom lenders ". . .we want te 
be more like venture capitalists ...", this would reqwe steps to reduce systemic risk 
aversion, and possibly a re-orientation towards locus of causation (LOC) issues. 
In this study, the question of interest was: if investor and lender groups are using the 
same basic set of criteria, how do they dBer? To explore this, a model based on attribution 
theory was considered, specincally its effectiveness in differentiating investor groups. 
Overall, the proposed model appears able to differentiate between investor groups and 
provide some insight into accept-reject decisions, as well as how information is processed. 
Specifically, the apparent role of risk aversion, both systemic and individual suggests a 
need to 'calibrate' decision aids to the user type. The apparent tendency for different 
investor types to place different emphasis on specificity and LOC may also have 
implication on how toois may be confïgured. 
Chapter 5 
Study III: Viabüity-Based Assessrnent 
In the initial study, the question king considered was what do lending experts 
consider when evaluating early-stage, technology-based ventures? The second study 
considered the question: If different assessor groups are using the same underlying 
set of assessment criteria, what, if anything, makes them different? In ternis of the 
overall objective, a decision aid, these questions are of interest because they improve 
the understandhg of the criteria and process that underlies the venture assessment 
process. 
Figure 5.1 
Study III Overview 
This study proposes and explores a mode1 to explain part of the assessment of 
early stage ventures, specincally the assessment of perceived technological viability. 
As illustrated in Figure 5.1, the original objective is the creation of a decision aid for 
screening and assessing early-stage technology-based ventures. Rather than 
considering "how these ventures are assessed?', this study examines the issue of 
"what should be assessed?". Severai researchers (e.g. : Cooper, 1986; Slevin and 
Pinto, 1988; Bell and McNamara, 1993; Balachandra and Friar; 1997), have 
conçidered success fkctors fiom various perspectives. In +bis study, an empincd 
study of venture success factors is not the focus. Rather, a theoretical understanding 
of what determines if a system will evolve and survive is the issue of interest. 
The idea that a new venture evolves and is constantly threatened with Mure 
(death), coupled with the realization that these organisrations are evolving under 
conditions of high uncertainty leads to the consideration of viability theory (Aubin, 
2991). To explore this M e r ,  a venture-system model is proposed and parameters 
identified that may serve as the basis for a screening and assessrnent aid. 
5.1 Eariy-Stage Venture Viabitity 
While there are several contributors to venture system viability, for example 
market and finanicial as well as technological, the focus will be on technological 
viability. This is not to imply that these other viability components are weak or 
unimportant at this stage in the venture's evolutioe Rather, for early stage ventures it 
becomes an important deteminant of the venture's likelihood to evolve m e r .  As 
discussed by Slatter (1992), a hdamental issue that must be addressed early in the 
development pbase is the technological foundation of the venturs. 
To considet the idea of system viability fùrther, a model descr-ibing the 
dynamics of a new venture-system during its development phase is required. What 
characteristics should this model possess? Not only must this model capture the 
dynamics, but also t must be general enough to represent a wide range of technology- 
based ventures. Further, it should reflect the nonlinear nature of a venture-system, 
especially at the early-stages of venture development. Finally, it should permit the 
examination of the venture-system in terms of siability. 
When a venture begins the development phase, its goal is typically to create a 
single, or at most a very limited number, of products. This is due to the limited 
resources of the venture, which restrict the range of development activities it may 
undertake. As such, the venture may be viewed as a project and thr simple model 
proposed by K.G. Cooper (1 993), illustrated in Figure 5.2, provides a starhg point. 
The objective of Cooper's model was to examine problems such as project 
delay, 'cycling' and the impact of rework, which conventional views of projects have 
difficulty addressing. These issues are particularly relevant when projects have a 
significant design component or high un~ertainty~ as commonly found in product 
development . 
Two important features of Cooper's model are the quality of task execution 
and rework discovery t h e .  Intuitively, the rate at which tasks are executed will be 
related to their cornplexity and the capabilities of the venture. Further, the iower the 
task execution quality, the p a t e r  the degree of rework that can be expected. QuaIity 
c m  be impacted by a number of factors, including capabilities, effectiveness of 
communications, and various motivational factors. Further, the faster a task 
deficiency can be identifid, the less overall impact it will have. This is a function of 
the experience of the development team and the quality of the project planning. 
5.2 Extending the Mode1 
Begùiouig with the project execution model (KG. Cooper, 1993), extensions 
may be made that provide insight into new venture viability assesment. To begin, 
consider the re-statement of the model Uustrated in Figure 5.2. For simplicity, it is 
assumed that the product or service d e m i o n  at the end of the formulation phase is 
stable enough that the amount of effort c m  be identined. Wi this model as a basis, 
several concepts may be identified that will have a significant development phase 
impact. Specifically, technobgical capab*¶ technological complexity and 'quality 
potential', defmed as the venture's potential to execute a 'high quaMy' development 
Figure 5.2 
The Cooper Project Execution Model 
Adapted fiom KG. Cooper (1993). 
Cooper's model, Figure 5.2, impiies that as rework is dixovered in the system 
it is simply fed back for re-execution. This appears to overlook the tendency for 
increased task interdependence as technological complexity increases, and hence, the 
potential for the rework to have a 'ripple' effect through the development process. In 
the proposed model Figure 5.3 this is represented by a rework effort penalty, which 
accounts for the additional effort as the discovery of rework is delayed. 
Figure 5 -3 
Development Phase Execution Model 
Based on the issues identified in Figure 5.3, the following relationshipsl may 
be identifïed in the development phase model. In tenns of systems and viability 
theory, these components may be considered to define sets of state variables and 
associated constraints that must be estimated when detennining system technological 
viability. 
Required Effort + f (complexity) 
Execution Rate + f (complexity, capabiüties) 
Execution Quality + f (compiexity, capabmies, quality potential) 
Rework Ratio + f (cornplexity, capabilities, quality potential) 
Rework Discovery Rate + f (comp!exity, capabilities, quality potential) 
Rework EEoa Penalty + f (complexity) 
5.2.1 Technological Capabiiity 
The fïrst of these components is technologicai capability, a complex concept 
that may be decomposed into three interrelated issues; technological synergy, 
absorptive cagacity, and technologicai vulnerability. In terms of viabilÏty, a venture 
can only evolve along trajectories viable within its technological capabilities, and 
cannot follow paths that require technological capabilities that it does not possess or 
cannot sustain. 
Technological Capability + g (technological synergy, absorptive capacity, 
technological vulnerability) 
A central issue when considering a venture's technological capability is the 
synergy between what is required to realize the venture's product and what it has 
1 A problem that is apparent when considering this mode1 is the subjective nature of the key variables. 
That is, they are easily expressed Iinguistically but are difflcult to quanti&. To facilitate this 
mvestigaticm, a f k z y  simulation model was developed (Appendix G). The objective of this mode1 is to 
examine bie behaviour ofthe systern as weil as to ccmsider v t i a l  via- d t s .  
available (e.g.: Someborne and Wilemon, 1990; Shilling and Hill, 1998). This 
includes not only the venture's physical technology assets, but also determination if 
the requisite knowledge and skills exïst. As discussed by Lefebvre et al. (1996), the 
technical capabilities of a venture are shaped by the past technical experiences of the 
individuals comprising it. However, as technology is not static, the venture must 
posses an ability to identiS., understand and assimilate relevant technological change, 
hence absorptive capacÏty (Cohen and Levinthal_ 1990). Further, as these intangible 
assets are not easily copied or tramferable, they becorne a key component of the 
venture's competit ive potential. 
The final component, technological vulnerability is concemed with the control 
of technologies critical to the venture. This is particularly important in the case of 
proprietary technologies as they, by definition, provide the venture with a key aspect 
of t s  cornpetitive potential. Thus e critical technology that is controlled to a 
significant extent extemal to the venture decreases its technological capability. 
5.2.2 Technûlogical Corn plexity 
The next issue to be addressed is the technological complexity of the venture's 
product. Complexity may be defiacd as the number of possible states that may exist 
in a given system (Beer, 1985). Starting with this description, technological 
complexity may be defined as a fünction of technological variety and matwity. 
Technological maturity contributes to complexity through its influence on 
uncertahty, and is mdes t ed  as four types of risk: breakthrough, obsolescence, 
integration and id?astructure2. 
hfhûucture risk pertains principally to younger technologies, and arises fiom the availability of 
complementary technologies. Specifically, do the technologies exist that are necessary for successfbi 
deployrnent of the product (Weiss and Binibaum, 1989)? While important to consider early m the 
development of a product, m this study it is considerd as a key component of market viability and is 
not developed fixrther. 
Techno logical Complexity + &techno logical variety, techno lo gical maturity) 
Technological variety may be simply stated as the number of required 
technologies. As the number increases, so does the associated variety. For example, if 
each component of the required technology and knowledge base is considered to have 
two states, present or absent, then, as the number of components, N, increases the 
number of possible systern states, and hence complexity, would increase at 2N. 
Obviously, if the number of states were expanded to include various degrees of 
availabiiay, then the complexity would M e r  increase. 
Established technologies have relatively Little uncertainty associated with 
them in te- of their fuhne technological trajectories (Dosi, 1982). A dominant 
design has evolved (Weiss and Birnbaum, 1989), and as such present and future 
performance and avaiiability are relatively predictable. In other words, the possible 
future states of a mature technology or knowledge area are fewer. Therefore, as 
maturity increases, the systern complexity will tend to decrease. 
At the other extreme, emerging or very yomg technologies have significant 
uncertainty associated wah them. Often a dominant design is yet to emerge and 
various possible technological trajectories may exist. Associated with this, new 
breakthroughs may occur, or may need to occur (Beil and McNamara, 1991), which 
c m  change the viability of an immature technolod. At the other end of the maturity 
cwve however, technologies become increasingly vulnerable to discontinuities andlor 
major shifts in technological paradigms that may render them obsolete, obsolescence 
risk. Thus, the assessrnent problem becomes one of detennining the stabilÏty of the 
venture's technologies. 
mese breakthroughs, or discontinuities, may be either mhancmg, such as development of 
complementary technologies, or destructive, such as development of competing technologies leadmg 
to displacement, 
The final cornponent of technological complexity to be considered is integration 
risk, and concems the potential difficulties that may occur when attempting to 
integrate difZerent technologies andor products together for the fkst tirne. Thus? 
while breakthrough risk is research and development oriented and focuses on the 
discovery or inventicn aspects of innovation, the focus of in t emon  risk is at the 
system level. 
Rehnning to the concept of viabiiay, a venture can only rernain viable as long 
as the technologies upon which it is based remain viable. As system complexity 
increases, and hence, system uncertainty, the number of potential technological 
mjectories also increases, with the potentid to move the venture outside its viability 
region, 
5.2.3 Quality PotentiaI 
Quality potential is defined in this study as the ability of the venture to 
develop a product with minimal energy, and hence, is a function of the organhtion's 
effectiveness and efficiency in resource allocation and usage. Therefore, it is defined 
as ha- two dimensions, management qu* and orgauizationa.1 effectiveness. 
Concepts such as 'product quality' and 'rapid development' are the outcorne of this 
potential. In terms of viability, a venture can remain viable only if t has the capabüity 
to control the allocation of resources and effort during the development process such 
that total effort, hence energy, is minimized. 
Quality Potential+ g (organizatiod effectiveness, management quaMy) 
As discussed by Shilling and Hill (1998) and Sobek et ai. (1998), it is 
important that the organization be suitable for the type of project king undertaken. 
Further, poor coordination and co~lzmunications within the organktion are a major 
contributor to development delays, especially for high technological complexity 
situations (e-g.: Moenaert and Souder, 1990; Wheelwright and Clark, 1992; Shilling 
and Hill, 1998; Sobek et al, 1998). A related resource allocation issue is that of 
development project concurrence and over-extension, and is a common cause of 
product development delay (Shilling and HiIl, 1998). Realktically~ this is almost 
certain to occur, the issue becoming how great is the over-extension. 
In summary, four basic postdates have been put forward that serve as the basis 
for developing a viability assessrnent hxnework. 
A venture cm only evolve dong trajectories that are viable mithin its 
technological capabilities. In other words a venture cmo t  folIow paths that 
require technological capabilities that it does not possess or cannot sustaia 
A venture can ody r e k  viable as long as the technologies upon which it is 
based remain viable. 
As systern complexity increases, and hence system uncertainty, the number of 
potential technological trajectories also jncreases, with the possibility of a 
venture's movement outside its viability region 
A venture c m  remain viable only if it has the capability to control the allocation 
of resources and effort such th& total energy is minimked. In other words, this is 
a function of the efficiency and effectiveness of the venture in temis of its 
development process. 
5.4 Mode1 Validation Issues 
Based on the early-stage venture model, a set of constnicts has been proposed 
that indicate if a venture will survive or not. This model must now be validated. At 
this research stage, validation has a 'theory development' perspective. Hence, as 
discussed by Cook and Campbell (1979), the impomt  validity considerations4 are 
- - - - - - - 
As discussed by Cook and Campbell (1979), the miportace of validity coasideratims depends an the 
type of researdi being undertalcai. Thus for theory development and testing it is most important to 
show that constructs are present and that there are causal relationships. Hence canstruct and intenid 
intemal and constnict. Therefore, construct validity of the causes (intemal validity) 
will be the focus. 
Figure 5.4 
Methodology Validation Plan 
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Intemal validity considers the question: are the constnicts in the proposed 
model present in actual assessment? The objective therefore is to determine if the 
elements of the mode1 are appropriate and to wnfirm that there is a relationship 
between the model concepts and venture viability. To this end, the validation plan, 
outhed in Figure 5.4, was undertaken. 
unknown oirtçome case. 
As indicated in Figure 5.4, the planned validation process has four major 
components. First, the venture capitalist data (Bachher, 1994) will be revisited to 
ba l  business plan 
vdidity are the most importaut issues. In the case of applied research, where the interest is ofien in the 
impact of a specific treatmeof Cook and Campbell argue that the priorities change. Specificaliy, the 
validity impurtance becornes intanal validity, external validity, construct validity of efFect, statistical 
conclusion validity, constnict validity of the cause. 
determine if the concepts proposed for Mability assessment are indeed present. For 
this step in the process, only those cases that are identified as early stage ventures 
entering the product development stage of their evolution are considered. In addition, 
the criteria5 set presented to the subjects was very broad and included several criteria 
that are directed to market and other post product development stage issues. These 
criterîa were removed for this analysis. 
A fiirther interna1 validation issue to be considered is whether the model 
concepts c m  be generalized to lenders as well as investors. This leads to the second 
and third steps in the validation process, in which Iender data is assessed to determine 
if there is support for the proposed viability model, This analysis will be based on 
questio~aire data., as weil as by re-examination of the lender interviews to detennine 
the fiequency of occurrence of these concepts. The analysis of the lender interview 
data &O required the development of a coding protocol based on the proposed modeL 
The finai part of the validation process consists of providing a group of 
subjects with a set of early-stage venture cases which will be consid-ered using the 
proposed assessment model. Several of the cases will be drawn f h m  the literature, 
specificdy fiom cases discussed by Beil (1 99 1). In these cases, the subjects know the 
case outcome. An additional case will be provided, for which the subjects do not 
know the outcome. This case is based on an actual venture that is entering the product 
development phase. The objective of this validation step is to examine the predictive 
valide of the model. 
A meta-analyns of criteria used for the aSsessment of R&D p r o j e  and new product innovation 
undertaken by Balachandra and Friar (1!W7), identifid 144 potential assessrnent criteria, classified 
mto 72 groups, fiom the literaîure. The 95 criteria used by Bachher (1994) may be viewed as a subset 
of this. 
5.5 Validation of the Proposed Mode1 
It has been poshilated that techaological viability of a venture system at its 
early stage will be the dominant consideration. This viatiIity is defïned by a set of 
constrainuig m o r s  that define the viability region of a venture at this stage of its 
evoiution, In this section, the question of whether early stage venture assessment 
practitioners are indeed atteqting to estimate venture viability is considered. To 
examine this, a structural mode16 (e.g.: Asher, 1976; Fox, 1984) for technological 
viability, Figure 5.5, is proposed, as well as a set of hypotheses, Table 5.1, regarding 
the expected relationships. 
Table 5.1 hdicates the hypothesized causal direction of the relationship (row 
3 column) as well as the correlation sign. Further, the expected correlation is based 
on the assessorts perceived requirements. Therefore, for example, a positive 
correlation between perceived technological complexity and 'required' technological 
capability is indicated. In essence the model defines a set of state variables withui the 
venture system to be estimated when considering a venture's technological viability. 
To examine the assessment behaviour of practitioners in t e m  of this model the 
methodology summarized in Figure 5.6 has been undertaken. 
To begin the analysis, the investor group data set (Bachher, 1994) is again 
considered7. In this study, the data set is examined to isolate only those accept-reject 
decisions that pertained to an early stage venture, that is, only those identified as 
king ~t the concept or &ut-up stage. 
ci This model is block-recursive (Fox, 1984) since causal loops are present within the rnodel which cm 
be isolated by defining concept blocks within the model. For clarity, disturbance t g m s  have been 
omitted h m  the pro@ model. 
As discussed previously, this data consisted of the importance attributed to a set of criteria whm 
making an investment decision. The investor groups mvolved m the study were then asked to idaitiQ 
the impact each Biterion had on an investment opporhrnity recently accepteci and one recently rejected. 
The subjects also idmtified wtiich stage the venture was at, seed, start-up, or initial market 
introduction. 
Figure 5.5 
Viabilhty Modei ReIationships 
Table 5.1 
Viability Mode1 Hypotheses 
















As indicated in Figure 5.6, the fïrst ~ t e p  in the analysis is to discard data 
identifïed as not king associated with concept or start-up ventures. Principal 
components analysis (e.g.: AfEfï and Clark, 1990) of the remaining data indicated 
that the tactos are dominated by market considerations. This outcome is not 
surprising as examination of the criteria set shows a signincant proportion, 
approximately 70%, of the criteria are market-oriented. Thus, the next analysis step 
was to rehe the data by removing market-characteristics criteria and analyzing the 
remaining data using principal component analysis. The factors identified were then 
mapped to the structural mode1 variables, Table 5.1. 
Figure 5.6 
Aaalysis Methodo bgy 
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The assumption in this analysis is that the identsed factors describe the 
underlying investor attribution of techno logical viability. Next, their impact in the 
accept-reject decision is considered. This assumes the decision is based on perceived 
viability, such that a reject decision indicates a perception that the venture is not 
viable fiom a viability theory perspective. Impact scores were derived by mean 
aggregation of the individual criterion impacts for each accept and reject case. 
Correlation analysis (e.g.: Affifi and Clark, 19901, was then performed to examine the 
relationships between the proposed structural variables. 
5.6 Investors and Viability 
As discussed, once the factors in the reduced data set were identifïed, t k y  
were mapped to the model variables as shown in Table 5.2. This lias the factors 
identifïed in the investor data fiom highest to lowest eigenvalue8. These factors were 
then defined in tenns of the mode1 variables {Yi to Ys). However, no direct mapping 
was found for model variable Yj. As a result, an estimate using a h e a r  combination 
of absorptive capacity (Y5), organizational effectiveness (Y7) and management 
qua@ (Y8) was used for M e r  analysis. 
n i e  results of the investor group correlation analysis are provided in Table 
5.3, and ilIustrated in Figure 5.7. In this figure, the solid lines indicate identification 
of signincant correlation, while the dashed lines symboiize hypothesized relationships 
that were not found. The heavy dashed line, B i3, represents a correlation between the 
estimated quaiity potential and technological capability. If this estimated variable is 
not included in the model, then correlation is found between management quality and 
technological capabil*. 
5.7 Anaiysis of Lender Interviews 
The goai of the previous analysis was to seek evidence that the proposed 
modei's constnicts are present when investors assess new ventures. The objective of 
this niialysis is to strengthen the model's construct validÏty as well as illustrate that it 
may be generalized to lendersg as well as investors. To this end, the lending expert 
data (Study 1) is coded using a protocol (e.g.: Olson and Biolsi, 1991) based on the 
proposed model, Table 5.4, and associated assessrnent concepts. 
8 The minimum eigenvalue for the analysis is 1.0. 
A large-scale questionnaire was also attempted. The re!tum rate was low and as such has weak 
statistical power. A discussion of this work can be found is Ap~endix F. 
Table 5.2 
Investor Importance Factor to Viability Mode1 Map (As Defined by Author) 
The entrepreneurs' ability to react to changing iisk 
The entrepreneurst ability to anticipate need for 
change 
The entrepreneurs' familiarity with product and 
market 
The entrepreneurs' hi l iarity with technology 
enablers 
A functioaing prototype has already been 
developed 
TechnoIogy fàctors are changing rapidly 
Market fâctors are changing rapidly 
Customer need fàctws are changing rapidIy 
Research and development skills of the 
en treprenemfs) 
Financial skilis of the enîreprenein(s) 
Engineering skills of the entrepreneur(s) 
Production skilis of the entrepreneurfs) 
Venture offering is propnetary 
Venture offering cm be protected by a patent 
Venture offerhg is highly innovative 
Ventures' technical aspects are very clear 
The entrepreneurs' ability to put a ba land  
managemezit team in place 
The entrepreneurs' demonstrated Ieadaship ability 
in the past 
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'O Barflett Chi-square tests the hypothesis that the correlations are zero. 
Figure 5.7 
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5.7.1 Leader Interview Results 
The results of coding the interview data are provided in Table 5.5 and Table 




" Through the course of the coding, some segments were classifieci as 'w>mments', in otha words, 
they did not relate to any of the coding concept, The fiequency of occurrence data has been correctecl 





Interview Coding Results 




Techno logy Development Requirernent 
Techno logy Maturity 
Novelty of Application 
Proprietary Technoiogy Protection 
Required Technologies 
Techno logical Complexity 
Organizational Effectiveness 
Techno logical Vuinerability 
Required Knowledge 
Table 5.5 provides a summary of the most fiequently occurrïng assessrnent 
concepts, ranked according to their mean fiequency of occurrence. As indicated in 
Table 5.5, the lending expert assessment process is dorninated by management 
quaMy, followed by market characteristics of the venture. The remaining concepts 
bave a wide range of variance, reflecting the earlier findings that there are merences 
in the assessment concepts used by each expert. 
When these assessment concepts are grouped into the model variables, their 
fiequencies of occurrence can be examined. As shown in Table 5.6, the model is 
domhatecl by quality potential. This is not surprishg given the high fiequency of 
occurrence of management quality related issues. Care must be taken in interpreting 
these results however, as there may be a tendency among the lending experts to 
consider general management quality rather than those characteristics specifically 
related to the management of design and development teams. m e  not easily 
differentiated in this data, fùture research may consider this M e r .  
Among the non-'other issues' concepts, techno logical complexity is the next 
most fiequently considered mode1 variable. This is strongly idluenceci by risk 
considerations such as development requirements. F W y ,  issues associated with 
technological capabilities of the venture appear the least often. This is not surprishg 
considering that this is the assessrnent area most problernatic for lenders. As indicated 
by several of the interviewees, there is a high reliance on e x t e d  expertise in this 
part of the decision process. 
Table 5.6 









Quality Potential Management 
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Effectiveness 
m e r  Issues 
Table 5.7 
Interview High-LeveI Co ding Chi-Square Cornparison 





Table 5.7 examines the hypothesis that the fiequency of occurrence of mode1 
concepts is similar between lending experts in the study. As indicated, the most 
similar pair is S2-S5, while the least similar is S 1-S4. Aithough there are similarities 
in terms of the most fiequent concept, i.e. management quality, this reinforces the 
ciifference between the experts. To explore this M e r ,  the chi-squares were 
compared to the credibility indices developed in study 1. No wrreiation was found 
between credibility index, or clifference in credibility index, and the chi-square. As a 
fmd check, cluster analysis, Figure 5.8, was used to examine potential bias due to 
analysis of taped interviews compared to notes only. While the lowest difference is 
found between the two subject i n t e ~ e w s  (52, S5)  that reiied on notes, they do tend 
to be clustered with other interviewees whose interviews are taped. Thus, while some 
bias may have been introduced due to note taking during the interviews, its impact 
can be considered =ceptable. 
Figure 5.8 




5.8 Model 'Predictive' Validity 
Another aspect of  mode1 validation is its ability to describe or predict a 
venture outcorne (e-g.: Zikmund, 1994). Based on the proposed model, a prototype 
screening and assessrnent aidI2 was created (Appendix H) for use in three 
experiments. The fist experiment considered six short cases having a known 
outcorne, drawn fkom Bell (1 99 1 ). 
The next experiment, consisted of having a group o f  subjects assess an early- 
stage venture case ushg the prototype decision aid. This case was based on an actual 
techw logy-based start-up, modified to prevent identification of  the venture or 
l2 Refa to Appendix G for more information regarding the aeation of this tool. 
individuals, and was presented to assessors in two parts. For this case, the assessors 
were not provided with the outcome of the venture7 which is known to the researcher- 
Initially, the participants reviewed a business plan and were asked to screen the 
venture using the decision aid. In addition to the business plan, an envelope was 
provided containing information relevant at the time the business plan was produced, 
and one year later. The participants were again asked to provide an assessment of the 
venture with this additional information The objective of this validation stage is to 
provide fuaher insight into the predictive validity of the tooL 
The thkd validation expriment again d e s  use of an early-stage venture 
business plan based on a biotechnology venture. An expert panel was created to assist 
in the assessment of an actual proposai, consisting of a chemist and two 
microbiologist from the University of Waterloo as weU as an accountant. In addition 
to screening the venture using the proposed decision aid, the venture was also 
assessed using the Bell-Mason Diagnostic (Bell, 199 1). This provides a cornparison 
to another methodology descriid in the venture assessment literature. Unlike the fïrst 
two experiments, the outcome of this venture is not known. The venture assessment 
in this case wss compared to the Bell-Mason Diagnostic result and to a self- 
assessment by the venture. 
5.9 Mode1 Corn parison to 'Bellf Cases 
In this experiment a set of six short cases", two each of viable, 'marginally 
viable', and not viable, were presented to a group of assessors. For this expriment, 
venture cases were defined as marginally viable if they experienced difficdty during 
their start-up that could have led to the f d w e  of the venture. The result su- for 
each case is provided in Table 5.8 through Table 5.13. Each table provides a t- 
statistic for the hypothesis that the means of the judges is equal to the score providecl 
'' These cases are found m "High-Tech Ventures" by Beii, pages 276 - 310, and conskt of 
"Analytican, "Ovationn, "Cirrus Logic", "Gateway", "Gensymn and "Maspar". 
by the researcher. Graphical re~ults '~  are provided in Figure 5.9 îhrough Figure 5.1 1 
for the 'Analyticat case. The remaining charts may be found in Appendix 1. The 
subjects in this experiment consisted of three graduate students in the department of 
management sciences and a technology compmy executive. 
Table 5.8 
Case: Analytica (Not Viable) 
TechnoIogical Complexity 0.76 0-71 0.85 0.85 1 1 1.67 O. 19 
Figure 5.9 
'Analytica' Viability Chart -- Quality Potentiai vs. Technological 
O 0.2 O -4 0.6 0.8 1 
Technological Capability 
l4 The charts are based cm simulations of the mode1 discuswd in Appendix G and Appendix I. 
" A discussion of the index may be found in Appendix G. 
' AnaIyt ica' 
Figure 5.10 
Viability Chart -- Technological Complexity vs. Techno togical Capability 
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Case: Gensym (Marginal) 
Technological Capabiüty 0.71 0.85 0.71 0.85 0.85 
Technological Complexity 0.71 0.57 0.85 0.85 0.71 
Qualjty Potential 0.42 0-43 0.71 0.57 0.85 
Index 0.2 0.55 0.61 0.52 0.84 
Table 5.10 
Case: Gateway (Viable) 
t-statistic P(T, 2 t) 
(E-lo: S=R) 
Technologid Capability 0.85 0.85 1.0 0.85 0.85 
Technologid Complexity 0.47 0.71 0.71 0.57 0.43 
Quality Potential 0.78 0.57 0.85 1.0 0.85 
Index 0.85 0.53 0.86 0.92 0.85 
Table 5.1 L 
Case: Cimis Logic (Viable) 
Technological Complexity 0.47 0.7 1 0.85 0.42 0.57 
Quality Potential 0.78 0.86 0.85 1.0 0.71 1 0.84 1 1.29 0.29 
Index 0.85 0.87 0.67 0.91 0.79 1 0.86 1 
Table 5.12 
Case: Ovation (Nat Viable) 
Technological CapabilÏty 0.15 0.28 0.28 0.14 0.43 
Technological Complexity 0.67 0.71 0.85 0.85 0.85 
Qualay Potential 0.21 0.43 0-14 0.28 028 
Index 0-00 0-00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Table 5.1 3 
Case: MASPAR (Marginal) 
Quality Potential 0.71 0.57 0.85 1.0 0.85 0.80 
Index 0.62 0.00 0.67 0.89 0.84 1 0.84 
I 
Table 5.14 
F-Test of DBerence in Means for Cases 
t-statistic P(T, 2 t) 
@&,: S=R) 
Not Viable (O) 
Case: Analytica 
Case: Ovation 
Marginal Viability (0.5) 
Case: Gensym 
Case: Maspar 
Viable (1 .O) 
Case: Gateway 
Case: Cimis Logic 
Approximate F: 32.7 
DF: 2,27 
p = 0.000 (Bonferroni) 
To examine the moders capacity to discriminate between the three groups F- 
tests were performed16. The null hypothesis is that there is no Merence in means 
between the groups. In all cases, Table 5.14, the F-test indicates that there is a 
significant ciifference between the groups. The correlation of the index with venture 
viability was considered next, as shown in Table 5.15. The strong correlation in this 
analysis indicates that the viability index may be a useful assessrnent metric. 
Table 5.15 
V i a b w  Vs Index (Dependent Variable: Viability) 
SSE D.F. MSE 
Index 4.65 17 0.27 F: 9.46**** 
Error 0.35 12 0.03 
Correlation: 0.87**" 
Barîlett x2 3 8.69**** 
**** p~O.OOO5(Bonferron.i) 
5.10 Mode1 Cornparison to Venture 1 
In the previous experiment, there is a potentiai bias due to the fhct that the 
judges know the outcome of the case, hence innuencing their responses. In this 
experiment, a case", the outcome of which is not known, is provided to a group of 
zssessors. This case is of interest because it was funded by a group consisting of a 
venture capitalists and a venture capital fund. The case was assessed individually 
l6 F-tests were perfmed using the discriminant fimction in SYSTAT- 
I7 The case is based on an actual venture entahg the product development phase. It has been reviewed 
in accordance with the office of research to remove any information that may permit identifïcaticm of 
the venture or mdividuals involved. In addition, financial information and projects were removed fiom 
the case so that this information cannot be used to ideatm the venture. Case sections where 
information was removed was identifid to the participants. For exampie, îables mdicating expected 
expenditures were mcluded with the nwnericai information removed. 
rather than as an expert panel, by a group consisting of a Iending expert &om study 1, 
an accountant, an entrepreneur familiar with technology startups, and two PhD. 
students at the University of Waterloo. One of these graduate students has an 
extensive engineering background (1 8+ years). 
The e x p e k n t  was conducted in three stages. Stage one was to review the 
venture business plan. Stage two was to provide the participants wÏth additiond 
information in two parts. Part one consisted of information which would have been 
available to the assessor had they gone to the venture as part of a due diligence 
process. The second part of the additional information consisted of information 
available if they had re-visited the venture approximately one year later. 
There are two issues of interest in this experiment: How is the venture 
assessed at each tirne period? How well do the respondents agree? Not ody  does 
this provide an indication of the tool's predictive validity, it provides an indication of 
the methods inter-expert reliability and its usefûlness as a monitoring tool. The resutts 
of each assessrnent period may be seen in Table 5.16 through Table 5.1 8. 
Table 5.16 
h i a l  Venture Business Plan 
Index 0.85 0.52 0.05 0.82 0.78 1 0.77 
As indicated in Table 5.16, four of the five assessors considered the venture to 
be viable after reviewing the business plan only. Of these four, one considered the 
venture to be marginal (S2), while in one case the venture was cunsidered dehitely 
not viable (S3), based on the viability index and location on the charts (Appendk I). 
This r e d t  is consistent with the fact that in the real case the venture was b d e d .  
Table 5 - 1 7 
Additional Venture Information - Part 1 
Technologid Complexity 0.85 0.85 0.61 0.85 
0A5 1 o.8o 
Table 5.1 8 
Additional Venture Idiormation - Part II 
Quality Potential 0.67 0.42 0.35 0.42 0.42 
Index 0.004 0.001 0.05 0.001 0.001 
0.49 
0.08 
Index 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.001 1 0.00 
Technologid Capability 0.33 0.57 0.62 0.57 0.57 
Technologicai Complexity 0.85 0.85 0.71 0.85 0.86 
Quality Potential 0.33 0.28 0.28 0.28 0.57 
When additional information, based on what would have ken  observed had 
the subjects visited the venture as part of their due diligence process was provided, 
the assessment changes as indicated in Table 5.17. Based on the viability index, ail 
subjects considered the venture to be 'not viable' after reviewing the additionai 
information. The implication of this is that the venture would not be considered for 
M e r  investment at this point, which eventuaily would be the correct decision 
Further additional information, Table 5.18 reinforces this hding. A graphicd 
example of the assessment process is provided in Figure 5.12 to 5.14, with more 





Venture Assessrnent versus Time 
Group t-statistics, Ho: No DBerence between Periods, Pooled Variance, D.F: 8 
Tecbnological Capabïlity 3 -77. 1.37 3.9 1 
Technological Complexity -1.61 -0.3 6 - 1.97 
Quality Potential 1.80 2.24 3.60' 
Index 3-93. 1.16 4.02. 
To examine this assessrnent process M e r ,  group t-statistics were examined 
as shown in Table 5.19. This tests the null hypothesis that there is no merence 
between the groups. In other words, the additional information was not changing the 
assessor's perception of the venture viability. 
Table 5.20 
Mode1 - Time Correlation 
Time 
Techno logical Complexity 0.5 1 -0.54 1 .O0 
Index -0.74' 0.77" -0.56 0.84"" 1 .O00 
Bartlett X2: 42.9**** 
**** p 1 O.OOl(Bonferroni) 
*** p 1 0.005 
** p L 0.01 
r(t p i 0.05 
As cm be seen, the most significant difference encountered between the initial 
information (business plan oniy) and the first supplement is in the perceived 
technological capability. When the correlation between the mode1 variables over the 
three time penods is considered, Table 5.20, perceived technological capabilÏty 
decreased as more information was provided. The perceived technoiogical complexity 
did not appear to change significantly with additional information. However, 
examination of the difference between the initial information and the two 
supplernents indicates that the perceived quality potential was also decreasing. 
To illustrate this fbrther, the progress of assessment process for subject S1 
shown in Figure 5.12 through Figure 5.14. As can be seen in this case, the initial 
venture assessment places it in the viable region. However, as information is added, 
the venture tends to move into the marginal region, and in the case of Figure 5.12 and 
5.13, moves near the hot viable' boundary. The final information supplement places 
the venture completely in the 'not viable' region. 
Figure 5.12 
Quality Potential vs. TechnoIogicd Capability for Each Time 
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Figure 5.1 3 
Techno logical Co mplexity vs. Technological Capability for Each T h e  Step 
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Figure 5.14 
Technological Complexity vs. Quality Potential for Each Time Step 
Subject S 1 and Mean (cross) 
1 L 1 I 1 
O 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1 
Quality Potential 
5.11 Model Cornparison to Venture II 
Unlike the fUst two experiments, the outcome of the venture in this case is not 
known The objective is to examine the usefulness of the methodology when dealing 
wah an expert panel, hence inter-expert reliabiiay, and to compare it wah another 
venture assessment method fiom the literature, specifïcally the Bell-Mason 
Diagnostic (Bell, 199 1). Cornparison with another tool addresses confidence validity 
by examinhg assessment agreement and provides a basis for evaluating relative 
strengîhs and weaknesses. 
5-11.1 Expert Panel Assessrnent 
This case considers an early stage (concept stage) biotechnology - 
pharmaceuticals venture1* that is king proposed for venture capital funding. To 
assess this case, an expert panel was created, consisting of the researcher, two 
microbiologists (One PtLD.) and a chemist (PLD.) on staff at the University of 
Waterloo and a Management Sciences graduate student with extensive accounting 
background. Each of the members of the panel was given a copy of the business plan 
as well as a copy of the assessment tool. The dennitions and usage of the tool was 
reviewed with each prior to beginning the venture assessment. While the panel 
members completed theix assessments individudy, Table 5.21, they were fiee to 
discuss their opinions with other participant S. 
Table 5.21 provides a su- of the panel assessment wing the viabiljr 
method (Appendix H). The t-statistic is provided as a measure of the agreement 
between the researcher and the other judges, testing the nul1 hypothesis that there is 
no ciifference in the judgements. 
As an additional indicator of the agreement between the judges, an 
approximate chi-square statistic was calculated by taking the ratio of the maximum to 
minimum variance. Based on this, using eight degrees of fieedom (df 8), the venture 
l8 Permission fOr assessrnent of this case was obtained h m  die venture under nmdisclosure. 
assessrnent scores do not appear to be significantly different. This agreement among 
the judges is also apparent when examuling the viability plots, Figure 5.16 through 
Figure 5.18. 
Table 5.2 1 
Expert Panel Assessment ResuIts 
R SI S 2  S3 S4 Mean t-statistic P(T, 2 t) 
@&:S=R) 
Technological Capability 0.28 0.29 0.28 0.42 0- 14 0.28 
Techn01~cal CompIexity 0.85 0.71 0.71 0.71 0.85 0-77 
Quality Potential 0.42 0-43 0.36 0.43 0.14 0-36 
Variance 0.088 0.045 0.052 0.027 0.168 
Index 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.008 0.0 0.0 
Approximate 2 6.2 
Figure 5.15 
Expert Panel Clustering 
The assessments by the various judges were ako examined using cluster 
anaiysis. As shown in Figure 5.15, the closest c!uste~g is among the scientific 
members of the panel (SI, S2, S3), while the greatest difference is associates with 
the judge with an accountiag background. This is of interest in te= of inter-expert 
reliability in that although they tended to look at different aspects of the venture, and 
had different perspectives as indicated by the cluster analysis, their assessrnent 
outcornes were in agreement. 
As indicated by the graphs, Figure 5.16 to Figure 5.18, there is good 
agreement aniong the judges. In Figure 5.16, the judges considered the venture to be 
in or on the boundary of the 'not viable' region, indicating that if the venture were to 
proceed, it has little chance of successfully reaching market introduction as currently 
configured. Also, Figure 5.16 indicates that there was consensus that the venture has 
Io w techno log ical capability and quality potentiai. 
Figure 5.16 
Quality Potential vs. TechnoIogical Capability: Case B Expert Panel 
Technolog ical Capability 
Figure 5.17 
Techno logical CompIexity vs. Techno logical Capability: Case B Expert Panel 
0.2 O -4 0.6 0.8 
Technological Capability 
Figure 5.1 8 
Technological Complexity vs. Quality Potential: Case B Expert Panel 
Quality Potential 
Examination of the remaining graphs, Figure 5.17 and Figure 5.18, indicates 
that there is consensus that the proposed venture was 'not viable'. Note that this 
simply reflects the opinion of the panel that the venture, as configured at the point in 
time when assessed was weak and not Iikely to successfully reach the market 
introduction stage. This is not to say that the concept is %ad', rather that the venture 
needs to underîake steps to improve both its technological capability and quality 
potential before proceeding. 
5.1 1.2 Corn parison with BeU-Mason Diagnostic 
The next objective is to provide an assessment of confidence validity by 
cornparhg the viability assessment with the assessment using another tool. A probIem 
encountered when assessing early-stage, techmlogy-based ventures is that there are 
very few tools specifically designed for this stage. As such, the Ben-Mason 
Diagnostic' @ell, 199 l), while not specincdy intended for very early stage ventures, 
is one of the few and was chosen for this experiment based on Ïts availability in the 
Literature and its appropriateness for assessing early stage ventures. 
The BelIIMason Diagnostic consists of a set of venture success criteria, 
determined empirically fiom case research, organized dong several dimensions. Each 
of these criteria is presented as a question requiring a yesho a m e r .  The scores for 
each dirnen~ion'~, provided in Table 5.22, simply reflet the proportion of 'yes' 
responses for each. To determine an overail rating, the majority opinion was used, 
providing a score based on whether each question associated with a dimension 
received a majority of 'yes' or 'no' responses. A tie was considered to be a 'yes' 
response20. 
-- - - 
l9 Refa to Appaidix 1 for more details on the expert panel respcmses. Note that only four of the five 
menbers of the panel were available for this stage of the experiment. 
This le& to an optimistic aggregation of the votes, which is a moderately less nsk-averw approach. 
Table 5.22 
Bell-Mason Diagnostic Scores for Case II 
- .  . - -  . . . -  
R S1 S3 S4 Majority 
Techno logy/Engineering 
Operations 
F k c e  and Cash Flow 






Figure 5.19 graphicdy illustrates the scores given by expert panel member 
'S4', as well as the majonty assessment. Examination of the 'Subject S4' plot indicates 
that the venture was given relatively a high score for its business plan, and weaker for 
several other dimensions such as marketing. Similarly, the Majority' plot illustrates 
that the proposed venture scored moderately well in terms of its business and 
marketing plans and management team, while having a lower score for 
techno logy/engineering- 
Overall, the diagnostic indicates that the proposed venture has weahesses in 
the technology-engineering dimension. This is consistent with the assessment using 
the viability approach. In terms of the management team, the diagnostic indicates that 
the venture has some strength in that dimension, although the CE0 and Board of 
Directos dimension scored very poorly. This is not s-sing for a venture at this 
stage as it has yet to form a Board and the CE0 is one of the concept team. 
Figure 5-19 
Bell-Mason Diagnostic Results 
Technol ogyEngineering Subiect S4 
Finance and Cash 
Board of Directors 
Flow 
Technology/Engineering Maioritv Vote 
Business PIan 
ance and Cash 
Board of Directors 
When compared to the viability approach 
scores relatively low. This difference is principal1 y 
Flow 
the quality potential dimension 
due to the focus on engineering 
and planning management rather than general management skills. Finally, the Bell- 
Mason Diagnostic does not reflect the complexity of the proposed venture and as 
such rnakes impact of the strengths and weaknesses less apparent. 
5.12 Discussion 
An objective of this study is to seek validation for a viability theoretic view of 
venture assessment. The most important consideration at this stage of theory 
development is constnict valide. This ieads to two questions: 1s there support for the 
existence of the hypothesized model constructs? Are the expected relationships are 
present ? 
Regarding the existence of the hypothesized constnicts, analysis of the 
investor data appears to support their presence in the assessment process. This is 
further supported by the examination of the lending experts. Using a coding protocol 
based on the proposed model evidence was found that these concepts are present in 
their assessment process. This analysis is based on the assumption that expert 
investon and lenders tend to use concepts and criteria that are reflected in the 
proposed model. Analysis also indicates that the expected model relationships are 
present, with several of the hypothesized relationships are apparent in the Ulvestor 
data. 
Based on the proposed rnodel a prototype assessment aid was developed. This 
leads to the next validity issue, predictive validity. Two experiments were devised to 
investigate this, with evidence was found to suppoa the predictive validity. Further, 
the second of these experiments illustrates the fiamework's potential as a monitoring 
tool. It was shown that venture progress can be tracked over time, and hence provides 
a basis for an 'early warning' system. As discussed previously, at this stage of a 
venture's evolution the concept may have merit, but the issue of the venture's capacity 
to successfully reach market development must be addressed. 
In t e m  of inter-expert reliability, the last three experiments indicate that 
although the participants considered different aspects of the cases, their assessrnent s 
tend to converge when using the fmmework. The number of subjects chosen for each 
of the case assessments was intended to reflect a typical assessment team This was 
also apparent when the decision aid was used with an expert panel. Although they 
came f?om different backgrounds and perspectives, their assessments were s idar.  
The final validity issue to be considered was confidence valide. To explore 
this, the expert panel also assessed the venture using an additional tool the Beil- 
Mason Diagnostic (Bell, 1991). This tool provides a wider view of the venture and 
addresses issues such as marketing and sales that were considered outside the scope 
of the present research. Further, it is intended for use at all stages of venture 
evolution, although is considered appropriate for early-stage ventures. 
Overail, the diagnostic and viability fiameworks identifid simila 
wealmesses. The majority score indicates serious deficiencies, and hence may be a 
poor investment candidate. As with the viability fiamework, Ït does not indicate 
whether the venture concept is 'good' or %ad', only the state of the venture. A major 
dBerence between the viabiWy fiamework and the Bell-Mason Diagnostic is the 
fbmework's ability to provide an indication of the severity of the venture weakness, a 
feature that many of the participants wted2'. 
2 1 A short pst-test questionnaire (Appendix 1) was administered to the participants to assess perceived 
tool usefîhess and clarity. The participants indicated fkirly strong agreement with the assessment 
outcome (median: 6 on 7-point scale). 
Median m=7) 
Tool Appropriateness 6 
Clarity of Instructions 6 
Perceived Usefiihess 6 
Chapter 6 
Conclusions and Future Research 
At a fùndamental level, what motivates this type of research? From the 
perspective of a Iender, it is to reduce the risk that their loan will defadt. For investors, it 
is to make money - to identi@ those ventures that have a high potential r e m  on their 
investment. In the case of entrepreneurs and venture management, it is to understand how 
to create a successful venture, typically in terms of financial success. For the academic, it 
is the need to understand what mechanisms are at work in the evolution of successfül 
ventures. 
The common thread nrnning through these points-of-view is the need to 
understand the mechanisms that lead to successfûl ventures. To this end, much of the 
prior research has focussed on the criteria used by experts when assessing ventures in an 
effort to idente those characteristics that are predictors of success. Closely related to this 
has k e n  the development of increasingly sophisticated statistical models for use by 
lenders and investors as decision aids. 
A potential shortcoming of statistical models of venture performance is that while 
well suited for understanding the past, they have wealmess when atteqting to forecast 
firture behaMour and events. Although these models will ofien outperform forecasting by 
experts (e-g. Dawes, 1982), they degenerate to speculation when forecasting significantly 
into the future. A possible expianation for this may be seen when viability is considered. 
As long as the systern under consideration is stable, the forecasts may have some validity. 
Further, if it is evolving slowly relative to model updates short-term forecasts will 
remain relatively accurate. However, when the system is changing rapidly relative to the 
model or is subject to discontinuities, then forecasting will have diniculties and may even 
be irrelevant, 
The overall goal of this research has been to increase understanding of venture 
assessment, which has led to three studies. The fist examined the assessment beaaviour 
of Ienders, wMe the second considered investors through the development of model 
based on attribution theory. The third study considered the venture as an evolving system 
and examined an assessment h e w o r l c  based on viability. 
The initial study of lender behaviour found that; when viewed in terms of the 
criteria, lenders and investors act in similar ways. Thus, if there are differences among 
these groups, as anecdotally reported, they may be at a deeper leveL The implication is 
that there is little value added by simply examining their criteria, rather it is the 
relationships between them that are of potential interest. To this end, f kzy  cognitive 
maps were developed to explore the interactions of the assessment criteria While this 
increases the understanding of how criteria may be related, the question of what 
dserentiztes groups of lenders and investors remains. 
This search for underlying structure led to the second study, which considered the 
assessment decision process within a fiamework based on attribution theory. Using thiç 
approach, apparent ciiffierences were identified between investor groups dong three 
dimensions, control, specificity, and a moderator variable. While the moderator will be 
multidimensio~ including more than risk aversion, it was assumed to be the dominant 
influence. Examinhg groups of investors within this h e w o r k  indicated that their 
differences are a h c t i o n  of required levels of perceived control and specificity, 
dominated by stability. 
The attriiution model also implied a decision surface, with reject and accept 
regions. Examination of this surface illustrated the role of risk aversion in expanding or 
contracting these regions. Further, risk aversion was seen to have two components, 
systemic N k  aversion that accounted for the clustering of dBerent investor groups on 
this surface, and individual risk aversion that accounted for the variation within the 
group. This also provided a potential explanation of why some individual criteria sets are 
larger than others. The increased information tends to reinforce the perceived levels of 
control and specificiîy, thereby reducing uncertainty to acceptable levels in terms of risk 
and ambiguity tolerance. 
The attribution fiamework provided insights into the assessment process, however it 
did not adequately address several questions: Why can different assessors operate with 
dinerent subsets of criteria and still be successfiil? Why dont all successfùl practitioners 
use a specific criteria set? Fzuther> a major shortcornhg with a d e r i a  based approach is 
that it provides no indication of what action should be taken in the case of missing 
information. This is a particularly important issue for very early stage ventures as they 
may be missing many of the characteristics that are king considerd by a criteria-based 
view. 
The third study was exploratory, focussing on model-development and examined the 
assessment of eady stage, technology based ventures fiom the point of view of viabilïty. 
This takes a system view of ventures, specifically that of coq lex  systems evolving 
under uncertahty like those found in evolutionary biology (Aubiu, 1991). When 
considering the viability of a venture-system, there are many interacting components, 
such as market and financiai viability. While these viability components are always of 
concem, technological viability is arguably the dominant consideration for these early 
stage ventures. 
W ' i  this fiamework, the structure of technological viability c m  be explored which 
has implications not ody for understanding the process, but also for improving it. 
Further, it provides a starting point for considering several of the questions posed. 
Consider the questions: Why c m  individuals operate with daerent subsets of criteria and 
still be successful? Why dont a l l  successfbi practitioners use a specific criteria subset? 
Lenders and investors appear to be drawing firom the same general set of assessment 
criteria, with no unique content ciifferences between the groups. However, within these 
groups, individuals appear to have unique sets of criteria and perceiveci relationships. So, 
why dont aU successfiil. venture assessors evolve to use the same criteria set? From a 
systems-theory point of view, an assessment practitioner may be thought of as building 
an estimation model that is attempting to define venture-system states. Thus, d e r i a  sets 
may be viewed as king  based on the assessment practitioner's attri'bution of the success 
of these indicators when estirnating venture viability. When viewed fiom a viabilÏty 
theory perspective, the estimation is not unique, hence there is no unique set of criteria. 
While there are theoreticai arguments that make this viey of a venture's evolution 
compelling, is there evidence that this is what occurs in practice? To iuvestigate this 
m e r ,  a model was proposed and validation sought. The objective was to evaluate the 
potential of this approach as the basis of an assessment aid. Based on the results of study 
three, there are indications that the components of technological viability are present. 
Further, tbis also suggests potential areas for improving early stage venture assessrnent 
and management, such as assessment of a venture's 'quality potential'. 
Perhaps the main contribution of this research is the movement away fiom a criteria 
based view of assessment to a system view. As for the examination of criteria, there is no 
'magic bullet' set of criteria, rather t is the estimation of viability that is important. As for 
assessment of ventures, the goal of predicting the wxt Microsoft when it is a start-up is a 
fool's errand. It is not more attainable than predicting the weather ten years into the 
fûture. At best, the current venture viability can be estimated and monitored over its 
evolution, as illustrated in the third study. 
6.1 Potential Shortcomings 
The studies undertaken in this research are not without their shortcomings and areas 
for potential improvement. In the fust study, validation of the cognitive maps is 
problematic. Ideally, comparing the model output to that of an actual expert for an 
accepted and rejected venture would be undetaken. However, in the case of the lending 
experts, two problems arise. First is the difnculty of obtaining access to realistic venture 
information due to privacy considerations. A possLble approach would be to develop a 
case that can be used by the experts as an assessment exarnple. The difficulty is in 
developing a case that has sufficient richness to be a realistic test. A related problem is 
the Wcul ty  in obtaining reject information, as the lending organizations do not track or 
retain information on ventures that are not accepted. Again, cases could be used, but it 
would be difEïcult to create a realistic reject csrse. 
Another approach that was investigated is to create a questionnaire to confirm the 
relationships identined in the cognitive maps. The difficulty encountered with this 
approach is that it requires confirmation of the concepts and relationships, resulting in 
2500 questions. This is undoubtedly an infeasible approach. Even when customized to 
each expert, there are 700 potenihl questions. 
Another potential shortcoming with the fkst study is inter-coder reliability. In this 
study a single investigator perfonned the operator-element analysis and subsequent 
coding. A possible improvement to the study would be to train several independent 
analysts in the methodology and compare the results. The approach used in this study is 
not simply a case of applying a defined protocol to transcribed utterances, but requires 
the analyst to consider the context of each. This requires familiarity with the topic area, 
the methodology and the interview information. As a resuit, the use of multiple analysts 
was not considered feasible in this case. 
In the second study, a potential weakness is bias in the mapping of the criteria factors 
to the attrribution rnodel. To minimixe this, the mapping was compared to that of a set of 
independent judges. These judges were selected fiom graduate students in the department 
of management sciences who were fkdïar with many cf the concepts embodied in the 
criteria. However, these judges did not have signifïcant familiarity with amibution theory 
or the proposed modeL Given this, the level of agreement between the experimenter and 
the judges is quite good A potential area of improvement in this study may be to provide 
a seminar to a set of judges to increase then fàmiliarity and then compare their opinions 
of criteria classification. 
The third study has several potential problems related to the data suïtability. Future 
studies are required to develop z data set that is focused more clearly on early stage 
technology-based ventures. The best approach would be to idente several ventures at 
the seed stage and follow them in a long-term longitudinal study. However, a difficulty 
when iindertaking any research on this stage of venture evolution is the srna11 available 
sample. Identification requires close cooperation with organizations and individu& that 
will be approached eariy by these ventures. This approach is complicated by a tendency 
for many investors to avoid ventures that are at the very early stages of product 
development . 
6.2 Future Research 
In this research several studies have k e n  undertaken and discussed. Through the 
development of models and prototype tools, the potentid of different research avenues 
has ben considered, with the overall objective of under%anding and improving early 
stage venture assessment. These paths suggest several potential areas of fiture research 
6.2.1 Assessrnent Practices 
In tenns of venture assessment practices, and the problems encountered by lenders 
when assessing new high technology, howledge-intensive ventures, perhaps the problem 
is not one of assessing the ventures at aU. Rather, it is an issue of bmdary spanning and 
technology forecasting. As such, this may be an area of research that has potential 'value 
added' for lending decision-making. To this end, it is proposed that curent practice 
arnong lenders and investors with respect to technology forecasting and boundary 
spanning are examined. 
6.2.2 Attribution Theory 
A premise of this research is that nsk aversion, systemic and individual, is a dominant 
factor for the moderator in the proposed attribution model. Further examination of the 
impact of other factors, such as ambiguity intolerance, on the decision process need to be 
undertaken This research would require mûaniles of risk aversion, ambiguity intolerance 
and other personality characteristics to be meanired aiong with control and specficity 
parameters duriog the decision process. 
In the second study, the 'end' points of the decision have k e n  considered. However, 
the dynaxnics of the decision process as the assessor acquires idionnation and reduces 
uncertainty would be of interest. Future research to examine these dynamics would 
require think-aloud sessions to be conducteci with investors as they are in the prncess of 
evaiuating a venture. As this is a long-term process, occurring over the time span of hours 
to weeks, such a study would involve many interview sessions and therefore would be 
logistically difficult . 
6-23 Viability Based Assessrnent 
The third study in this research explored a viability-theoretic fiamework for venture 
assessment. While this study demonstrated the application of the model, work is required 
to refine the model and it's component F M  (see AppendYi G). Further, an assumption 
in the curent model is that the product is completely dehed at the start of the 
development phase. Future iterations of the model will remove this assumption. 
The logical next stage is to extend the models to include other aspects of viability as 
well as to strengthen its empirical foundation and test propositions that have been 
generated. This research is envisaged as a relatively long-term longitudinal study of 
several ventures as they evolve through the concept and start-up stages. As with most 
research in this area the principal diflticuity will be i d e n t w g  ventures early enough to 
be of value. While studies of ventures that have evolved beyond this stage c m  provide 
usefiil data, a wmmon dficulty is selection bias. In other words, these ventures have 
survived and may be considered to have ken viable while those that did not survive may 
be of rnost interest. 
A possLble approach to data aiialysis for such a longitudinal study is data 
enveloprnent analysis (DEA). The idea of viability regions seems conceptually similar to 
the concept of an efficient 6rontier in DEA. This relationship is in itself a potential area 
of fùture research, 
In tenns of venture management, this k e w o r k  pvides  an approach for monitoring 
and control, This may be achieved through identification of development milestones as 
the venture evolves, and the application of 'backcastmgr. Periodic monitoring then 
provides a tool for tracking the venture's development and determining ifit has remained 
on a viable txajectory. 
6.2.4 Development of Decision Support Aids 
As discussed in the introductory chapter, the goal is to develop a toolbox of 
assessment ai&. Each of the studies has implication for the development of toolbox 
components. There are several toolboxes avdable for hancial analysis associated with 
packages such as MATLAB and EXCEL. The objective would be to create add-ons that 
provide intelligent tools for coping with many of the intangibles associated with these 
early stage ventures. 
In the first study, the application of cognitive maps in aggregating expert 
opinions was illustrated When the aggregate map is examiaed, the focus is on 
management quaiity issues. This may provide the basis for a decision tool to help assess 
this aspect of the venture. 
The second study illustrates the potential impact of issues such as risk aversion in 
the decision process and the need to 'calibrate' tools to user groups. Fuaher, it may be of 
interest to explore decision tools which attempt to assess the stability of information 
king  acquired during the decision process. 
The third study, viability-based assessrnent, suggests a set of constraints to be 
evaluated and monitored. This may have the greatest potential for a new decision suppoa 
tooi. A possible approach based on this approach is to develop a knowledge-based system 
to evaluate the venture viability coupled wah a database for backcasting. In addition, 
evaluation of the model also suggests several tools for assessing capability and 
complexity- For example, the application of kno wledge-mapping (eg. : Sparkes and 
Guild, 1999) for assessing synergy and absorptive capacity may be w f u l  additions to the 
toolbox. 
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Appendix A - Abstract of Bachher, 1994 
One of the main difEculties that early stage technology-based companies in 
Canada fàce is obtaining equity capital to aid their growth. This study provides an 
understanding of the decision-making criteria currently used by Canadian equity 
investors to evaluate technology-based companies seeking early stages of financing 
(seed, start-up or first stages). Three diffierent types of investors were shidied: Business 
Angels @As), Private Venture Capitalists (PVCs) and Public Venture Capital Funds 
(PVCFs). The group merences in their decision-making criteria between evaluating an 
early stage technology based and non-techology-based company were determined- Data 
were collected using survey questionnaires administered through personal inte~ews. 
The key and important decision m a h g  criteria used by these investors were 
grouped into five categories: characteristics of the entrepreneur(s), characteristics of the 
market targeted by the venture, characteristics of the venture offering (product or 
service), investor(s) requirements and characteristics of the investment proposal fiom the 
venture to the investor(s). Results fiom the study showed that there are signincant 
differences between the criteria used by these types of investors when evaluating early 
stage technalogy and non-technology based companies. For example, all investor types 
consider characteristics of the venture offering (product or seNice) with a significantly 
higher degree of importance when evaluating an early stage technology based company 
as compared to an early stage non technology based company. Results also showed that 
PVCFs appear to make a greater number of investments in early stage technology based 
companies than PVCs in Canada at this time. Lastly, both PVCFs and BAS showed 
similar investment patterns (in terms of number of investments) at the early stages of a 
Company. 
In conclusion, we expect that entrepreneurs will have increased chances of 
success ifthey know what Canadian equaty investors are looking for as they decide where 
to lend their support among our technology based enterprises. 
Appendix B - Analysis of Investor Data 
B.1 Business Angel C riteria t-Tests 
Acce~t Rej& 
Criterian Mean SD N Mean SD N Difference PooIed SD t pvalue 
Accept Reject 
Criterion Mean SD N Mean SD N Diffaence Pooled SD t p-value 
Accept Reject 
Criterian Mean SD N Mean SD N Difference Pooled SD t p-vdue 
94 4.900 1.683 20 5.053 1.545 19 -0.153 2.615 -0.295 0.616 
95 3,944 1359 18 4.000 1.458 17 -0.056 1.847 -0,121 0.548 
B.2 Private Venture Capitaüst Criteria t-Tests 
A-t Rej& 
Criteaicm Mean SD N Mean SD N Difference Pooled SD t pvalue 
Accqt Reject 
Critaion Mean SD N Mean SD N Difference Pooled SD t p-value 
Accept Reject 
Criteriou Mean SD N Mean SD N Difference Pooled SD t p-value 
90 6 1.764 19 5.333 1.970 18 0.667 3.486 1 .O86 0.861 
9 1 5.053 1.177 19 4,778 1.166 18 0.275 1.3 73 0.713 0.762 
92 4.895 1.629 19 4.833 1.618 18 0.06 1 2.637 0.1 15 0.546 
93 4.316 1.529 19 4.444 1.247 18 -0.129 1,959 -0.279 0.390 
94 4.579 1-677 19 4.588 1.543 17 -0.009 2.610 -0.017 0.493 
95 3.706 1.359 17 3.938 1.063 16 -0.232 1.499 -0.543 0294 
B.3 Public Venture Capital Fund Criteria +Tests 
Critericm Mean SD N Mean SD N Difference Pooled SD t p-value 
Accept Reject 
Criterion Mean SD N Mean SD N Difference Pooled SD t p-value 
Accept Reject 
Criteaion Mean SD N Mean SD N Difference Pooled SD t  value 
B.4 Criteria Importance Principal Components Anaiysis 
Table B. la  
Factor Analysis of Criteria Importance, AU Investor Groups 
(Li2 0.50) 




The entrepreneurs' fhiliarity with customer requiremaits 
Quality of cornpetitor analysis 
The entrepreneurs' fimiliarity with business cirivers 
Track record of co-investors in the deai 
Proposeci venture wiIl create a new market or niche 
Quality of product analysis 
There are ottier co-investors present in the mvestment 
A functioning prototype has already been developed 
The entrepreneurs' fàmiliarity with product and market 
Ease to evaiuate proposal by investor(s) 
Table B.1 b 
Factor Analysis of Criteria Importance, AU Investor Groups 
(Li 2 0.50) 
pp - - - 





CIarity of communication in proposal 
Overall quality of proposal 
Completeness of venture proposal 
Effectiveness of graphies, tables and figures m the proposal 
Financial skiils of the entrepreneur(s) 
Marketing research skills of the aitrepraieur(s) 
Clear ernphasis on key points 
Production skilIs of the entreprenetnfs) 
Quaiity of financial analysis 
Quality of market analysis 
Sales force and/or distn'butim skiSls of the entrepreneur(s) 
Advertising and promotion skiils of the enîrepreneur(s) 
The entrepreneurs' demcmstrated leadership ability in the past 
4 5.5 67 Investor's f'amiliarity with the technology of the venture 0.914 
66 Investor's hiliarity with the industry of the venture 0.913 
69 Investor's familiarity with the market targeted by the venture 0.903 
68 Investor's familiarity with the offering @roduct or service) of 0.806 
îhe venture 
72 Ability to attract a viable investor group 0.572 
65 The venture's stage of deveiopment (e.g. seed, start-up, flust- 0.527 
stage, second stage 
Table B. lc 
Factor Analysis of Criteria Importance, Al1 Investor Groups 
(Li r 0.50) 




5 6.6 10 The entrepreneurs' fhiliarity with technology enabIers 0.855 
1 The entrepreneurs' abiIity to react to changing risk 0.803 
30 Proposed venture is s-g an existing market need 0.700 
2 The entrepreneurs' ability to anticipate need for &ange 0.698 
49 Venture can demonstrate a defendable compeîitive position 0.657 
14 The entrepreneurs' management cornmitment to success 0.633 
55 Expected market risk to the investor(s) 0.577 
B.5 Lender Concept to Attribution Model Coding 
Table B .2 
Assessment Concept to Attribution Classification Mapping 
Attniut ion Model Classification Lender Assessrnent Concept 
Environmental Muence / Control Venture Market Understvlding Required Capitalization 
Proprietary Techno logy 
Product Potential 
Market Leadership Potential 
Market Focus 
Market Access 
Market Growth Potential 
Investment Cycle 
Industry Growth Potential 
Table B.2 
Assessment Concept to Attriiution Classification Mapphg 
Attri'bution Mode1 Classification Lender Assessrnent Concept 
Venture hternal Control Venture Protection 





Development Team Vulnerabilky 
Development Team Quality 
Development Team Capabilities 
Devebpment Team Management 
Development Team Experieace 












Market Forecast Credibw 
Product Existence 
Management Commitment 
Management Co hesiveness 
Financùig Availability 




Cash-flow Potential Credibility 
Cash-flow Potential 




Assessrnent Concept to Attribution Classification Mapping 




Venture Growth Potential 










Business Pian Existence 
Business Plan Completeness 
Business Plan Quaiity 

Thank you for participating in this phase of our smali business investment decision 
making study. Your responses will remain confidentid and any reported results wiU 
contain aggregated results only. Before beginniog, please tell us a iittle about yourself. 
What is your highest level of education? 
How long have you been associateci with this 
organization? 
Konours Degret 0 MBA 
[7 1 year 6 to 10 y- 0 16to20 Ycars 
[71 to~years  17 Il  to ISYears More than 20 Years 
1 lm3Y- 0 5 to IO Years [7 more than 15 Years 
How long has it been since you f i s h e d  
formal ectucaîion? 
OLessthanlYcar O 3 t o S ~ e a r s  I7 loto LSYcars 
in terms of ernployees, what is the typicai 0 1-5 ppie 
size of a srna11 wmpany you d d  with? 1 1 1 - 20 people 0 51 - 75 p o p l c ~  
Which group best describes your educational 
background? 
(7 O B&~SS 0 Mathtmatics 
0 Science 0 Engineering oother 
1 C] Slk-SiOOk 0 MSIk - 6500k more than $ 1,000k I 
In terrns of mual saies, what is the typical 
size of a small ampany you d d  with? 
How long have you been involved in the 1 O Lass than 1 Year 0 3 to 5 yearr O 10 to 15 Years 
evaluation of srna11 ventures? I 
0 ~ 5 0 k  CI s101k-S250k CI S501k-$I.OOOk 
1 0 1 to 3 ~ e a r s  ff 5 to 10 Years a more than 15 Years I 
How many s m d  ventiaes do you assess in a 
y ear ? 
I n s1oo.000 to S500,000 to O more thm S250,ûûû s750,oOo S I,000,000 I 
1 - 1 0  26-50 O 76- 100 
0 11-25 0 51 -75 0 more than 100 
How large is the typicai 'invstmmt' in one 
of these ventures? 
' L ~ J  th. S~OO,QOO $ 2 5 0 , ~  to O S750,oOO to 
SSO0,oOo Si ,OOO,OOO 
Faculty of Engineering 
Department of Management 
Science The University w = t t ~ ~ ~ .  o o h ~ ,  Canada 
N2L 3G1 
of Waterloo rel. ind F-: (5 19) 888-4567 
Research Consent 
I agree to participate in the research k ing  undertaken by Douglas Sparkes of the 
Department of Management Sciences under the supenlsion of Dr. Paul Guild. I have 
made this decision based on the information provided in the information letter provided 
to me, and have had the oppominity to receive any additional details 1 wanted regarding 
this research. As a participant in this study I realize tbat 1 am king asked to complete an 
initial questionnaire which wilI take 5 to 10 minutes, a set of not more than 4 i n t e ~ e w s  
of approximately 1 hour duration, and a set of not more than 3 follow-up questionnaires 
of approximately 15 minutes duration. 1 understand that 1 may d e c h e  to answer any of 
the questions, if1 so choose. 1 also understand that 1 may withdrawai this consent at any 
tirne. AU infiormation 1 provide will be held in confidence, and 1 will not be identïfîed in 
the thesis or other related research publications. 1 also understand that this project has 
been reviewed and received ethics clearance through the Office of Research Ethics at the 
University of Waterloo. Any questions or concems about the study or your participation 




Initial Interview Discussion Questions 
Il.  
How would you define a technology-based venture? 
Do you believe that these ventures have special decision attriiutes? 
What characteristics do you believe dxerentiate a knowledge-intensive venture 
from techno Iogy- based venture? 
Do you believe that kno wledge-intensive ventures have special decision 
attributes? 
When assessing a early stage knowledge-intensive venture are you considering 
this as an 'investment' decision or as a lending' decision. 
What characteristics do you believe difEerentiate these two types of decisions? 
When assessing a knowledge-intensive venture, what are your specific objectives? 
What issues do you consider to be most relevant? 
Are there any specific sources of information that you tend to use during the 
assessrnent process? 
Describe for me a recent example of a very early stage knowledge-intensive 
venture that you have assessed and decided to d e  an investment in? 
Were there any characteristics of this venture that made it unique? 
What features lead to the decision to invest? 
Are there a .  aspects of this venture that you considered to be marginal and could 
have easily changed your mind on investing? 
Descriibe for me a recent example of an early stage kcowledge-intensive venture 
that you have assessed and decided to make an investment in? 
14.1. What stage was the venture at? 
Are there any characteristics of this venture that made it unique? 
What features lead to the decision NOT to invest? 
Are there any aspects of this venture that you considered marginal and could have 
easily changed your mind? 
Appendix D: Intemew Transcripts and Notes 
D.l Interview Discussion Notes -- Expert S1 
Subject does not deal with equity investing, only with debt lending. As a result the 
subject feel that he Iooks at ventures differently than would be the case for someone 
who is going to make equS investing. 
The dominant Merence is that as a debt lender the level of risk that he is willing to 
take is much Iower than that for a equity investor. 
Does occasionally team up with the equity lending parts of the bank when examining a 
smaLl venture 
Since doing more conventional lending tends to see ventures that are more mature 
than pre-market introduction ventures, but does occasionally deal with them. 
Unlike lending for personal loans, credit scoring does not play a siflcant role in the 
decision process. Each case is considered on its own merits and the variables are too 
wide ranging to be adequately handes by a simple credit scoring model. 
How would you define a technology-based venture? 
Do you believe that these ventures have special decision attriiutes? 
Considers that there is no major clifference between knowledge-based ventures and 
technology based ventures m terms of the lending decisioas. 
Typicaily when asked to give an example of knowledge based venture software or the 
enteriainment indusfry corne to mind. 
What characteristics do you believe differentiate a knowledge-intensive venture 
fiom technology-based venture? 
Do you believe that knowledge-intensive ventures have special decision attri'butes? 
When assessing a early stage knowledge-intensive venture are you considering this 
as an 'investrnent' decision or as a lendùig' decision. 
Looking at the venture fiom a lending perspective. 
What characteristics do you believe merenthte these two types of decisions? 
When assessing a knowledge-intensive venture, what are your specific objectives? 
There are four major areas that are considered: product, market, financing and the 
management team 
Of these the projected cash-flow requirements of the venture are the main concem 
Typically providing operating fun& that are related to the expected accounts 
receivable. Use various standard financial ratios to monitor the venture- 
Does not see the He-cycle of the venture products as a major concem other than how 
it wiU impact the cash-flow of the venture. The iink is through the required R&D 
spending rate of the venture- 
Realistic market projects are important since that has a major impact on the cash-flow 
projections of the venture. 
Dont like to lend to a venture that ody  has a single product. Need to see that the 
venture has a plan to develop spin off products or future generations of products so 
that the venture cash-flow has long term potential. 
Does not thiuk that R&D should be funded through bank loans, rather this hding 
should be through interna& generated fun& that have been generated through 
product des .  
Market projections beyond a year or two are considered to be unreliable. 
Since looking for cash-flow potential of the venture it is important that there be at 
least one customer for the product. If not the product should be in beta testing with 
expressions of interest fiom a credîble customer. 
OAen dealing with s d  ventures supplying larger com~>anies. 
The management team must cover the major bctional areas of the venture. If they do 
not then want to see some Hidication that these people will be acquired in the near 
firture. Also find that having a technology person in charge is not always the best 
situation. 
The technical people Hi the venture are not a major consideration. Want to have some 
indication that these people are in place, but no other sigdïcant consideration is made. 
Securing of the loan is based on the projected stability of the venture cash-flow. 
Not trying to ident@ and secure specinc assets. Knowledge assets are not specincally 
exarnined 
What issues do you consider to be most relevant? 
Are there any specifïc sources of information that you tend to use during the 
assessment process? 
Primarily look at the business plan. 
No business plan and the venture wiU not even be considered. 
Look for a realistic busmess plan that has a realistic assessment of the potentid size of 
the markets the venture will be going into. Want to see who are the customers, who is 
the cornpetition and how these customers will be reached. AU these issues wiu have an 
impact on the venture's cash-flow potential. 
Look at the CVs of the management team, Less interested m the CVs of the technical 
staff. Looking to see is the management team has the ability to Inanage the venture 
from a financial and growth point of view. 
Do not spend much tirne regarding the management team dynamics. 
Look to see if there is a strong board of directors for the venture. A strong board 
provides advice and mentoring to the venture especially m the early years. 
Look to see if the market and cash-flow projections can be substantiated. Sometimes 
tbis wiU involve i n t e ~ e w s  with major customers or other independent sources- 
Like to see third party verification of projections. Often market and sales projections 
are over-optimistic. 
Look for a good clear executive summary that gives a clear picture of wfiat the 
venture is and what it is trying to do. 
10. Describe for me a recent example of a very earIy stage howledge-intensive 
venture that you have assessed and decided to make an investment in? 
Lately has been dealing wÏth tuniaroumi situations where the original management 
team has made some mistakes that have lead the company into trouble and a new 
management team is tryhg to tum the company around. 
Cornmon management mistakes: 
No second or follow-on products. 
Try to grow through acquisitions and end up in financial trouble. This ofken results 
in the venture moving away fkom its core business. 
Grow too fkst and outgrow the management team's ability to control the venture. 
Often if the founder is a techical person the venture becomes a R&D shop with 
the focus king on developing technology and not on s e b g  products to get cash 
flowing in the venture. 
Use financial ratios to track the venture progress. 
If the venture is too early stage then there is no revenue Stream to support debt 
hancing. 
Main risk areas 
Balance strength risk - what is the risk that the venture will not be able to maintain 
a viable cash-flow 
R&D risk. This is not only the technologicai risks that the venture might face when 
trying to develop its products, but also the kancial risk that it will not have the 
cash-flow required to sustain its research and development. 
Revenue Stream risk. This is related to the sales 
Cost risks. Can the venture keep its costs under control 
Infhstmcture risk - this is related to cost risk in tbat the Company may try to grow 
too fhst to accommodate sales projections which are not realistic. 
Were there any characteristics of this venture that made it unique? 
What features lead to the decision to invest? 
Are there any aspects of this venture that you considered to be marginal and could 
have easily changed your mind on investing? 
Inadequate revenue Stream 
14. Descrii for me a recent example of an earIy stage knowledge-intensive venture 
that you have assessed anci decided a to make an investment in? 
14.1. What stage was the venture at? 
2 5 .  Are there any characteristics of this venture that made it unique? 
16. f i t  features lead to the decision NOT to invest? 
17. Are there any aspects of this venture that you considered marginal and could have 
easily changed your mind? 
D.2 Interview Transcript - Expert S1 
Question 
1 .O So to start off with, in 




wmpanies, do you see 
any re.1 distinction 
between those two? 
2.0 Okay,soforthe 
companies that uh,..I 
guess wtiat would be your 
Spical example of a 
Iaiowledge based 
Company therl? 
3 -0 And in terms of 
examining companies 
that are very sort of 
knowledge intensive 
versus your standard 
technology company,  is 
there any specific 
characteristic that you see 
in those companies that 
really separate them 
apart? 
4.0 Okay. Um, so then in 
tenns of your decisions 
whether to invest or... I 
guess what I'm 
spScaI ly  interesteci in 
is investment issues 
versus debt Gmancing . 
When you're looking at a 
m p m y  for the first 
t he ,  what kind of 
a t t r i ies  are you lodring 
1.1 No, no. 
1.2 Other than 1 think lcnowledge based cornpany is 
probably a wider dekition, 
1.3 It Itcludes technology 
2.1 Uh, well the majority of the ones we would see 
wodd be in cornputer s o k e .  
3.1 A. Well, my definition of knowledge-based also 
includes um companies that are in areas such as 
entertainment, 
3.1.1 so um the film industry and so on. 
3.2 So the technology side of it isn't a big issue there 
3.2.1 uh but the rnajority I'd say its the technology 
because really you're talking about a specific 
product and its applications. 
3.3 So, uh the emphasis would be an technology. 
4.1 1 guess to be clear, um, I'm solely concentrathg on 
debt financing. 
for in that companfl 
5.0 Okay. 
6.0 0Eray9 then would you say 6.1 
that in your decision 
making prtlcess, do you 
use a lot of credit s&g 
models and that type of 
thing? 
We do have another atm of the Bank of Montreal 
that looks at equity a sub debt type financing. 
1 ttiink there are dBerent criteria ia the sease ofrisk 
toferance and reanri, 
Uh, 1 think the fimdamentals are the same 
but the amount of risk that ï'm willùig to take as a 
provider of debt is gomg to be lower than somme 
who's making an equity play. 
Uh no. 
6.2 There wouldn't be any formalized, tick the box to 
get the right answer. 
6.3 No its n d  ha. uh formalized whereas 1 think that's 
pretty Çommon în something like personal debt 
fïrlmcing. 
6.4 1 think in the area of commercial, in general 
commercial finaacing, you don? really have haî. 
6.5 1 mean in each of these companies there's so many 
variables 
6.5.1 and issues that you d d n ' t  easiiy 
compartmentalize it to m e  up wÎth some decision. 
7.1 Weli, there's really um four areas that we would 
have to review. 
7-0 Okay, when you're 
looking a t . 3  1 came in 
nght now with a business 
plan, what kind of things 
would be your first quick 
scan, wimt would you be 
looking for? 
7.2 Um your going to be looking at the product itseir; 
72.1 uh the market, 
72.2 the Gnanciag required, 
72.3 and perhaps most importantly, the mauagernent, 
8-0 AU right, so in terms of 
the product, again 
looking at knowfedge 
intensive companies 
where the product might 
not be al1 that tangible, 
d a .  kiud of issues are 
you lodring for there? 
8-1 Um, that relates firom a debt kancing perspective 
to the stage in the company's lifé cycle. 
10.0 So then, b a s i d y  you're 
looking to see, does this 
product have customas 
hW 
1 1 .O Okay, or potedltial 
customers. What 17m 
thinking of mare now is 
that company that has 
their prototype mare it's 
in baa and uh they might 
not officidy have a 
customer ye$ but they're 
working more fur peuple 
that are signed on to ... 
When you're iallring about a very early s&age that 
eittier doesn't evai have a ooanpleted produd 
or um may have one in the beta testing stage. 
Urn it is very dîflicuit fbr us to get a amht level 
that that product wiIl aciually generate revenue. 
Our mal goaI is to uh be able to assess and rely on 
(fiItlUe9)-cash fim. - 
Wïthout th& verifidcm which realIy cornes fiom 
third parties, 
fiom the users of the product, 
uh its very djf£ïcult for myone to make a pitch to us 
tbat their product is gohg to make th= money. 
'ïhere's just no way that the retum I'rn basing my 
laam at, that 1 could take that sort of risk 
11.1 WeUnonotnequmbirttharemaybeaded 
that can be sîrudured, 
1 1.2 But what 1 want to be d o r t a b l e  witb is let's say 
they have a prduct that's uh in beta or um partiaUy 
=pIe-% 
11.2.1 or1W?compiete, 
1 1.2.2 1 want to be able to get uh, a cornfort level that the 
compauy has the £hancial resources to get it to the 
stage wfiere it's going to be commercialized. 
1 1.3 Because I'm not going to come into the picture with 
loan advances mtïi they are at that stage because 
what I'il be fïnancîng is uh cash flow that they're 
going to be generating firom the sales in terms of 
receivables 
1 1.3.1 or amtract fhncing or datever. 
12.1 Um, 1 wouldn't iike1y put my money in and then 
hope that they've got enough to finish the product. 
13.1 Which is where the equity side has got to be there so 
that 1 know that those resources are there. 
14.0 IntannsofBankof 
Mmtreal equity si&, do 
you ofken partner with 
them in looking at a 
-panfl 
15.0 Okay. 
16.0 Yeah. Because that's 
going to be a big hit- 
17.0 In terms of the product 
life cycle, does that, how 
does that enter into your 
lending. decisitms? 
18.0 Sure. Okay. In terms of 
um sort of cal1 it a 
technology intensive 
company versus a 
knowiedge intensive 
compaay, if that makes 
sense, do you see any 
specific dBere~1ces in 
their Mé cycles, their 
product M e  cycles? 
14.1 Yeah we do. 
We work pr* closely with thern, 
Uh, and they have various Ievek of uin involvernient 
Normally fkom a subdebt side they bo are looking 
for companies that already have established cash 
flows, 
that may be looking to ramp up or ander 
mpany- 
&cause there, although its subdebt, and ttiey're 
gettuag you know, various eQuity or quasi-equity 
type returns, uh, they too are relying on the cash 
Bow to pay thm back, 
And of c0utse7 thqr're standing, they're even behind 
the baak tiom a Secutity point of view so their 
position is that much more precatlous. 
Um then there is a portion tbî is Iooking at true 
equity plays 
and then they'll take, you know if they like the d d  
or the tecaiaology 
or whtever7 will take the, uh, the tnie equity risk 
there. 
Hoping for ihe true equity r-. 
Weü, you know, we don't really want to be 
hancing, and certainiy in technology, a one tri& 
P Y -  - 
Um we want to get an understandhg that &y, 
they rnay be coming out with a certain produd but 
then where is that going to be leading in the friture? 
Are there enhancesneats that can corne, d e r  
product spin of& that can corne? 
Xts very rare you can find a company that can 
sustain a cash flow on one product 
Um probably no. 
19.0 Okay so yw're lodüng at 19.1 
the poteda1 iùîure d u e  
of that howiedge asset .in 
the company. 1s that a 
fair statement? 
20.0 Sure. Okay. In terms of 
like for instance a 
software company, their 
produd H é  cycle may be 
very fast. You know, 
they might have to be 
tumhg out a new product 
every six montbs to stay 
in the game. 
21.0 Does that enter înto your 
lending decisicm at dl? 
Okay. So in terms of uh 
a security loan then, a 
company's traditional 
lending point of view, 
what assets, like let's say 
you7re dealing for 
instancewithasoftware 
company and a i i  they've 
got is fau cornputers and 
a couple printers. What 
are you Iookhg at in 
terms of um security and 
k>an? 
Um, ifyw're lodring at pure Irndedge bssed. 
In d e r  wads um alma providing a service to 
Createsomething, 
uh, its not so much the provisional product that has 
to keep evolving, 
or more produds coming on line, 
but you do have to address the issue cm what 
industry are they in 
and is that industry going to grow 
and whaî possible evolrztiolls d d  occur there, 
wdd this person's acpgtise there be of d u e  five 
years down the r d  
21.1 Yes, because we are looking at R&D requirements, 
2 1.1.1 whether they are EWD expenditures and how does 
the çompany intend to h a n c e  that 
21 2 And that shouldn't be financed out of bsnk lines. 
21 -3 It should be hanced out of interndy generated uh 
cash flow or equity indications. 
23.0 So7 you're basing at sort 
of an operathg type loan 
where you say you'll lend 
them up to 50% of 
accou~lts receivable or 
samethhg like thaî. 
24.0 Okay. Um okay in teims 
of the market, what are 
the key issues you're 
looking for t h e ?  
26.0 So, basically you're 
looking at uh attributes 
that are going to directly 
impact accoMts 
receivable? 1s that uh.,. 
23.1 Whaîever, yeah. 
Um, 1 see a lot ofplans where it simply says, you 
Ernow, the world market is ten billion d o b s  and if 
we get twa percent of it we're millionaires. 
Um, we try to get an understanding of who actually 
they're f i i n g  their praduct towards, 
who their real potential customer base is. 
Um and is it realistic. 
Um and also who's their cornpetition. 
And then we're lookhg at, you kuow, do they have 
things like strategic alliances for distribution, 
um track record ifany. 
Yeab because that's what generating the cash flow. 
27.0 Okay. In terms ofum, 27.1 A. Well, 1 think we have to @a-}, we um would 
maybe this is more of an want to have access or try and do third party 
equity aiteria than invesbesbgation. 
lending but in tenns of uh 
if its a new product 
hi#ing the market and 
maybe they have one 
customer, do you 
explicitly look at the 
likelihood that that 
prûduct's going to be 
adopted widely in thaî 
market or are you relying 
on wtiat they are 
projecting? 
Or ifthere's any Iiterature that's available, 
any associations, 
uh ma* taik to their exïstïng customers, 
uh try and get an understanding if th&. product has 
applications ufi cm a wider b i s  within - 
say they seli to the financiai industry - well then, 
Who would want to buy this. 
The £inancial industry. 
And also, can it be adapted to &er industries. 
28.0 ALI ri& And then, in 
terms ofthe management 
team, again take the 
scenarïo of somme 
comingm fbrthefkst 
t h e  with a business plan, 
what are yrw looking for 
in the management team? 
29.0 Okay, in terms of sort of 
um management team 
dynamics, is there 
anything that you look for 
specifically in that? Um 
how weil they work 
togethet-.  
28.1 WeU, you're looking to see ifthe management te!am, 
um, is covering off the key sucoess areas fa any 
-PY- 
28.2 Uh, ncxmdly with these ttrhnology companies, the, 
the fômder, the inventor has a strong technology 
b4w-4 
282.1 buî that in itself is ptobably you how,  only the 
bottom m g  of what it needs to be successfùl. 
283 You're gohg to look at the other key elements. 
28.4 You know, marketing, hanciai, Altministration, 
production, uh and who's in those roles. 
28.5 üh and ifthey dm't have individuals there, how are 
they going to address those? 
28.6 You're also going to look at uh, Who they've got on 
their board of directam 
28.6.1 and whaî sort of outside advice, ercpertise, 
mentadg that ihey're taking. 
29.1 Weii, I mean to a degree 1 want to see wfiat the 
backgrounds are. 
30.0 Okay. So7 in terms of 30.1 
staginl3your-ea 
of the company. Okay, 
when the guy w a k  in 
the first t h e  with their 
business pl- whaî 
happens a i k  that? 
3 1.0 Sure. 
1 don't know how nonnaüy you can r d y  assas 
that other than you pi& up certain vibes 
but 1 guess ifthey were di relatives, you'd wonder 
how'd that happa, you how,  um and that may 
cause an eyebrow to be raised. 
Um 1 can't recall any instance where that has corne 
"P per *- 
Um, normal procedure is we um, 1 mean we get 
many requests, m e  oa out and see us, you know, 
hear my stary, let me cane in and tell you my story. 
3 0 2  Um if1 did tbat in the normal course for eveayone 
that wanted to walk in, 1 mean that's aU I'd be 
doing. 
31.1 Uiunormalprocedureis,uh,youwouldaskthemif 
they have a business pian. 






Uh ifthey do, you'U. ask them to send you thaî to 
prepare you for any subsequent coaversaü(111~, 
üh, usually7 just by reading the business plan you'il 
likely be able to teU d i c h  ones are not g d  
and uh probably give them h o w  that there's 
nothhg there that yw can do. 
And yw know, ver@ that with the prospect in 
M e r  oonversations. 
Um, ifthare's somethïng in the business plan that 
does um come aaoss as very positive 
and yw wish to explore it, then you will meet with 
the p r e  and try and structure it fiam there. 
Now, 1 k d  that with many of these, especially 
srnalier mnpanies, its an issue of managing 
eixpedations 
and c w g  aeally what the% needs are because 1 
find many of them are comiag to banks realfy 
Iookhg for equity money. 
And you bave to explain what you really do and 
who should be doing probably their deai, or that it 
shouid be a mix 
Uh, because naturally if they can get equity money 
at bank rates uh, with n d  having to give anything 
up, they'fl take it. 
But tbere's not too many people that will do th& 
So, that's often the challenge when yw're dealing 
with less sophisticated campanies. 
When you're deaihg with those that have already, 
you know, that have passed the early sbge 
and have a management team in place, uh, 
and usually the management team for even a 
relatively snall, ongoing, high-tech company has a 
caliber of people that you wouidu't normaliy find in 
a comparabie company of another industry. 
Because thefre b ~ g i n g  in uh, people to uh, heIp 
them in their growth. 
It may only be a one million dollar sale company 
-Y 
but the type of people they have in it are those that 
could handle it when its a twenty million dollar 
-PaY- 
And so the expectatiofls or the knowledge of really 
how the system waks is at a better level. 
You can talk more as peers. 
Whereas if you're dealiag with uh maybe an eariier 
stage, 
373.1 especially ifthe person you're dealing with is purely 
the techaology pebsoa, they don't really understand 
uie financing side of it. 
38.1 So, thae 's  a lot oc there's some mmtoring and 
guidance, within b i t s ,  there's only so mu& tbî 
we can do, or s h d d  do. 
38.2 But, uh, you h o w  we'U try and guide them or refa 
them to somewhede that may be more appropriate- 
39.0 0kay.Sointennsof 39.1 Yeah. 
what you're doing, if they 
don't have a pIan in 
place, its a non-starter? 
392  Thq. have to get a plan. 
39.3 1 just-need to hear a story. 
40.0 In terms of what you 
would c d  a bad plan, or 
a not good p h ,  what 
kinds of thmgs do you 
look for. Like, uh 1 g u s  
the füsî question is, how 
long do you typidy 
spend on a business plan 
do you thinM 
41 .O You just know. 
44.0 Okay. 
40.1 There are some you can, p u  know Granldy7 some of 
tbem ten minutes and you know. 
You know its nat going anywhere- 
Win you don't really um. 
1 mean you're doing essentially wlïat equity uh 
providers do you know. 
F i i  qui& scan can o h  tell you whether there's 
anythhg there to pursue- 
Um and sornetimes you might only spend ten 
mioutes on if or you get the flaveur very quickly. 
Um, ceriahly you don't have the time to do hours 
and hours of andysis on every business plan th& 
cornes in, 
It's just not faible. 
Um some of the key things that you're trying to u m  
get out very @&y is, is there a very succinct story 
at the beginning. 
Uh, thaî's usually what's going to make you want to 
read on. 
The execufive summaryi 
Um, you're lodring at projections and seeiug how 
they are substantiated. 
Um, you wmt to see what third party verifications 
they're providing 
45.0 Okay, so ifthey know 
exactly what they're 
asking for, d e r  than 
sort of; we need money. .. 
44.1.1 or can provide even if its not part of your initiai 
plan an on their assumptims of the mark& or the 
pr- 
44.2 Un, you know, if tfiey have clieaits who th& clients 
are right now. 
443 Urn, and 1 guess some briefbiographies on the key 
management people. 
44.4 And also, a weil thougtit our summary of wfiat their 
reqyest is. 
45.2 That againjust sort ofgives you an indication that 
they have a level of sophistidau that understand 
what they may or rnay not get. 
46.0 In terms of um, the uh 46.1 Um, 1 guess it depends cm the level of risic that 
again, a technology-based you're taking. 
Company that might be 
fairly knowiedge 
intensive, um you Iook at 
the bios of the key 
management people. Do 
youlodcatdattheum, 
sort ofthe keytechuical 
people? 
48.0 Okay. In terms of theù 48.1 
R&D requirements, whaî 
are you lodcing for when 
you're talking to key 
technical people. Are you 
looking far uh indications 
Certainly yes, we do Iook at haî. 
Um, you may not get into the same level of due 
diligence as an equity player. 
ifthere is an equity player coming in at the same 
time you're coming in, you hope that you can trade 
some iaform~m. 
Um and you're normally not doing that same, y w  
lmow quite that same level to get thaî h l i n g  but 
you may be relying an them. 
Um, 1 guess you're, if there is historicd 
performance you can rely, you how, take some 
reliance on that too- 
üh, but part of your due diligence could be 
convexsatioas with uh key technical people to help 
you understand. 
Especiaüy uiien you're iooking at uh, R&D 
requirements and so on- 
ofwhat risks they're 
h5ng œ are you looking 
more for indications of do 
they have the 
infirastnicture and 
materials to do the job 
or.. 
48.2 1 mean iffûture cash flows are dependent on 
successtlllRBtDy 
482.1 uh you want to try and get some understanding of 
what are the challenges they're Eacmg andor 
problems that they've & c d  to date. 
48.3 Uh and do they have the tesources in place now to 
deal with that 
48.3.1 or what's it going to cust to get them. 
49.0 Okay, what I'd like to do 
now is sort of r d  what 
yw would consider 
howledge-intensive 
technologybased 
annpany, say a software 
company or an IT 
Company that you've 
d d t  with re~e~itly. And 
what kind of things uh, 
sort of the process you 
went through and what 
kind of ttiings struck you 
as important to leading 
you to invest, or 
providing money to that 
company uh 0th- than 
the fiiiancials. Was there 
specinc issues that came 
to mind that you 
considerd important to 
that particular companfl 
50.0 Oh. Okay. 
1 Okay. 
49.1 Well, Iym not sure how to answer this. 
49.2 Well, urn certainly the fwr key elements that 1 
rnentioned before, are the starting point. 
49.3 Um there are a number of campanies that we l d e d  
at recently that are in the turn around phase. 
50.1 Where uh, the company has been aroulld a few 
years, um, has made mistakes, primarily due to 
management decisiau. (pause) 
5 1.1 We're looking at siftiatiaas where t k e  bas to be an 
equity infusion to take piaœ to ùas idy  covet those 
mistakes and move foc~gfd 
51.2 And, what we're interested in is that suftïcient 
finanhg is going in to put the cûmpany ba& an a 
sound hanciai footing because they were befœe the 
52.0 Sure. Ukay t i i  to the 
rnistakes. What would 
you say is the most 
common mistake that you 
see uh a company that7s 
early siart up and they're, 
you how, thqr've got 
their nist customea and 
they're chugging dong. 
What would you say is 
the most common sort of 
fàtdthingthatyousee 
happening? 
53 .O Okay. So they sort of 
way overestimated the 
potential based cm me 
key guy that wmts to buy 
their produd. 
56.0 Okay. So then in terms 
5 1 -3 And then more importantly that um, those mistakes 
aren7t going to happem again which relates a good 
part to existing managenient which is usually 
diflèreat than the mes th& made the mistakes. 
51 -4 Um and also that the revenue streams that ttrey're 
now predicting are verifiab1e- 
5 1.5 Like they have an ader book that demanstrates that 
rmi, at least the percentage of what they're 
predicting is air@ in the bag. 
52- 1 At the early stage (pause), um, its probably not 
being able to get the second custuma. 
Or that uh, th& initial produ% worked in 1 guess a 
relatively mail applications 
and they've never been able to uh, M e r  develop 
that into somelhtng that has either wider acceptauce 
or larger appiications. 
Um, when you get past thai stage the most common 
mistake say would be campanies that went on an 
acquisition trail. 
In order to grow. 
And those acquisitions either they were in, they go& 
out of their core business. 
Uh, theygrewtm- 
and didn't have the managerial expertise to deal 
with that 
and basically had to right off that investment, 
And alSOS because of probkms that arme there, they 
took their eye .off the ball on the axe business. 
Oh, 1 guess the third me wouid be when the 
57.0 Sure. Acaiaily 1 can 
think ofa perfêct 
example ofthat, *O, 1 
used to work for. 
visimary, the fmder? 
56.1-1 who being perhaps too technically oriented, bas 
turned his company into an R&D &op - 
562 amcetltraîed on that and fotgdten tfiat you still 
have to sel1 somethhg at the end of the Aay. 
57.1 Yeah, there's lots iike that. 
58.0 Okay, um 1 guess my next 58.1 I'd say that the rnajority of those would be those that 
question is kind of are* at too early a stage f a  the bank to be in 
thinking again of because they don't even have 3 r m u e  stream, or 
companies that you've its so naminal, or its pure amtract - 
dealt wifh recently- Can. 
you thmk of one that you 
dezided not îo give any 
money to and what was 
the key friaor that lead to 
that outside of that they 
just had bad hancial 
projections. 
Okay, when you're 
talking abouî risk, Wtiat 
specificaily are the 
different aspects of risk 
thai you're.. . In the 
g e n d  tenn, there's the 
risk that the thing's going 
to defàuit. 
How would you sub 
divide the risk is 1 guess. 
6 1 .O Sure. That's what I'm 
lodring for. 
you Imow they've got two yys in the basement 
and they've got a amtract for a hundred thousand 
dollars and &ey need f B y  thousand to get it done. 
Um, its really tw much risk 
Uh because you're so dependeait an two people with 
no tradc record 
being able to u m  wrrectly estimate cos& and 
profitability 
and then have the wiiere with a i i  to develop thai. 
Yes. 
Okay as it al l  fàlis togethet, so trying to break it 
tg... 
um, we're catainly loaking at um we'll cal l  it, these 
are my own definitiaas.. 
I'm just winging it here after you raised the 
guesticm* 
Vm we're lodrîng at, caü it balance shed rkk 
We're l&g at uh the financial structure of* 
- W Y  
and does it have uh sirength to witbstand &cks - 
And, then we're looking at the R&D risk 
Do they have the financial reSOUTces to susîain 
necessary R&D for product expansion 
arrd enhancanent 
You know, and tbis is ali within the amtext of the 
four keyrisks which isreaiiywhaî it al1 boils down 
to @a=)- 
Um, you're lodring af œrtainly you're looking at 
the revenue stream which we've disaissed in deCail 
mdisthatdid 
and sustainable. 
You're also lodring at the cûst side of it. 
Um, in a number of cases, 
auother problem that these companies had is they 
try and build up too much inçastntcture 
too @&y in order to handle this huge sales 
volume that they're gohg to get that doesa't show 
up- 
And very quidy the custs and revenues start to flip 
over and then it starts gomg into the red. 
Um, as I'm lodting you know, how we try and 
stnicture the deal so that we're covering thos issues 
is primdy through, îbrovgh a matgin so tha. we're 
fbncing ameut assets. 
There may be some uh fiinancing of lmg tenn assets 
but agah that's, you know, higher risk Ievel in the 
sense that you're putthg out money that you want to 
get paid back in three years, five years based on 
fixed assetS. 
Its pretty hard to projeet that fiu out on an earlier 
g r o d  mpany- 
Aithough you may ask for, you may get projections 
five years down the road 
How accurate is scnnethhg that you're getting for 
the year 20057 
Yw're l u e  ifyou can take di in the '99 
ones, maybe the 2000. 
But once you get past two yeats, 1 don't really think 
we codd put any reliance on projections. 
So, looking, you're lodting at that issue. 
So what you're r d y  trying to do foa a three year 
margin is keep a pretty tight rein on borrowings 
and knowing you know where the trouble spots 
arise. 
And then the other way you're ûyhg to coatrol that 
is through financial mvmants of the company so 
that you have certain triggers based on certain 
financial ratios - 
64.0 ûkay, in terms ofthese 64.1 
risks then, d d  you say 
that you look at them ail 
kind of equaiiy weighted 
or is there uh,., 
64.2 
65.0 Okay. 1 mess that 
actually finisher; up the 
@estions. 
primarily working capital ratios or debt tanpile net 
worthordebttoequityratio5. 
&, thaî wiil throw up fhgs very qui- 
L think tliat diey are in a sense -y weighted uh 
on sort of und%iY;ng is the management issue. 
Um, certaialy we're dealing with finance, so it d 
~ ~ m e s ~ t o f i n a n c e s o y o u h v e t o j ~ s t n i d u r e i t  
in a financial mamer. 
You know you codd say financial is the ultimate 
risk fim Our perspective, 
aud since we're not there actually mansging the 
-PmY 
or can have that much level of umtrol as say an 
equity provider can with a seat on the board, 
or more intensive monitoring than we do, 
we have to structure ours to be more conservative, 
buî hopefùily still give us en- time to react 
Mme everything goes offthe rails. 
D.3 Interview Discussion Notes - Expert S2 
How would you dehe  a technology-based venture? 
LoolrHig for proprietary technology 
Looking for mdications that a market exisîs for the proposed product. Specifically 
lookmg to see if the venture is already selling product. Typically do not consider 
products wirich have not already been mtroduced into the market. Therefore do mt 
typid'y consider a venture which is only at the research and developme~n stage - 
would rather refér them to other sources of finaecing such as equity fhncing. 
Do you believe that these ventures have special decision attriiutes? 
What characteristics do you believe daferentiate a knowledge-intensive venture 
fiom technology-based venture? 
Dont typicaily dinerentiate between technology based and knowledge based or 
knowledge mtensiive ventures. Same kmds of asesment principles are applied to both 
types 
Key differences wouM be the thne to ramp up mto production which is very much 
fàster for a knowledge based venture than for a technology based - manufachiring 
onented - venture. 
Another key difference is in the product Me-cycle thne that is much shorter for 
knowiedge intensive ventures - due to rapid changes in their markets. Technology 
based ventures tend to have longer cycles times 
Do you believe that Imowledge-mtensive ventures have special decision attniutes? 
Much shorter product cycle times and nuch higher pro& maigins. 
Much Mer growth rates and shorter time d they can becorne very profitable and 
perfEIPs large ventures. 
When assessing a eariy stage knowledge-intensive venture are you considering this 
as an 'investment' decision or as a lending' decision 
Not making equity mvestments, rather still making loans that are interest bearing. 
Take much higher risk when making the lending decision than would be the case with 
srnail businesses m the retd or conventional mauufàcturing sectors. 
For these ventures the bank is taking a longer-term view. They are providing the loans 
to hi& risk ventures, as weli and advice and management expedse ifrequired with the 
objective of klpbg the wmpany grow quickly mto a good longer term bank 
customer. Loolüng to bdd a good relationshq, with the venture. 
Placing Iess emphasis on the strength of the venture's kdance sheet since these 
ventures have very iÏttle in the way of conventional assets to secure a loaa 
Wd not usually make early stage loans since the risk is too high. This is not O& a 
'corporate' policy, but also one that he agrees with. Et is better for these types of 
ventures to seek other forms of investment than to have high levek of bank debit 
Very early stage ventures create leditg ~ c ~ e s  as they cari? get operating loam 
because there are no operations and hence no accounts receivab1es. 
If a person approaches the bank for a loan M e  at the early stages of product 
development the loan would be &en if there were collateral such as personal assets, 
but this is a high ri& approach for the person 1ookh.g for money. 
What characteristics do you believe differentiate these two types of deckions? 
Did not ask this question 
When assessing a ksowledge-mtensive venture, what are your specific objectives? 
Typically the ventures which are king considered are not yet profitable. They have 
done the i .  research and development and have a product and sales, but a growing 
too fàst for their cash flow. They are usually in debt and having some type of 
management ditl6iculties. 
Quite often these ventures have ody a s m d  number of employees - maybe 6 - but are 
poised for ragid growth. 
Great deal of emphasis is on the quality and completeness of the management team. 
An important consideration is considering ifthe members of the management are likely 
to work together with the bank account manapers. The decision to provide financing 
Loans are very subjective m nature. Has a lot to do with the cornfort level of the 
account manager and weather the account manager wiU be willing to champion this 
venture as it grows kger 
Look for top management ço mmitment to the venture. 
Looking for indications tbat the team can work together and have experience. 
Track record of the key people is an important consideration. If either they are known 
to the bank or have developed successfbi ventures in the past. 
Look for indications that thqr seek outside sources of councii such as accountants and 
lawyers or other technical sources and are williag to take advice fiom these sources. 
Exmine the business pian to see if Ït makes sense. If some item seems to be 
measonable then the entire plan may becorne suspect, or at least wiIl get closer 
examhaîion. Look for reaüstic market projections on the size of the target market and 
who the customers will be. 
Prefèr to deal with companies that have identifled niche markets that they plan to try 
and enter. 
Look for key milestones in the business p h  Usually these destones are finiuical in 
nature, such as projected des.  
What issues do you consider 40 be most relevant? 
Look at the business plan and try to monitor the wmpany's progress against what they 
have stated in the busmess p h  
Deviations fbm the plan are expected and wili want some explanations if the 
pe&ormance of the company starts to deviate too fàr fiom the stated plan. 
OAen will tier the financitg based on the successfiil completion of destones such as 
sales projections or the obtaining of key contracts. 
The completeness of the busmess plan is not as miportant as the management team's 
a- to articulate the plan 
Hiring plans are important fiom the point of view that the account manager will want 
some idea of what the company is planning to do. TypicaUy do not consider these are 
specific goals or milestones to be monitored. 
Unlike equity investors, the exit strategy does not consider If the company wili go 
public or not. From the bank's point of view a good customer can be either a public or 
privately held company. Interesî est the wcompany plans to go public are more to have an 
idea of where the coqany is goiag and its status with any equity investors. 
Do mt typicaIly assess the venture technology. There are experts tbat the bank has 
access to fiom Toronto ifthey need more advice in this area Since they are dealsig 
with companies that already have a product md are either seIling them or h the 
product launch at least, the assumption is made that the technology is soimd 
WiIl consider the situaiion with respect to knowledge assets in a knowledge mtensive 
venture. look at Who are the key technology people in the venture and whether 
the company bas taken d c i e n t  steps to safeguard itself fiom the Ioss of key 
technology people. This may inchide how the people wiîh the key knowledge are being 
wmpeIlSafed. 
Also look at how mtellectual property is king protected. WiIl look at Who the Iawyer 
for the venture is and whether steps to protect intellectual property are d c i i e n -  This 
requires some understanding of w h t  the intektual property is. 
F i  that fèwer mmpanies are trying to patent. This appears to be primariLy a result 
of the length of time and other costs associateci with the patenting process. The fiist 
product cycle t hes  in knowledge - intensive industries is part of the problem The 
products are changing so fast that by the time a patent has been obtained it may not be 
relevant, Refer to rely on product Lead as the cornpetitive advantage rather than 
mvesting m obtainmg a patent. 
Also tq- to assess if the product that the venture has now has any futine. Looking at 
what future spin-oB may r e d  fkom the product. Would wnsider it a bigh risk if 
there are w indications of the product tùtm. 
Also look at how much the Company is hvesting m product research and deve1opment 
to create futirre products. The companies that are typidy  seen only have one product 
so they need to be investing in fhre  product development. 
For a small company 25% of its money going into product research and development 
is not unusuaL Anything Iess than this would be a cause for concem. In some case a 
Company with more established sales and larger than the typid d Company may 
have as low as 10 - 15% of its fûnds going to product research and developmnt. 
Are there any specific sources of information that you tend to use during the 
assessment process? 
Business p h  Does not need to be very long and detailed. Not even n e c e s d y  
cornpletc as long as it can be understood what the company is trying to achieve and it 
is apparent that they have put some thought into were the are going and what they are 
doing to get there. Understand that the p h  wili be evotving in some cases. Important 
to undentand wfiy some changes are taking place. 
Interviews with the key management people. Looking for indication that the people in 
the compiiny derstand the problems and difficuities that they are either king or 
about to &ce. Lookiog for indication that the key management team is unredistic or 
overIy optimistic about their situation 
10. Descnbe for me a recent example of a very early stage knowledge-intensive 
venture that you have assessed and decided to make an investment in? 
Recaiied a company that was run as a s m d  operation for several years produchg 
software for the insurance industry. 
It had onty one full tie exnployee and several part time efnployees that had other Ml 
tiriEe jobs. 
Got a new employee fkom the insurance indusby 
Went to see than regarding h c i n g  and found that they people in the cocompany 
management had a very realistic outlook of what problems they were going to face, 
how they were gohg to develop thek products and markets and whaî resources they 
needed. This provided a high level of confidence in the venture and as a r d  high 
confiidence in providing a loan "Seemed to be a company 1 could work with" 
11. Wae there any characteristics of this venture that made it unique? 
Started d and stayed small for several years until it 'decideci' to grow. W some 
years where it made money some years where it lost and had fàk@ constant sales in the 
100K range. 
Now is growing rapidiy and wül have sales m the » 1 OM range. 
12. Whaî features lead to the decision to invest? 
Confidence in the management tearn that they could succes- implement their 
business pan. 
Feeling that they understood the problems tbat they were gohg to face. 
Feeling that they understood the problems that the accoud manager fàced and were 
willing to work with him. 
Feeiing that the account manager could work with the management team. 
Product availabiiity 
Expertise in the product niche they were going to initially enter. 
13. Are there any aspects of this venture that you considered to be marginal and could 
have cas* cbmged your mind on investing? 
14. Descfl'be for me a recent example of an early stage knowledge-htensive venture 
that you have assessed and decided to make an investment in? 
One company that assessed and did not invest in was because there was a feem tbst 
the senior manager / CE0 was not fülly cornmitteeci to the venture. 
Can derstaddeal with this if there are several other senior m e m e n t  people 
committed to the oompany but not ifthis is the ody  senior manager 
14.1, Whaî stage was the venture at? 
15. Are there any characteristics of thk venture that made it unique? 
16. What f e .  lead to the decision NOT to invest? 
17. Are there any aspects of this venture tbat you considered marginal and could have 
easiiy changed your mmd? 
D.4 Interview Notes - Expert S3 
1. How would you define a technology-&id venture? 
Does not typically differentiate between knowledge-based ventures and techwlogy- 
based ventures. 
However, the early stage laiowledge-based' ventures that are considered typidy have 
M e  in the way of physical assets. 
Typidy dealing with information technology companies or sometimes health related 
companies when tanang about knowledge-based companies. 
Often considering companies which do not have market presence or products and have 
a high cash bum rate. M e r  than ha* loans these ventures typically have venture 
capital fiinding. 
This bank has a variety of venture capital fimds which may be tapped into for the 
venture. 
Typically Lookhg to develop long term relationship with the Company so that as it 
grows it will use the services of the bank. 
The general philosophy is to act as a busmess incubator. The role is to coach and 
council the venture. Help it understand problems it may &ce and help the ~compy 
management deal with these problems. 
Do you believe that these ventures have special decision attri'birtes? 
People are the important asset. 
Lifecycles are fâster for knowledge based ventures. This is important to consider when 
looking at the venture since the venture will need to be able to react and move quicw. 
This h& some impact on the îinancing 
What cbaracteristics do you believe diikentiate a knowledge-intensive venture 
h m  techno1ogy-based venture? 
For a typical lending situation rnight as weil put the financial section of the business 
plan at the front sirice this is the most important thing the banker will look a-. In the 
case of lcnowledge-based venture l e n .  the financiais are l e s  important. 
Do you believe that knowledge-intensive ventures have special decision attributes? 
When assessing a early stage howledge-intensive venture are you considering this 
as an 'investmentf decision or as a 1endin.g' decision. 
Lookhg at the venture firom both points of view. 
However, typicaliy wïli deal wÏth companies that would not be considered in 
conventional bank lending. 
What characteristics do you believe differeiitiate these two types of decisions? 
When asesshg a Imowledge-intensive venture, what are your specXc objectives? 
What is the technological position of the venture and is it viabIe. This is more 
important than the finirncials on the venture. 
Team is important. Look at the history of the key people. Detemillie what is their 
background as much as possible during interviews with them. Do not do specîfic 
background and reference checking on the key people in most cases unles it is a very 
large investment. 
One approach to evaIuatnig the key m e m e  of the management team is to look a.  
their breadîh of understanding of the various busmess issues that the venture wül fkce. 
Consider how quickly the key people can answer questions wvering the entire range 
of business issues. This provides some insight into the depth of the management team 
and how rapidJy they can react to potential problem situations. 
Management is the key h to r .  
When there are very little m the way of physicai assets associated wah the venture, the 
quality of the management team becomes much more important- 
Need to wnsider the impact on the venture ifthe management tearn is lost. 
Wbat is the product and or technology potentiaL 1s the vemture in a niche market. 
What issues do you consider to be most relevant? 
9. Are there any specific sources of information thai you tend to use durhg the 
assessment process? 
Often use outside experts such as NRC, coIlSultants or people with experience in 
similar ventures. 
10. Descn'be for me a recent example of a very eariy stage hwledge-intensive 
venture that you have assessed and decided to make an investment in? 
Do not use creda risk models as they would m conventional lending. However do have 
an assessment b w o r k  that is followed when deabg with new ventures. 
Look for focus in the product development. 
Look for depth m the product h e .  What is the potential for fuhire products bebg 
developed baseci on the initial products. 
Want to make sure that there are spin-off products and next generations of products. 
Look to see if the management team has the abBy to develop the next generations of 
products. 
In the management team look for technicd capabii  and communications skills. 
Must have the technical capability to understand the technological problems that will 
be fàced. 
Must be able to cornmuniCate to potential investors. N d  to be able to sell the idea 
and to answer questions that are put to them. 
Major warnbg sign if the key management people cannot seli the idea behmd the 
veature and its products. 
Often scientists and engineers have poor people skdh and interpersonal 
communications skills that can lead to problems when presenting their ideas as well as 
F o r  team communications. 
Look at the team dynamics. Want a team tht cm work well together. 
Look at the idhtmcture of the venture. Does it bave the tools and other 
bfhtmcture necessary to develop the product- 
If there are areas where the management team or the development team are weak then 
need to address these. 
Look for how weii the knowledge and sidis of the development team fit. Ie: the skills 
mix 
Look for the product's market potential. 
Only look at the business plan for infonnafion concernhg the technical people and 
their skilIs. 
1 1. Were there any characteristics of this venture that made it unique? 
1 2  What features lead to the decision to invest? 
13. Are there any aspects of this venture that you considered to be marginal and could 
have easily changeci your mind on mvestmg? 
Financial control problems. Did not have good hancial controls in place, good person 
and was missing tools to help hancial management such as cornputer and accounting 
software. 
The company got a financial officer who was satisktory. 
14. Descni for me a recent example of an early stage laiowledge-Ïntemive venture 
that you have assessed and decided to make an investrnent in? 
14.1. What stage was the venture at? 
15. Are there any characteristics of this venture that made it unique? 
16. What features lead to the decision NOT to mvest? 
17. Are there any aspects of this venture that you considered marginal and could have 
easily changed your rnind? 
A poorly written business pian will often lead to the venture not king considered. 
Need a business plan that is readable. Often technid people have problems getting 
their ideas across and this can show up in the business plan. 
If the business plan is produced using a software package it has the advantage of king 
easier to r e d  
A business plan developed by another person, such as a consultant, for the venture 
usually will not be considered as king bad. 
NRC and IRAP often help many of the ventures that he deais with develop a business 
PI= 
D.5 Interview Transeript - Expert S3 
Question 
1.0 ,..TeCain~l~-based 
ventures. How would you 
defïae a technology-based 
venture versus m e  that's .... 
axning up as knowledge+ 
haseci or knowIedge 
intensive? Ln your eyes do 





1- 1 W d  I think that it has to bave some proprieîary 
tecbnology behind it or proprietary value to it. 





It can't just be shrink wrapped in someone else's 
software, d i s t r i i g  it to be what we would c d  
information technology based. 
I mean they may still be part of KBI portfolio but 
uh, true KBI to me is uh campanies that you kuow 
have a genuine focus on developing their own. 
They spend money on R&D= they invest in 
eahanciog system produds that they have 
proprietarily developed. 
So, they've created dieir own proprieixy base and 
asset, 
You know, they buy the rights to software uh h m  
someone else. 
They probably fàll under that KBI bill but they're 
no& quite often tequiring the same kind ofhand 
holding that some of the early route companies do. 
1 mean, 1 was out this morning to a company and 
that company is not having sales yet at dl. 
And they've been esseatiaily burning cash for 
probably three pars but they've had thre s u d  
rounds of equity raised to fimd ail of that, 
So, there r d y  isn't a lot of  banking that we cm do 
fur them at that point. 
Al1 we're doing is fàcilitating introduction to a 
venture capital group, uh m&g sure that we're 
kind of involveci in the process all almg so tfiat 
when they do hir cammercialization, uh the b d c  
that they choose to do the banking f i  than is not 
going to be the bank across the street - its gohg to 
betheRoyal. 
So, its kind of an invesiment of t h e  on our part, 
Weil, y&. 
It's the Scdia Bank downstairs. 
Yeah- 
So its kind ofwhat 1 c d  the incubation period and 
we have to be t k e  in that incubation p m d  
7.0 Okay, so your sart of 
objective is more inaibating 
the Company, l d c h g  at, 
you're ïrying to capture, 
lodriag long teml trying to 
capture tais guy as a Iong 
tenn Customa. 
8.0 So in terms of a howledge 
based company with what, 
what sectors do you.. is 
there a particuiar sedor that 
you think ofwilen lodcing 
at knowledge based? 
6.5 Otherwise, we don't get to k m  the principles of 
the company, we donTt get to lmow the applications 
of the tecainology. 
6.6 So, we've made a pretty ooasclws effort to do that 
lcbd of- 
7.2 And providing them with some value added contacts 
in either venture capital (becaltse we've got a 
venture capitai ), or you know, introducing 
them to people who may potentiaily take the 
company public at some point with the Royai Bank 
group* 
7 .  So, you lmow, this oompany 1 met with this 
morning, we had our experts out fian the n d  
(might be a company name Denmi?? 
7.4 SecMties that handle the IPO and the IP a r a  
7.5 Because they believe that these girys may have 
something there tbat's potential, 
7.6 You know, and they usually do a preüy good 
assessment ofwhether they want to corne up and see 
a client, they're &g d the way fiom Toronto. 
7.7 And uh they've been out a couple times to see these 
guy because they believe that what they've created 
has actually uh got some r d  significaut 
applications- 
7.8 So, you h o w ,  when iî is commercial it wil l  be an 
easy seil on the markets. 
8.1 Weil, 1 mean, it usually ties in with ïï but not 
always. 
8 2  1 mean there's um businesses that are people based, 
rather than aset based that we'd sometimes put into 
the KBI category. 
8.3 Um, an example ofthat might be somebody's um 
personnel type SecYice companies that are providing 
high technology employees. 
9.0 Okay,inteamsofum, 
cornpanles that .., what I'm 
thinking of right now is 
produd lifé cycle, Would 
you say that there's some 
markcd difkeace in 
product Wè cycle with 
companies that have more 
howledge base 8SSOCi8ted 
with the produd, m..-? 
11.0 Okay. 
12.0 Okay. 
13.0 Mhmm. Okay. Un, so then 
in terms of assesshg arly 
stage ventures, since you're 
adhg more a s  an 
incubator, are you loaking 
at them mare fian an 
investots point of view or 
are you lodring at th- aU 
... (phone ~ g i n g ,  can't 
hear this part)... like d e n  
you're doing the assessnent 
P- 
8.4 You know, they kind of nill into that other gray 
category wtiere we say, you know, you don? have a 
huge asset base but to generate cash flow, and we're 
doing it on the basis strength oftheir people versus 
you hm, saying we're going to lead x number of 
dollars against th* asset, 
9.1 Ch, you mean in teams of how long the pro&& 
stays viable (reliable)? 
10.1 WeU, 1 mean ifyou look at software, 1 mean, that's 
why its so critical when we lend to software 
companies thaî we know the short and long term 
Pr- of this company because they can change 
uh quickly (mudplay???) ifthey don't watch 
thmselves, 
10.2 And by the thne they get the product 
commacialized,uh,withinthirtydaysitcouldbe 
obsolete, uh, if someiliing else better m e s  to the 
market- 
1 1.1 Which is ail the more reason you want to kind of 
focus in on these companies early so that we 
understand exadly where their niche is in the 
particda. market that they're going dkr, so. 
12.1 But the life cycle of the product w d d  be very, very 
short. 
122 So, when you finance stuffyou've got to kind of 
look at it that way. 
15.0 Okay. 
16.0 Okay, weli, if a company 
cornes in to you with a, for 
the firsî time, with a 
business plan, you kmwY 
the next great idea, what's 
sort of your fïrst objectives 
when you're 1-g at 
this? 
17.0 Sure. 
Yeah, because the way we've structured our 
knowiedge based industry group, we've kind of 
created as qectmm ofsources of capitai for 
companies that are knowledge based 
So, we've said, akay in the early stage we can't 
bank them because there's no way that a traditional 
bmker can give th- any mcmey. 
1 mean, its equity capital they need. 
So, we created the Royal Bank Growth Co., which is 
a venture capital company to invest in early stage 
cmpanies and evea very smaU amomts, 1 mean 
250 000,500 000 amouflts to get them s&w&d 
And then, &:om there uh the-  can move into the 
next strata *ch is InterRoyal Bank Capital 
Corporation which deal with ub, in the mal1 
business venture h d  which is a 50 million doilar 
h d  
It goes hm 250 to a million dollars in traditionai 
venture capital. 
And then we've got a IT group that handles 
specindy, you how, KBI, IT type aistomers. 
And then of course at that point once we see you're 
LikeIy fairly close to some cummercializatim 
opportrniityy so that's when the bauk cornes in- 
1 mean, there's some companies that, they've come 
in before that and we've providecl them 6 t h  
additional traditional fiancing as a result ofthe 
structure of the play. 
We& you gotta really, you know, you've got to 
spend a lot more time figmïng out their technology 
because that is aIways the criticai fhct 
16.2 1 mean ifwe don't undersîand they're pitioned in 
the market and whether this thing's buyable or not, 
we have to do a very good assessrnent ofthat. 
16.3 We spend probably more t h e  on that than we do on 
financiai projections in the eariy stages because 
the's no point in giving us aii kinds of projections 
ifwe're not collvinced that its going to have a 
market appeai fix it when it does reach the point 
that i fs  generating reveaue- 
17.1 Soy we tend to spend more the an those areas 
vasus the traditional deal that cornes into a banker, 
18.0 Okay,sointennsof 
understanding the 
tecainology, how do y w  go 
about doing that. Like.., 
20.0 Okay, so again returning to 
the business plan, okay 
you're assessing the 
technology, is it viable, is 
there a market fol it. Is 
there any other sort of 
specific issues that you 
consida relevant or try ta. 
You know, and you might as weU take the teport 
and put the hancials in the &ont because that's 
usually where the banker wiU go befote they get to 
the meat of the document 
We tend to you bow, with KBI lending, we tend to 
step badc a bit and say, &y, we understand there's 
going to be cash burn rates, there's going to be you 
how, baiance sh& deficiencies bur what do we 
really have here technology wise and can we 
uuderstaad the technolog$? 
18.1 WeU, there's a couple of ways. 
182 1 mean, m e  of than is we try to, wfitze possible, we 
cm use some outside arpertise like National 
Research Council who does, they'ii do an 
assessment which quite o h  they'ii &are with us if 
the clients has alr- gone to NRC. 
19.1 And then a lot of the other decisicm making is based 
on our ercperienœ of doing deah in those markets, 
whether its heaith care where we've got a similar 
20.1 Uh, management's obviously a key Wor Ï n  it 
because you can't place the same reliance on 
physical assets- 
21.1 You'd bettes make sure the management team has 
the depth to them to take this product or this 
development and get it to commercialization. 
2 12  And that's always a big problem in these smder 
companies is thaî some of them are great at 
developing things but la& the business a m e n  
required to you h w ,  sell it to investors and ta.- 
2 1.3 you know, I've seea a heu of a lot of ideas tha. are 
spedacular in terms of their applications but they 
never get fiom point A to point B because its the 
scientist or its the techie wbo ean't necessarily 
~~l~l~~lunicatewithuhguysthatareinthe 
investment business a guys like me that are in the 
banking business. 
23.0 Okay. So then would you 
say it a fair statement that if 
the venture has its produd 
is largely based an 
kuowiedge and not so much 
an technical or physical 
assets, then the 
management team becomes 
a higher priority in terms of 
your assessneat? 
24.0 So, in tenns of the 
completeness of the 
management team then, 
how um, do you explicitly 
look at wûether they've got 
the basics covered or do you 
just look into &etha they 
got &..., 
25.0 So, in terms of background 
checking, isthat s0methg 
you wouid do through 
interviewiclgsortof 
employer references type 
21.4 S o , t h e g t r y c o m e s i n ~ a ~ c u l a r i d e a , h e  
spent five years researching it, aii the studies to 
prove it buî he cadt position it you hm, big 
pichtre wise to say why should I mvest or why 
shouid II bank this mpany. 
22-1 You know, and we wmt through that a lot in some 
of these neural nehvork type campanies. 
22.2 You know, lots of these cumpanies develop you 
how, significantly proprietary modeis for you 
know, neural nehvorlc 
22.3 And, you how, tbey had eight or nine ofthem with 
similar types of tedmology and much of it came 
d o m  to how strong the management was to actualiy 
see how the commetcial application could be used 
by Otis Elevator, or you know... 
23.1 Yeah. 
23 2 Oh yeah, fm sure. 
23.3 It becornes a much bigger portion. 
23.4 That's your real ri&. 
23.5 Ifyou lose the management team that they'd come 
to you originaily, yuu could be in deep trouble in a 
years tirne you know, because you don't have any 
assets to back yoursei£ 
24.1 Weli, we try to conceive of whether they've got a 
grasp over the whole business in tenns of howing 
whether they're going, they've got a strategy around 
how they're going to get there, a team of people that 
you know, are able to put the strategy together and 
execute it. 
24.2 So we're lodring at a lot of the history behind where 
were they before they got into this, 
24.3 You know, we spend a lot more background 
checking in terms of their capabilities. 
25.1 Now, usually we dm't get into that part mtil we 
kind of assess &y, were they presideat of this 
campany before, or what was the success, tell us 
about that company to try and get a seaise of ... 
26.0 Kind of a se l f  report. 
27.0 Yeah, &yy 
28.0 So in terms of; how to 
practidy word it, the 
aedr'bility of the 
interviewe theae, is there 
specific things that yuu're 
Iooking fm? 
29.0 Okay, in terms ofagain, 
sort of the organbtional 
plan, you how,  a lot of 
businesses plans will have 
sort of an org chart and you 
have one guy doing ten 
jobs. Is that something that 
flags fidl into? (not sure if 
this what you said) 
26.1 Yeah, yeah. 
27.1 Its difncult for us to begin checking refebences 
because that's not usualIy our role so we kuid of 
have to rely somewfiat ori what we're told on our 
assessmeat based on questioning p u  k n ~ ,  how 
they handle certain things, not how much 
knowledge they have, c a p b i i .  
28.1 Weil you try, what you try and do is take them 
through a gamete of issues. 
282 So you ply 6om the financial right back to the 
personne1 to marketing to, so you try and see how 
quickly* the CEO, h m  &&y thq can move fiom 
one aspect to a n d e r  and how good their 
understanding is of it when a question is asked 
about that area 
28.3 Maybe, if they dm't know what's going on in the 
business then, you know, it's tough for them to uh 
kind of read propesly if they need to get tbis thing 
commercially viable, 
29.1 No that's not unusuai, particularly in the technology 
field to have one guy doing many t b g s  in the early 
stages ofit- 
30.1 Now once the hhstmctwe of people is in place 
then thaî tends to change. 
30.2 1 mean, the company that 1 refwed to e a r k  îhat 
does 15 million in sales, uh, whea you lodr back a .  
the history of the company, that campany was doing 
2 millicm douars in (pause) 1993. 
30.3 So here they are in 1999, sisnifiant growth in 
des, they now have a, a CE0 that they hired from 
outside because the two fmding members of the 
company realized thaî they really can't do same of 
the things that need to be done within that 
4xrpod0~1.- 
32.0 Okay, so in terms ofhow 
the effort is being squareci 
around in this snali 
company, do you look for 
indications thaî they are 
overextaided or over, you 
know, fiR instance if the 
key technicai guy is aiso the 
head of mantdàcturing and 
the head of finance and 
things Like that, would that 
be.. 
33.0 Sure &y. 
34.0 Sure, &yY Um in terms of 
the, ifthe compmy's, you 
know, apecially in its early 
stages and it doesn't have a 
lot of physical assets 
eveqthhg is sor; of 
knowledge assets, is how 
those are pro5ected and how 
those are, how the 
knowIedge is distributeci in 
the Company an issue tfiat' s 
relevant to your decision? 
35.0 Sure. 
So, you know that's (pause)...so they reaiïzed that 
they needed the expertise of a CE0 type persan to 
haudle this weU. 
WeU, 1 diink it becornes more of a faam as they 
start to borrow more and need more &ancial 
reporting* 
Y& thaî's when we start to Say, okay you need a 
CF0 in thexe. 
Yeah, so when 1 look at some ofthe smalier 
compaaies that I've got that are dennitely KBI type 
customers, that's m e  of the things we try to coach 
and colmcil them m. 
We say, lodr, you need to have some expertise corne 
in to do this fiaanciai management stuffand uh, you 
know, kind ofhelp take it to the next level. 
Uh yeah, we want to make sure that the right people 
have the right knowiedge. 
And so when you go look at the technical person, 
you Look at the finance person you, as 1 said one of 
the big gaps that we always fkd on the s m d  ones is 
that guys that developed it decide that they're going 
to be the ones nmning it. 
It doesn't always work out the way tbey'd like. 
You know, the =art anes will mmgnhe that yw 
need to maybe add same people in the financial area 
once you've got m e  revenue or whai you're 
appro9chiing that reva~ue Stream. 
Mhmm. So interms of 
whether they have the right 
knowledge base in the 
Company to puU off w2iat 
they want to do on the 
technicd side, is that 
something you reiy on 
ouiside expertk to judge? 
Okay, so your assessnent is 
basidy using whatever 
CVs and stuff are part of 
the.. . (Business plan) 
Okay. So, you how,  we7ve 
beea talking about 
companies that you've 
recently been dealing with. 
I'm just wondering if you 
couid sort of de~~l"be  sort of 
the decision process for one 
that cornes to minci- 
40.0 Okay. 
41 .O Okay. 
42.0 Dave Cross and 
But you know, its hard to amvince people that that 
expenditure is wocth doing but the me's thaî do it 
are fBr bdkr  off in the luag m. 
No, usually its pretîy much done internally for the 
smder ones. 
1 mean, some of the Iarger oaes we might, uh larger 
W, we might bring in a consuitant but you how, 
its usuaZly intemalized until we get to a certain 
borrowing level. 
Part of the package, yeah sure. 
Weii, 1 p2ss it depaids too on how much mmey 
they are borrowi~g. 
39.1 You know, ifwe are approving it withiu say a limit 
that I've got a d a b l e  for approval, then you know 
much of it becmes, the proces becomes much 
quicker. 
40.1 If we've got to pr-t it to a credit group then, you 
how, your presentation has got to include a lot 
more background mateaial because the person 
lodnng at the deal may not have the same 
understand of the technology or the KBI that f do. 
4 1.1 And what we've tried to do at the bank is have 
designateci people in aedit risk management that 
have had the backgrounds in thase areas so that the 
deals, you kuow 1 look at Kitchenery the guys down 
there, I'm n d  sure if you've intdewed them yet or 
not but 
42.1 Dave Cross and Paul Seigai. 
44.0 Okay, so uh actually, 3's 44.1 
interestkg you say that In 
terms of credit risk 
management, do you use 
like credit scoring models 
like you would in sort of 
traditional lading? 
45.0 Okay, in terms ofthe, I'm 45.1 
trying to get to the 
management of the 
company then, what um 
attributes of the 
management team would 
you say are m06t important 
for you in deciding whether 
to deal with these guys or 
not? 
46.0 Oh, &yY 
1 mean uhat theve  dme is urn, they've had a 
aedit guy on site that they've uh grachially I guess, 
taught the business uh in tmns ofthis is what a 
typical company like this looks like. 
And so, you know, ifyou walked in J œ  Banker 
fkom Burhgtcm or sometbiag is going to say holy 
smokes, this is Iike different than what 1 wouid 
approve under standard asset financing 
ammgernent. 
So you kind ofcusfomize your approvai process to 
deal with those companies and their needs and why 
tbey're différent you know. 
Yeah you do. 
You rate each you know, when we break it dom it 
would be uh ampany and management, and 
financiais, uh access to h d s .  
All of t h e  are kiad of givai a rating to say, here's 
how we rate this company on ail those areas. 
(pause) 1 mean, I think its a combination of the 
technical capability, that is, knowing the business 
well enough that they can properiy position 
thernselves, 1 mean, or explain themselves to Joe 
Public or to investurs. 
45.2 As 1 said, that , what really ends up turning off the 
tap sometbes is someone that can't get in front of a 
crowd of investors and explain in layman's tenus, 
even analysts and even to investos, what they're 
actuaiiy, whaî their company does ar what they seek 
to accomplish. 
46.1 So, 1 mean cornmimication skiHs uh I wouid say is 
an important factor we look at. 
46.2 Because it can determine whethex the guy can raise 
WtY- 
46.3 he can have great techies but you know, ifthey're 
limiteci in terms of their ability to communicate then 
you know.. 
46.4 That that's me of the gaps that we do fin4 to be 
ihnk, in the technology area - 
47.0 Sure, 
50.0 Okay so it doesn't have to 50.1 
be the technical guru but he 
has to be the one that's 
is that some ofthean have been trained to be uh, 
g d  attechni-, but butek people slciils and 
interactive skills are veay weak. 
Ithinkitsjustthenaîureofthebeast 
Ifyou're a uxnputea cornputer science graduate 
fkom a partidar tmiversity, you may have spent 
most of your tirne in front of the sgeen and you 
know, maybe not have the same interactive. 
So, you know, that's one of the areas that we 
scmietimes find is weak, you how, with the ability 
to communicaîe these issues. 
But not aiways. 
1 mean there's some engineets and people like that 
are extremely g d  at uh communicating. 
And so we, you know its a generalization 1 would 
agree but it is one of the factors that we look at- 
How weli, even ifyou had someone as the lead guy 
uh to get up and taik about it, evenatauy there may 
be m e  technid questions. 
How weli can that person explain those technical 
issues? 
I mean I've seen a series of companies d e r e  we 
haven't been able fo do anytbing for and you look at 
it and and you say the idea is spedacular but the 
management, in tenns of their ability to 
communicate with is doing an a m  job. 
The business presentation kn't what it should lx, 
uh, you know. 
The National Research Council has heiped a littfe 
bit because what they try to do is help hem put 
together the business p l a .  
They've got you Imow money that they use to help 
fund the writing of the pruper business plan- 
So you know, some of that has improved fiom what 
it was. 
You know, 1 can recollect two or three years ago you 
how, you'd see some of these proposais and you, 
yw'd be ready to throw them in the garbage because 
they just weren't even legiile or they didn't have 
enough detail in it to make any sort of 
determination of whether the thing was any good or 
not 
51.0 Sure. C h  the d e r  end of 5 1.1 Yw know, hase me's are usually a little better 
the do, y o ~  dme but somethes they're missing information 
there's the ïiiegiiIe withh them. 
bsinessplan. What abortt 
the one's that come out of 
cannedpackages? You 
know, iike you can go out 
and buy a 'biz plan', you 
know. 
5 1 2  But we have a loau application package that is on 
disk that we give thean as weil so, you know, it 
certainly, uh, that's helped. 
52.0 Okay, but in terms, 1 guess 52. f No, not necessarily- 
what I'm wondering more 
is uh, sort of at one end of 
the spectnmi. you have the 
me's the guy tried to write 
himself but are really boid, 
At the other end, you have 
the one's that somehdy's 
done foi him. Do those 
raise flags as well, or? 
522 1 mean, soinethes its just more professional, 
presentation wise to have it done for you 
53.0 Okay. Inteamsofa 53.1 Yeah, 1 mean its an important part of it- 
campany you've recentiy 
investeci in, woutd you say 
that, in terms of the 
manageanait team, the 
dynamics inside ofthe team 
were somethhg you lodred 
at or is that somettung 
that... 
They've got to be able to work together for cornmon 
development but uit, 1 t)iink the uh, and I'll just 
think back to the one we just did and it was a six 
month long account. 
Uh reaily what it was there is that the csmpaay had 
some vision on wfiere it wanted to go. 
55.0 So, really it came down to 55.1 
how well he ptesented his 
casethen. 
55.2 
So we placed a great deal ofreliance on the CE0 to 
to take them in that direction. 
W e  bought into the business plan, ôought hto the 
concepts that they had oirtlined in that. 
Yeah. 
Weil, a lot ofit m e  down to that. 
56.0 Sure Okay, in teans of this 56.1 Almost didn't go through, you mean? 
uh cunpany that you were 
just descri'bing, is there any 
sort of m e  thing that canes 
to mind that was aImost a 
&ow stopper? 
57.0 Yeah. something thaï was 57.1 (pause)- Um some of the uh £hancial management 
sort oc you were seeing and probably controls that we would have thought for a 
you didu't like and if it had annpany that size that they would have, they didn't 
been worse or dï.fEredlt have. 
somehow, it wouid have 
changed your mind? 
58.0 Okay. 
59.0 You mean in terms of 
amputer equipment? 
60.0 Okay, in tenns ofthe 
technicai -le in the 
agauizatian, you have a 
product team developing 
the product, do you look at 
how many products are 
concurrently being 
developed? 
58. I So, if that's been since resoIved because they've 
brought another person in to m i s t  with k 
58.2 %me of the hancial controls, and even some of the 
technologies we expeded. they would be using 
internaily to manage (vanish??) theù financial 
positions weren't there. 
59.1 Yeah. Yeah. 
59.2 Electronic tie ins or accounts, things like that. 
60.1 Yeah, we've got to make sure that their pipeline of 
p r a i u a ~  isdeep enough that you know, when they 
ge$, you know kind of &art in the existing main 
produd line, that they've got sornething else in the 
pipe- 
60.2 I mean, just like any business you wmt to ask, okay, 
you did this fast year but what have you got coming 
this year, to kind of assess their prospeds. 
60.3 Or wfiat do you have that's gohg to be coming in 
Stream, you know five years fiom now? 
60.4 L mean in the health care industry, some ofthese 
biotech oompanies we've got, uh its very important 
that you say, okay, the prduct that you're focusing 
your phase three trials on is this one but what else 
do you have thaî's ccnning behind it to compliment 
it or provide additional potential commercial 
revenue far you- 
6 1.1 So, you know its just like the phamaceuticais 
companies that corne out with a blockbuster dmg 
but theae is always follow almg development that's 
done cm that drug. . 
6 1 2  Either they change the name or they cal1 it. 
63 .O Okay. So in terms of again 
a s m d  cznnpany 
developing produds, is 
there an optimum number 
of products that they cau be 
developing at any one time 
do you tûink? 
64.0 Okay. 
66.0 Okay. A couple of product 
questions. In terms of the 
infbstmcture of the 
company, is tbî something 
that you make an explicit 
assessnent of or do you 
j-.. 
67.0 Like do they have the right 
design tools and do they 
have CAD systems and... 
62.1 Yeah, they change the prdcess, 
62.2 Just iike improving any produd but you've got to 
make sure they have that pipeline because ifthqr 
l m  uh customers to say a competitor thaî's very 
simïiar7 then you know, you could be, they couid be 
out of business rather @dy. 
63.1 It depends on the size of your inçasbructure. 
6 3 2  1 meau in the cornputer software area it could be me 
product that they're trying to perfëct to ged to the 
point that, you know they've got to do their beta 
testing an it and and al1 of that SM. 
64.1 Uh, 1 woddn't say that, 1 mean, you gotta make 
sure that they're not going all wiliy nilly all over the 
place. 
64.2 So you want ta make sure its a focused pipeline. 
64.3 Like I've seen some companies that yai start to look 
at their pipelines and how does this relate to *ere 
you want to be. 
64.4 Y O U ~ O W .  
66.1 When you say inhstmcture ... 
67.1 Yeah. 
67.2 You usually want to make sure they have the tools 
to do the job and, you how,  are they cornpliant. 
67.3 Right now obviwsly the Y2K issues, you know, in 
technology is and important part ofit, 
68.0 Okay. And in tenns of um 68.1 Yeah, oh yeah. 
the techuology, the 
developmat team, the 
people in that team and the 
knowfedge skilis in there, 
do you look at how well the 
key imowledges are spread 
around in that team? 
Because you've got to, you want to make sure that 
they've got a good mix of skills within it, 
1 mean, i've seen wfien we talk about the howledge 
ecunomy, an example, uh of a client, is a client I've 
got that doles engineering work and al1 of the 
ernplayees are essentially engineers, okay? 
70.0 Oh okay. Um, when you're 70.1 
looking at that mix is there 
any, sort of  specinc method 
or a p p r d  that you use, or 
just sort of lodgng at what 
îhey have in the CDS and 
what they're doing? 
70.2 
Uh, the guy that does the day to &y management of 
financial and busiiess decision making is not an 
engin- but has a you know, signifiant track 
record in business - to nm businesses, 
So, although these guys are all engineers and 
they're out doing work for Proctor & Gambk, and 
they're out doing work for Cm-Cola, Ktaft, you 
know large customer base that do, uh, yai know, 
design work for them on you know, systenis that 
they're using in the plants. 
You've got to have meone there that can bring it 
al1 together and market it and seU it. 
Its a knowledge, theae's no assets ia th& Company 
d e r  than cornputer CAD equipment and things 
Iike that, 
Um, there isn't r e d y  any rnethodology behiad this. 
1 mean, its not really an exact science because you, 
sometimes you end up taking some risk and you 
assess it and you say, &yy what's the viability of 
this, 
And you may be wrong, you may be ri&, so 
soaietimes youjust take a bit of a flyer cm them and 
say, &y, we're prepared to put some money at risk 
on this because we believe that, although we, we're 
not sure where they're p i t i m 4  we do lmow that 
there is potentiai far this thing. 
And sometimes we've won and sometimes we've 
l a  
72.0 Okay, well that's it. That's 
aiithernainQuestiomI 
had. 
D.6 Interview Notes - Expert S4 
Predominant mdustries hvolved with are telecommunications and software. 
To a lesser degree, involved with He-sciences and environmental sectors These sectors 
are emerging and growhg hst, 
BMO does get involved in frmdmg early stage ventures through Ïts associated venture 
capital corporation, 
May do 'angel' Ïnvestmg 
Also involved in the TIPS program and western Canada development fund 
How would you define a technology-based venture? 
Do you believe that these ventures have special decision attrïbutes? 
What characteristics do you believe differentiate a knowledge-intensive venture 
&om tecbnolo gy- based venture? 
Do you believe that knowledge-intensive venhires have speçial decision attributes? 
Software and semiconductor industries have fàster We-cycles 
Electronics and wmponent companies have a slower W-cycle than software. 
Telmmmunications has slower He-cycles due to the hi& capaalizaton required 
The higher the lmow1edge content the M e r  the product We-cycles 
When assessing a early stage bowledge-intensive venture are you considering this 
as an 'investment' decision or as a lending' decision. 
What characteristics do you bekve ciifferenthte these two types of decisions? 
When assessing a knowledge-internive venture, what are your specific objectives? 
Look for the quality of the management, protection of intellectual property and export 
po tential, 
Look for clear technological advantage and export oppomuiities 
8. What issues do you wnsider to be most relevant? 
The architecture of the product is miportant, especially in software 
Look for niche markets 
It is important to consider adoption of the product and technology by the customer. 
Qualiry of the management team is very important. 
It is important that the management team be seasoned and has done it before. Not 
necessary to be m the same market as the proposed venture, but have experience 
moving a product into markets 
Look for a high degree of innovation and potential for market leadership 
Look to see ifthe venture is in a niche market 
1s there a well dehed strategy - who is the market, who will buy the product, who 
will be the pinchaset, how will these customers be reached. 
What is the potential for partnerships which will leverage the venture te~hnology and 
or products 
1s the venture receptive to extemal advisors 
The management team of the venture is the number one consideration 
Also look to see ifthere is a strong board of directors 
1s the venture based on good science 
What is the pote& to set up partnerships to develop the venture. 
The management team is important, but so is the development team 
Need to consider how the inteliectual property wïli be protected 
How have the development people been protected. Have they been identifid How are 
they conipensated. Are there royalties or ESOPS 
If the key technology people canwt be identified or if they have not been satisfktod~ 
protected then tbk is a potentiai are for conceni 
Does the venture have a working prototype or have they been providing custom 
products in a related field up to this point. 
Often usefbl to a& if the venture muld act as a high quality service mmpany 
Can they be a successfiù design shop. Do they have the capabiiity to develop high 
quality, innavative products 
Does the venture have an experienced engineering group 
If the management team has no busÏness expenence, do they have a plan to get 
experienced help. 1s there sonieone in the group with business experience. 
Are the key people open about the needs, abiüties, oppominites and risks. 
Good documentation on business plans, financial histories and the development of 
products and technologies. 
Does the venture have a lawyer fbd ïa r  with IP issues. 
Want to try and assess if the management team has the abïlity to take the venture to 
the next leveL Can they iden* and articulate what is necessary to gmw to the next 
leveL 
Looking for ventures that have high growth pote& 
Wd the venture create employment and grow or are the principals interesteci in selling 
the venture quickly 
Qroduct and technology potenta management team and organization are the 
imposant considerations in the venture. 
Also looking for the p o s s h i i  of being or beconhg overextended in product 
develo pment. 
Like to see product focus. Rather concentrate on one product rather than overextend 
resources and start missing milestones. 
It is important that the key knowiedge assets of the venture are avaüable for . . 
development and not going to be tied up with admmstmtive tasks and other 
management hctions. 
2 or 3 products is too much development effort. 
1s the business plan succinct and easy to understand? 
Does the business plan have lots of typical buzz words and realistic projections 
Are there any specific sources of information that you tend to use during the 
assessment process? 
Sources of background technical information are the web, 0th clients, other 
hvestment experts, extemal technology consultants, and govennnent labs such as 
NRC. 
It is important to have a network of people to help m understanding and assessing the 
venture technology 
Often extemal experts will not understand the busmess iriiplications, but can asses the 
technology, its fùture potential and the level of innovation of the techwlogy or the 
product. 
When undertaking a major investmenî, will interview key management people for one 
- two hours, Will also i n t e ~ e w  customers and suppliers. 
Look at the customers to determine the potential for product adoption 
Look at the suppliers to get a better understanding of the risks 
For large scale HiteMews wiU also interview key technical people m the venture in 
addition to the management. 
Can often tell after an interview if the team mmbers have an understanding of the 
business. 
R e  looking at how the people operate. How are they with each other. Can they seil 
thek ideas and are they crediib1e. 
DO they have a seasoned project manager 
The CV with the business plan usually has information on the key technical people. 
When looking at how the people operate, looking to see if they have a professional 
attitude and approach to product development and business in general How does the 
team interact. 
Ofken get to leam a lot about a team and the venture mamgelnent during the course of 
interviews and business discussions 
10. Describe for me a recent example of a very early stage howledge-intensive 
venture that you have assessed and decided to make an mvestment in? 
1 1. Were there any characteristics of this venture that made it unique? 
12. What features lead to the decision to invest? 
13. Are there any aspects of this venture that you considered to be marginal and could 
have easily cbaaged your mind on mvesting? 
Ego can be a problem. S o m e k  as a result of previous success people can become 
overconfident and unrealistic about the market potential of thek product and the 
problerns that the venture rnay fàce. 
This can lead to under-estimation of the difEculty in market adoption of the 
technology 
Like to see product - market focus 
14. Describe for me a recent example of an eady stage knowiedge-intensive venture 
that you have assessed and decided -t to make an investment m? 
14.1. What stage was the venture at? 
15. Are there any characteristics of this venture that made it unique? 
16. What features lead to the decision NOT to invest? 
17. Are there any aspects of this venture that you considered marginal and could have 
easily changeci your mind? 
There can be a problem if planning is not realistic and resource requirements are 
under-estimatecl 
Need to see that there is an understanding of what techical risks emst Hi developing 
the product 
Without a good CO0 may consider that the risk is too high to consider investing 
Development over-extension is a major problem 
BMO venture capital group typicdy will do a much more complete skiils inventory. 




f -1 %am a niche manuEachrrer. 
2. L You how, they may have buiit a product 
3.0 I'm sure, 
4.0 Sure. 
5.0 Sure 
- so Cm going to put these guys in the e1ectrica.i or 
componeaîs kind 0% that kind ofspace. 
They're slower moving but thaî can be very 
attractive 
uh financing vehicles for us becmse, you how7 
they may in fiid 
uh, you know build prducts aimed at, you know, a 
particular market or., 
You know 1 can think of a couple companies we 
have that focus oo certain veaticai markets and have 
nm produa solutions aimed at those markets- 
Uh, they have a positicm of leadership today in those 
market. 
Blut to mature, like to mature to that point, they took 
-Y== 
They didn't do it overnight, 
So unlike ah, you know, maybe the semicunductor 
space or the software spaœ where it moves t6ey 
am, they look more like a traditional ~~l~lllufacttrrer- 
The realïty is they aren't - bscause they're selling 
pretty rigorous s t u E  
Because they're u d y  a smaU comgany s e h g  to 
large muitiaatimal clients. 
So that means their theu gear, has to be 
rate. 
Whether its a software or hardware play. 
But uh, so i'll caU that the electroaics or the 
componaits industrydustry 
1 find that a iittle bit sIower. 
Uh, tele~~~ll~nuaications s mature, 
Ph, its moying fast but not East in the sense îhat... 
(psuse) 1 m e .  architecture7 architechire tends to 
have one and two year ... 
you lmow this as much as I woulb.. 
you how,  it tends to, it goes cyciicaUy7 you h o w  in 
terms oc you know, what space you're in - 
whether it, uh @riuse) 
...y0 u how, whether its driven sort of depends upon 
what part of telecam we're tallcing about but, but 1 
h d  it a very orderly business in a lot of ways - 
communicatioas. 
But its life cycles tead to flip year to year- 
Any major play= in that space, who's sebg gear 
to that space, obviously has to be weU capitalizd 
You don? just set up shop, uh you how, and start 





You know, 1 guess is what X'm getting at - rotitem 
or OYhatever wfiatevea play you're taking 
about, 
These companies tend to have matured over ten 
years, fivetoterayeas, 
um ym know, and they tend to be significant 
players either in the public market place or Oatamty 
well capitalized 
dm, with capital - private or seed capital M i e  they 
become sigaiscant, 
So, we've got thls vesy m g e  market going on but 
= suppose' 
ah.. up here you bave telecom that's moving Wly 
@me)... slowiy but its not - I, 1 hesitate to say it 
because it's changing rapidly but you need a lot of 
horse power to play in that market and its a Ianger 
matirntyty 
Soakare has a capacity to do this. 
Semiconductor spaœ has the capacity to do this7 
am, recently 1 would have said in the last year more 
SO. 
Even though the investment cycle is long, oh life 
sciences, biosciences 
irb tends to be evolving quicker out of the lab too. 
What happens ah that apace is rih, if the idea is 
innovative and its a dnig play or its a devices play, 
then it gets a lot of capital fhst to grow i t  
10.0 Oky.  
10.0.1 A W y ,  that's kind 
of intaesting 
because the bi- 
oneisuhan 
i n t e r d g  one firom 
the research point of 
view because it, its 
a 
10.02 the faster M e  cycle 10.1 Yes. 
ones tend to be the 
high knowiedge 
You don? do it on the back of your band. 
Uh and its very cornmonplace to s e  biotech plays 
siart at five, ten, twelve million dollars in venture 
capital right ftom day one. 
So they can, you know, run th& reseiuch. 
Birt it takes them several years, obviously, to get 
through the processes required to commercialize it. 
So, its a long cycle - it requises a lot of capital. 
Um anyway. .. 
L 1.0 And whereas, uh 11.1 
biotez&ithasthis 
capitalization hurdle 
it has to go over,,. 
12.0 . ..- Until tfiat starts 12.1 
to take eiEct 
122 
13.0 Yes. Okay. 
14.0 Sure. 
Yes it does, 
Yes. 
Yeah it desperately needs that so it can continue to 
do the research and the testing and 
ali you know that whole piece, you know, in order 
to be su- 
This market &as uitimately raised a lot of money uh 
for Ph kIecan plays. 
People mderstand te1ecur.n here and that's the 
business ofOttawa 
UJs, recaitly more and more capital seems to be 
chasing life sciences plays here, you know. 
Gradually they're building a bit of an infrastnicture 
- very loose but a bit of an hfhdructure is 
evolving. 
So, 1 see this capital unne in m l y  aggressively. 
It probably isl't aggressive - it's probably the 
model. 
If1 was in Montreal where bioscience is really what 
drives the market, um you know, I'd probably say 
well that'sjust the way its dane. 
You know, you have to have five or teni million just 
to open the door. 
Um, typicaily fm a software play, when we invest 
we ofken invest anywhere f k n  a miflion to three 
million on average when we're an equity play - 
that'll get us going and then some. 
If we've got good management, 
you know uh, you may have a successfbi ccnnpany, 
at th& adoption anyway. 
Taking it to the next level wiU take subsequent 
rounds but cebtainly, biotech would need a Id more 
than that to begin with. 
15.0 So, when 
yod re ...when some 
guycomeshwith 
his business plan 
and um you're 
lodàng at it, 
15.0.1 whaî kind of 
aîtrii'butes are you 
lmkiug at in that 
company to decide 
whether this is 
something 
spedicaüy that 
you're i n t e r 4  in 
being, doing some 
angel invesbng, or 
whether you're 
going to just say 
%el& we'il provide 
you banking services 
but no thanks"? 




1 guess there are a few generic things that 1 would 
point to. 
1 want to be able to see that rrh ti& company can uh - 1 mean if its a producî or its a technology play - 
1 want to see that they can, either through their 
innovation or good management, they can take a 
leadership position in the space their in. 
You knovcrl 
So 1 have to see a clear pidure in tenus of their 
market. 
Are you bringing saeethhg? 
Is your science innovative? 
In other words are you solving a probtem out there 
that's not solved todafl 
And there may be five soIuti(~1~ to the same 
problern. 
But 1 mean, 1 think what you really have to get to 
the rub of it is: 
Look, does ABC company have an innovative 
solution here in this space? 
And ifso, is that a template for them to, you Imow, 
(pause) to grow a business in. 
And 1 mean in that space. 
So product or technology that plays the science is 
very i m m t  in that there is opportimity fm 
growth and leadership in the segments they're 
attackiog. 
The strategy has to be weli d&ed 
1 read so many business that uh, thaî cover the 
gerleric bases. 
In fàct, you could almost start clawing out the buzz 
words in the business plan and then 
19.0 Sure. 
uh @rime) at the bottom at, the rneat of it woulh't 
be thert- 
Recently we were digesting (myself and my parnier 
who does the seed stuff out of Toronto) a plan. 
And we both read the same plan and it wasjust Ure 
it hit us both with a wave that this chap had gotten a 
cyber dictionaxy and kind of pop, pop, pop, you 
knowW 
He'd said aU the ri@ things but there was nothing 
thme, -fl 
SI, ah, a weii denned stra.tegy gives me a sense that 
pm, management, 
now that they've identifieci the sciesce, 
identified their advantage, 
they talk about who their clients are, 
who the users are and how best to get to them. 
What are the best strategis f h m  a distribution or 
marketing point ofMew to get to them? 
What partndps do we need? 
That's another thing - openness on the part of 
management 
Receptivity to partnefships, 
to extanal advisors, 
ah Cpoiuse) Ph a lot ofplays you see, th, 1 mean m e  
ofthe î%st sigus or one ofthe first things that sort of 
tums me off is a scientist thai (pause) that Iives an 
his own self worth, you know. 
He doesn't appear open- 
You can read it in his business case that he's not 
open to, you know, to bringing other peuple in to 
advise him or help him. 
Um so I'm really lodung for someone that is 
flexi'ble and open to 
uhadvicebutalsoopen to 
pm partnerships that wil i  levexage the scieme out- 
Obviously if- ifyou really want sort ofthe sIam 
mmk- 
you've got good technology now, 
you've got a business strategy (you am tinker with 
the business strategy. 
We can all argue to deaâh w h d e r  that Channel part 
was right or tbat market was the right one. 
And you're gohg to make mistakes, that's business 
eh, it's kind ofpreformed - Um, ifyou've got seasoned management that 
have done it before. 
I'm not taiking about, necessarily, with th& money 
to play. 
Oh that's always nice because obviously that gives 





But mae to the point that have s u d y ,  y m  
know, brought product to market. 
Y0u know maybe in a difièrent space, ma* in a 
diftèrat science. 
That's hugely important. 
Um, and in ah, in the absence ofit, the at>ility to 
draw or the existaice ofstrmg board. 
Very important, even in eariy stage. 
A real solid technology play usudy starts with a, 
you icnow, starts with a team. 
Not one or two people, a team. 
Uà, now if it's good science and and there7s.. , 
ifit's good science there'li be people already 
interested, open investing in the company, even 
early on, and are participating. 
SO? management's redly important, uh, redy, 
really important. 
In fkct, 1 used to do corporate finance, 
1 used to do large project finance More this - 
buildings, shopping phas ,  that sort of thing. 
So, I'il say it was location, location, location *ch 
is tme. 
Ifits a retail, you know, maJi, big box or whatever, 
wtiatever it is- 
Or for that matter, apartmeat building, you know, 
obviously location drives you know, whether people 
want to locate there. 
You know, tra£Ec, customer traflic, ease of access if 
its a residential development 
So that was the driva in that market. 
Here, 1 iike to say that ifs management, 
management, management. 
Give me sofi technology, or tectinofogy that is 
aimed in the right direction, uh and great 
management, se8soned management. 
I'ii take the seasmed management any &y because 
they caa take that prduct play, they can tweak it, 
they can ah @ritue), they can drive that market and 
uh, yw know, they can be successfiil, 
They have a better &ance of beiig successfbi than a 
company that just simply has peat scieblce. 
The two usually go hand in hand 
It's rare that they don't go hand in h d  
Birtsometimes you canseeit,youcan feel itand 
you go, no, I'm going to bet oa tfiis. 
22.16.1 @rpre)oathkentaprise,thisentitybecauseI 
really like the team. 
23.0 OItay. 
23 .O. 1 So when you're um 23.1 Pretty wide, pmtiy wide. 
assessingwhethff 
its a good science or 
the technology, what 
reSOUTces do you 
draw cm to uh 
detehmine that. Do 
you do that 
independent O£.. 
UIU, geaerally speaking um 1 might use d e r  
clients, oonftdentially 1 m e -  um ask about space- 
Um there is the intanet 
1 mean just simply to do a bit of seifstudy- 
But generally speaking, because ofthe advantage of 
having in house and investment council botfi an the 
public market side at NESBIT and inside Bank of 
Montrd Capitai, 1 d d  veay quickly go to a 
number of people. 
At Ventures West, if its a s m ,  1 can actually go to 
a sedor - somme th& does, you know, does 
network management software. 
24.0 Sure. 
5.0 ... to think about it 25.1 
and m d  it over. 
252  
1 can phone a guy who does it, y w  know and that's 
his thing and that's a good start. 
And 1 may, 1 may be right away thinking about 
partndp-  
So if rm thinking abut partnership, uh, say its a 
medical play, 1 might be thinlting, geeze, you know, 
this is a good thing for uh, you know a firad thaî is 
focused m'II Say. 
The Canadian Medical DiScoveries Fun& 
Like focused at this spaœ. 
So there's another source of înfbnnation. 
Because you bring a partuer in that in a sense is 
going to do more due diligeaice. 
An equity investor is cycIes much langer than mine. 
1 don't have the luxury of thai cycle. 
Someîimes 1 have to act very quickly as a baaker. 
If its a good appœtunity 1 have two or three weeks 
to uh... 
That's right, and thai decide whether I'm going to 
pr- 
Ib, so oh, so 1 don't have the same advantage that 
uh, you. know that a venture qitalist might have. 
So, 1 ofttm do that. 








uur investmedlt house because there's ccddentislxty 
in that respect and they use a lot of exteanal 
technobgy ccmsultants themseIves. 
They, they deal witb straight product plays so 
they're pro€mbly going to have seen one or two or 
severai, you know, business cases simik- 
And that leads oa a bit ofa research project, but iîs 
never um al1 that long. 
Um, you've got credenthk of the individuah 
involved too that might lead you to an externai 
source here or there- 
Sometimes you jus& know. 
It's kind of an educated gut h l  in that, you hou?, 
you've lodred at this, you know, God here we go. 
Here's another application like tbis. 
Literally, you're reading - and if1 in Ottawa am 
readiug business plans that have a similar ilk m e  
after mother, you knm, withh a a e r  or six 
months, um, I've got the latest hot tomalley I'U cal1 
it, you know. 
Then 1 h o w  right off - this is not unique so what 
can we make dit .  
Can we make auything of it? 
It's fimny how a g d  idea jumps offthe page. 
Do you know %uhat 1mean? 
Uh, its kind of .... 1 don't h o w  ifthat answers it or 
not. 
But there are lots ofsources. 
There wasnyt whai 1 began - it was terrible. 
Oae, L t)iink it was afmost being a little uh ... 
h m  cari 1 say.., intimidahi by the fact that 1 have 
a Gnance or accou~lting background, you how, 1 
understand business, and 1 understand investment, 
but 1 mean, I'm not an engher. 
So at nrst you're a bit intimidatecl by the, you know 
five years ago, by the technology. 
But you quickly leam that the t ~ o l o g y  doesn't 
drive the deal. 
As much as, you bow, some of the basic business 
principles. 
So, you get a little les  unamfktable. 
So, once you've had a féw years at it, you have sort 
of a network ofpeople y w  can talk to. 
32.0 Yeah that's right. 
mat% his 
CrBdibility? 
34.0 So when you're 
looking at the team, 
that's one aspect. 
34.0.1 What about the the 
knowiedge assets 
and the venture 
intenial. 
34.0.2 Like do you 
specifically take a 
look at uh, w k e  
the knowledge lies 
in the company and 
how its being ... 
35.0 Yeah, 
3 1.4 in the early going, the bank would hire, fkom time 
to the,  exteanal fec)rnofogy d t a n t s .  
3 1.5 You kii0nr7 basicaily they ikrould hire out amtracts 
but you know, this is, this is a problem. 
3 1.6 Weii, you know, 1 never really thought this would 
work as a business case. 
3 1.7 1 have somme cuming with something unique. 
3 1.8 So now we go to ORTECH, for example, and we say 
uh, you know uh, do an assesmat on this, 
3 1.9 Well who do I have assessing it exactly? 
32.1 What does he know? 
His fie got any design, you know, work in this ara? 
You bow. 
So qyickly 1 realized that wasn't going to wurk 
1 had to fiad d e r  ways. 
Um, in this city we're lucky. 
W e  have the National Research Cound. 
We bave a lot of science advisors. 
We have a lot of very good technical people that we 
can dl cm fian within the government too that 
may know the science. 
They may nd h o w  whecher Îts commerciaiiy viable 
but they may be able to say you know that's unique 
science, that's good science. 
35.1 M y  cuncern is when 1 register um that the baak has 
a nice glot>al form, this general security agreement, 
35.2 Ifyou read it, it's everything but the kitchea sink, 
including inteiledd property. 
35.3 Mind you, I wouldn't say our g e t i d  registration is 
gohg to amtrol intellectual property by any stretch 




Um but if we're reailybkïng on it, ifdiat's in the 
background, ifthings go sorah we can sell uh, you 
how, the product or the technology, 
Then we speud a litîle bit more time on it. 
1 mean 1 have never p e r s d y  done escrow oa 
software code or controiled it. 
Um, again, 1 have a doubt as to whether the expense 
redyjustifies what 1 am trying to accomplish. 
You how its changing. 
The îdhsîmcture of the product, the code is 
chtznging so quickly and its in the min& of uh the 
key development team that probably what 1 should 
focus on is who's building the product. 
And what sorts of arrangements are in place to keep 
them at the table. 
Incentives- 
Uh, yori know, ah whether there's an esop in place, 
&der  there's you h o w  ail opporhmity basically 
for them to participate in the growth and the weaith 
of this company. 
Um, if there isn't, then 1 have a problem right fiom 
the get go. 
So we usuaiiy look to see tha. 
Ts this refîned? 
Ub, do the key devetopers have a piece of the 
-pan* 
Do the key devetopers have employment contracts 
that have some solid control over their, you knm7 
movement. 
Not just movement but the use of that technology. 
Um good technology companies typidy focu~ on 
it. 
Its reaIly -y. 
When we do our - and 1 haven't even got to iP yet - 
wfien we do our, do our technology s e d  fimd. 
that's what the mmey is usually used for. 
Making sure they have cantrol of the technology. 
Tbat may be some simple patent work, you know, 
some of th& being some legai, some legal advice. 
That's around a hdf million dollars - you could 
spaid that red qui& trying to get a patent csr uh, 
whatever it is, y w  know colltrol there and on 
süucturing uh you know, sofbwue employment 
program- 
You know, making sure the labour side, the human 
side of the company is tidy. 
40.6 Those are the two areas that out money is used for 
primarily- 
41 .O Do you spend any or how would you (pause).-- 41.1 You mean iç 
Yw look at uh whaî howledge passage is the patent 
there in terms of the pcop1e. How atunxî good or? 
what's missing? A .  you m a position to 
assess sort of the strength of those knowiedge 
assets or what are you looking at, Kke &cm 
you Say you Imow.., 
42-0 Mmm, I'm 42.1 Or y w  mean the actual idea itseE 
diinlo'ng... 
43.0 th, I guess 1 was tkinlo'ng mare almg the 43-1 Yes. 
lines, you m e a t i d  you know do they have 
the esoW essops?? in place to keep the key 
peuple in place, Um in terms of yau hm, 1 
guess there's two issues. One w d d  be, how 
do you tell ifthat's the key person? 
44.0 And secondly, uh, how do you tell 44.1 






45.1 45.0 Sure- 
Weil, um, imfortunateIy my cycle ofuh (pause),.. 
how can 1 say. 
M y  cycle in terms of decision is shorter than say an 
investors. 
So, 1 don't, 1 can't honestly say I can interview d 
ofthe key management personnel. 
1 can't. 
1 mean 1 look at the business case, 1 lodc at uh 
d o s e  on on the & you know, there, what there 
ski11 set is, mat& it up to the praduct and say well 
yeah, we need developers in thls area. 
We se%n to have two or three that are key and these 
guys definitely have the requisite skilis for that area. 
So fiom my point of view, its maybe a Little generic- 
I'm just sort of doing a ticky checky and saying, 
thwve got the right guy in finance, they've got the 
right guy you know here as a project manager, 
they've got seasoned projed managers for th& 
software development teams. 
Um you know, u s d y  a good business plan WU 
give me a fauly heavy duîy or rigofous vite on you 
how, h d  of analysis oftheir team. 
47.0 Yeah that's right. 
49.0 Sure. 
50.0 Sure. 
51.0 Oh, &y. 
You know there rnay be five or ten pages just 
straight on peuple and 1 look at tfiat iàïrly carefidly. 
Um, on the d e r  side, on the capital side, we spend 
a lot of time when we're Uivesting, a lot of the. 
Uh the standard is m e  to two hour interview with 
each of the key peasonnel in the company. 
Um, we inteniew the suppliers, &yY 
We travel if we have to. 
We fly to the aistomers. 
If its, if its a ampany that's emerglag and uh, you 
how, we're looking at maybe three to four major 
beta sites, we'll go taik to those beta sites. 
Go to wherewer that company is - Ddas  or 
wheremr it is - and fhd out ifthey're really 
satisfied with the gear. 
Oka9 
Will they be uh good wiU ambassadors for the 
product. 
So uh so, oa their side of things, one, îhey structure 
it with more money up fiont to cuver some of their 
costs you know Mare they actually make the h a i ,  
call it d t m e n t i  
And two, they buiId a fàr greater return. 
They're targeting a return of 30 or 35% oa theu 
money. 
Technicaiiy7 my spread is 3 or 4% so, so you know, 
there's a degree of what you can or cannot do. 
But uh, dennitely the key management people say 
on a more macro level, are peuple that I would end 
up taking to in the process, 
Typically when we bank someone here, we've spent 
(pause).,.-Uh sometimes somme calls up and says 
Chris would you look at this deal and we do i ï  
But a lot of the tirne we actually have this kind of 
i n f i a l  way ofgetting to know them. 
You meet up here at a networkhg opportunity or 
you hear of someone you can cal1 on. 
And then months may pas. 
So, by the the  you've actually put pen to paper, you 
may have spent six or seven manths g a g  to know 
this individual and g&g to know their idea and 
their company. 
That happens more o h  than not 
And that usuaily is g d  foundation for a soiid, you 
know decision, 1 th& 
I thhk that its important. 
52.0 Okay, so then if 52.1 
mebociy sort oc.- 
54.0 Yeah. 
You see how they operate too, 
You how, evm when its uifônnal yort.. Fint 06 1 
mean (pause) .,, Ifa person can't sel1 themselves to 
me, and 1 can't seli them weii (ii goes bath ways) 
but ifthey can't seU the ide% or explain thr: idea, 
bring it in, you how, to me, uh how are they going 
to seU the produdi 
So there are a lot of signs that corne across. 
Somehes you go geeze, 1 don't get thaî guy. 
That guy daein't work for me but maybe he's got a 
complimetitaryperson within his team- 
So, you want to explcae, 
You go, 1 like this idea but this gq's definitefy not 
the right guy to seil it, zight. 
So you dig deep and you fin4 classicaüy you find 
two or three -le with diffèrent skiU sets, 
And then that work.. 
One might be strong on the markeîing side, another 
pérsan may be very good & m the prduct 
developmeat side, anather person may be gr@ in 
operations. 
Hey, yw've gat three people. 
Ifyw can get three guys like that, bonus. 
Banus round on the software Company. 
You know, W... 
55.0 Okay,soifsomebodycameintothe 55.1 The person? 
office here art of the blue with uh a 
propos& a project and somebody that . 
you'd had, you know, opportuartres for 
informal networking with, if they had 
the same propûsal you would probably 
say that you w d d  coasider the oae that 
yw'd haà more exposure to? 
56.0 Yeah. 56.1 Hmm. 
56.2 WeU not nBCeSS8tily- 
56.3 1 mean, uh, not to give too much to schmoozing, uh 
youhowcauseuh,nqI7vestillgotto~withthe 
fùndarnentals but 1 wouid say this, that it wouldn't 
hurt them. 
56.4 It w d d  probably help than ifthey had uh, ifthey 
made a fairly professional approacti. . 
56.5 Da you know what 1 mean? 
56.6 Oc my view ofthem had been, yai how, enhmced 
Ikom the get go, that's not a bad thing, its probably 
a good thing. 
56.7 Because you now look at $iem and say weii these 
guys have got some business skills 
57.1 YoucanteU. 
57.2 You can tell though if someone's gat thaî. 
58.0 Okay, what I'd Like to do rïght now is 58.1 Let's see. 
sort of have you think of the most m t  
a;ise of one ofthese type ofventures tbat 
you made the decision to go with. And, 
specifidy, was there anything sort of 
unique about that one that redy, sort of 
yw lodred at it and said, that's a go? 
Hmm. 
There were quite a féw recentIy. 
Okay, weii we have one t2iat is uh, is in we7U say 
the semicotldudar world, &yY 
And um, the cunpany was seven months old 
It had already swcaddiy completed one design 
p r o j e  custom design prqjed for a major 
te1eCOILLrnunicrrtim vendor. 
Um, what did 1 like about the company? 
Um, even though the annpany was very eariy stage, 
it already, uh, it had already gone to the extent of 
building or developing a board. 
It brought an extanal board in. 
It brought in a varied board, uh, @ause)), 
Basically, there were thtee gentlemen that drove 
this campany- 
Three, uh SONETIASIC???? engineers, design 
engineers, chip designers that were seasmed and 
their vites were very good. 
Just a nice cut. 
They had wocked sort of varid through three or 
four different entities, ail of them. 
Tbey'd aii started their NORTEL hebitage many, 
many moons ago but venturexi offinto d e r  places. 
So uh, I liked the fact that they had the d g .  
Noae of them had run a business though. 
WhatXwasgettbgoutofitwasthesegurswere 
basicaliy kick ass designas, uh you know, in the 
wald of ctistm chips airned at telecommunication 
or data communicai.ion you h o w  needs. 
1 knew they had some skills in SONET wbich, you 
know, is kind of hard to find and uh, there's a lot of 
demand fm these three guys, the bodies just on a per 
diem basis. 
So they d d  be a very successfUl uh design shop as 
weU as a product company- 
And the axnpany has t h t  lodc 
60.0 Sure. 
That caa~pany has a look right now where it can go 
out and sell its SetYices, its design services, and 
make very hedthy rnargin, extremely healthy 
margin because these guys have the talent, 
But what it reaIly wants to do is take the design, and 
own the design, own the inteiiectual property and 
um, not just simply take 1% on the royalties stream 
but to drive the prudud and you know, to dominate 
it. 
So, first cut is, you know they can build the widget 
and they csn g& paid for it 
So, they had sort of said, weU what we're going to 
do befote we take any venture capital th- we have 
some ideas about what we want to do design wise. 
But what we'U do is we'U run a couple of contracts, 
do sane custam design build uh, -.and put some 
monqr in the bank which is d y  what they did 
So its the first six mon& of th& business, they put 
about a halfmillion bu& in the bank 
Just straight profit off theh nrSt design contract - so 
1 N e  this. 
But what they're really aimïng at is being a big 
player, a thUty or fbrty million dollar a year 
- P Y -  
Taking two or three concepts that there is a need for 
out there, y w  know, with umvergence uh and you 
how, making ttiem their own. 
So, on the one hand, I've got a veay safe services 
company that 1 like, anybdy would want to bank, 
mybady who understood teIecommunicati0fls or 
understood technology w d d  bank this company. 
But the next part of it was &y, we've got these 
ideas - yeah I agree. 
I've rad about this, I've heard about this, these 
plays might wark. 
Um, thae  might be a market there fol these desigus. 
In any mat, they did seem to have what 1 cal1 the 
horse power, you know, to becme a product 
-3?=y- 
So what did they do? 
They went out and when they brought the board in, 
they brought in people that were successfùl in 
bringing produds to market in the space. 
In fàct, they brought in, they were able to attract uh 
an executive &am a I d  public company that was 
in chip design spaw. 
So, they brought in srneone like that. 
They brought in a key player firom within one of the 
telecommtmicati~~~~ compaaies 
Vm, so they started Mding this board, thea they 
brought in a kick ass lawyer. 




Now some say weii why do you need a lawyer there? 
But a lawyer that specializes in tecbnology p d c e ,  
who undetstands inteliecûxai propertyoperty 
I mean by the t h e  thwd rounded up this board, 
and then thcre were the three guys, it was just, it 
was just a terrific board, 
I'm gomg gee, they've had the foresight to put these 
foiks in place and of course these foiks were 
attraaed because they Jmow they have design 
capabiiity and need some council. 
Then they brougfit in an operatioas feilow. 
They hired a guy who they h e w  personallyy but 
they hired him out of a major telecommunicatlcms 
-PY- 
Theyjust hired him in, gave him very sigdïcant 
status, gave him a piece of the adion, just points or 
whaiever. 
And he was kiud of a seasoned kUow and that was 
kind oc 1 c d  it a r d  rounding. 
1 thought, this is great. 
They've now got somme that can really carry - 
they can sell the concept and the design - but this 
guy can really do opeaations- 
He had beea respmsible for huadreds, in fkct, 
thousands of people in his previous job. 
Um and u n d m  the. ... 
.., in the business pian corn diat point of view- 
You know, I spent a lot of time on d o ' s  there, but 
you h o w  that going to teU me the broad stroke. 
It's going to say yeah, I've got the right guys in the 
Company to do this. 
So, usually in m y  mind I sit t h e  whiIe I'rn reading 
and L go, okay weil he's going to do this, he's gohg 
to take care of this. 
1 kind of dissect the company. 
Buî, what it doesn't do, and I think what you're 
aiming at is wfiat 1 was just descfl'bing our capital 
guys are doing, it doesn't foiiow the chahs, the 
Chain of cummand 
Or in the case ofa project, it doesi't foilow it 
through and say "&y do we have ali of the pieas 
of this puzzle to get the job done". 
And they do in fàct do th *..and idemm (pause) 
There inve~bment, uh, they have an investment 
transaction. 
We have a ledlding transaction which is a form, you 
laiouR 
For theu investment d t î e e -  
65.0 Sure 
67.0 WeU, you how. I 67.1 
think you preüy well 
have to do that as 
weu. 
Mine's for my lending cornmittee- 
That's what's uuicpely difkeat- 
When 1 read it it's ObMously longer, there's more, 
it's more in d q t h  
But there's a fàkly heavy duîy piece of it that 
focuses cm management and not just management 
but CaUEs about d the skiil sets. 
It breaks them out - produdion, operations, 
marketing, identifies the people and uh then breaks 
dom their p d  vites and then talks to the 
relaîicmships. 
And then it almost dways (pause) ... it's expected 
that risks are going to be ideatifid 
You are venture investing here. 
There are risks, right? 
So it makes the writer.., the mode1 makes the w-.iter 
identifythose. 
At the end ofthe day there's probably seven or eight 
key risks.,. uh you know.,. siguiiïcant risks tbat are 
identïiïed by the investment group and thete's 
invariably me or two that focus in on the skills 
inventory of the company. 
We have a w&ess here. 
Sameme's missing, something's missing. 
A condition of our investment - ofien, o h  a 
condition of our investment is s w c  action on the 
HR side. 
In other words, we're going to invest, 
Buî within three months we intend, you know. ..they 
iden@ and its agreed on. 
It's sort of a prefonned discussion. 
You know, we are misskg an operations guy or a 
guy on production or were, we need a seasoned 
execufive, markeâhg e x d v e  in US. 
And these are just examples, kind ofrandom 
examples of three business cases where we invested. 
You know within 90 days, we've gut to get that 
perscm in and WC, it has to be one that satisfies you 
but us too as investors and a baud. 
You how, so it is done on the investment side. 
1 don't know how you couldn't do it 
Because, you know, that sntly could uh fk you. 
68.1 You kmw. 
69.0 ûkay, uh, 1 guess. 
(end of interview) 
D.8 Interview Notes - First Session Expert S5 
Thank-you for participating in this phase of  our research hto investment decision- 
makinP- 
Investnient vs loan decision making 
two totally different worIds 
two total& differenî risk-reward criteria 
What is the typid corripany size to which you provide loans. 
companies are not nomaUy classified by the number of employees. 
more relevant are net worth, saIes and or loan size 
The management skills of the people in the new venture 
definition is too narrow 
skills needed go beyond the management skills as important as they may be 
1s there another issue that is important to consider? 
Entrepreneurhl skiils of the people in the new venture 




carry on into the mmufacturing phase 
What rank would you have assignecl this issue 
tira 
Experience and expertk 
some key points 
need for a good business case which wiIl mdicaîe technical viability of the product 
abiiity to manufacture 
market study 
identification and availabiiity of resources, both people and materials 
wdbmtion of people who can make it happen 
too much emphasis on knowledge and.experience 
the key point is does the venture have these individuals with the ability, inchidmg 
entrepreneurial spirit, to design, develop and market the product inc1uninp all the 
business related actMties inchidmg obtammg capitaI, attmct@ the necessary people, 
plan, establish budgets, organize and direct work actnrities etc. 
often there is a need for a marrjage between those with the ability to design and 
develop new products and those that can make it happen 
As a general statement for what it may be worth the type of financing related to here 
would not likely be available on a stand alone basis through conventional bank loans 
and wodd require outside support. 
The primary reason is risk / reward 
There is a very srnaII profit on sndl business loans and by necessity the risk must be 
low. 
this 4 profit also prohibits lending officers fiom spending the thne necessary to 
properly assess the proposal 
Furthermore this is the bottom end of the market and in most cases involves junior 
lending officers who have neither the knowledge nor experience to do so. 
As a g e n d  statement, ventures such as descnibed would require quasi-equity or 
equity* 
the usuai source is venture capital compiuiies 
having said this at least some of the major banks have specdty areas tbat specialize in 
knowtedge based ventures 
Also, on a limaed basis, they provide quasi-equiîy or equity through entities such as 
baok of Montreal capital corporation 
For yoia information, loans d e r  say $1 million tend to be adjudicateà by a cornputer 
program based upon input provided by a lending officer. 
ie: credit scoring 
D.9 Interview Notes - Expert S5 (E-mail exchanges) 
How wouid you de* a knowiedge-based venture? 
1 would define a knowledge-bad venture as an economic dertaking wfiich is 
primady dependent upon the special knowledge and ability of one or more individuals 
to create, invent, discover or enhance upon an idea, process or product which can be 
developed and placed in marketable form on a commercially viable basis and where the 
successfbl creatMty or development involved ir a mandaiory prere~uisite to other 
busiwu considerations or processes such as manuktmhg, packaging or marketing. 
In more simple terms, the succes of the venture is dependent, fbtly, upon original or 
creative tbhking with hfhtructure, manufàcturing or marketing processes which may 
be necessary b e i i  of second, albe'a essential, consideration 
What markets come to mind d e n  you think of a laiowIedge-based' venture? 
Mackets which corne to mind are cornputer hardware and software, medical or 
pharmaceutid products, specialized electricai components and certam defence 
products, etc. 
Not all companies engaged in these markets, of course, fit the definition of howledge 
based ventures. 
1 think of stand alone ventures rather than larger somewhaî diversifieci entities. 
In my m i n .  a typicai example wodd be a one or more indzviduals forming a venture 
to develop and rnarket cornputer games. 
To the extent they have the technical knowledge and sküls and the imagmation and 
creativity to develop products which can stand up to or beat the cornpetition, and 
likely the need to continue to do so, they may be successfid. 
Ifnot they are dead m the water. 
3 What characteristics of these markets &e them stand out eom more "traditional' 
industries or other 'high-techr sectors of the economy? 
I see the characteristics of these markets as the need for a combination of specialized 
technical knowledge and skills and creativity. 
In my mind, the emphasis is not so much as seg~egating among diffèrent high tech 
Mdustries but the form of the venture7 Le.: stand done 
focused upon development or a narrow range of highly techaical products and the 
attrilbuted needed for success ie: technical knowledge and sküls coupled with 
creativity . 
4 what attributes or characteristics do you look for in the venture's product or 
service development team which indicate ifit is based on original or creative thinzring? 
This is a tough one for me to define. 
Its like pom, I can't de* it but I know it when 1 see it. 
1 guess the best 1 can m e  up with is that the product requires a high tevel of 
inventiveness, imaginatioq innovation and creativity. 
Same for the development team. 
5 At the initial stages of this time of venture are you differentiating between the 
'development team' and the 'management team!. 
Yes, very much so- 
To me success rests h t i y  upon the development t û ~  
The management team is criticai but is of no use ifthe development team EIils. 
Also, by my d e m o n  the development team requires specialized technical knowledge 
and skiüs. 
The management team can be more general management skills. - 
In my experience, m a howledge based ventrire the development team is the driving 
force, and wuai& the dominant force, with the key players tied to development. 
The management team may in some cases be mdMduals bired to bring some order out . . of chaos, ie: accounting, arlminrcllttation, possibly some marketing such as advertising 
or packaging. 
More ofien than not, there wiU be a smail group of key players who are the developers 
and also provide overaii general management supported by a management team 
Having said this, a weakness in hwiedge based ventures can be skilled and capabIe 
innovators/developers who lack general or q e c h b d  management skilis and fàil to 
acquire or develop a supporthg manage~~hent team. 
A cntical requirement for success of course is creative of hovative products but all 
can come to naught if there are not the skills required to finance, manufacture if 
needed and market. 
Do you believe that these ventures have specid attri'butes which must be 
considered when assessing them? 
In the conte- of assessmerrt of a knowledge-based venture for investment or lendmg 
purposes, and assuming the venture is prbady  on a stand alone b i s ,  these ventures 
have special attri'butes which niust be considerd in that criteria required for a classical 
awwment is ofien not available or is of limited relevance. 
The key deria is determÏnïng the ab* of the key players to develop the creativity 
required which is essential to succeu and then mustering the capital, assets and 
management required to brHag the venture to a successf'ul conclusion. 
These attributes c m  be very d35cult to determme and measure especially by an 
evaiuator Who is mt intimately knowledgeable about the particular technologid field 
invohred. 
In view of absence or obscunty of key criteria, the risk k t o r  for these ventures 
usuaUyis at the highend ofthe risk spectriIIit 
What would be some examples of criteria other than the abiiity to develop a 
creative environment which you mayymrisider to be devant when assesshg a 'knowledfge- 
intensive' venture? 
Som examples wouid be, vision, drive, CO mmitment, leadership, inspiration, 
judgement. 
Overall it is an assessment of the key players and their abiiity to make it happea 
These are subjective and accordinph. are dificuk criteria to quanti&. 
Far too often it is a gut feeL 
8 when considering this type of venture, say a sofbvare or other IT type venture, 
what would you consider to be usehi Îndicators or metrics of the venture's ability to 
devefop a creative environment. 
Attn'butes of key players are as discussed, 
One or more of the key players has to have the vision, drive? enthus& and 
inspration to make it Iiappen 
9 When compsred to a venture which has a bigher physid technology' eomponent 
- say a venture which is developing a product based on a custom elecftonic component - 
do you thmk that there is any significant difikence which must be taken mto account? 
A venture with a higher physical techlogy component may requPe more specialized 
equipment for developmenf of Ïts product. 
In some cases, a laiowledge based venture may be large& represented by the min& of 
the key players with W e  supporting equipment other than the usuai computers, etc. 
otbers may also requHe specialized equipment. 
10 When assessing a venture which requires howledge and expertise to fùlly 
undefsfand the technology issues mvoked, what sources of information do you consider 
to be important and usefid? 
A good basic grasp of the technological issues is most helpful 
However, this cail be dif£icuit to obtaia. 
There is also the problem of a Little knowledge can be dangerous. 
The usual reference h i  can help. 
Also indutry periodicals, discussions wiih 0 t h ~ ~  in the field. 
In some cases the services of a professonal independent wnsdtant in the field can be 
of aSSiSfSLIlce. 
Often, detailed and inquiring discussions wah the key players is the best bet. 
The bottom line is that it is difficuh for an evaluator, who is not a specialist in the field, 
ie concentrateci on a naww segment of the market, to acquire a good level of 
expertke m a technical field. 
In my view, this is a major weakness m assessing a knowledge based venture. 
In my experience? an evaluator for general business has neitéer the time w r  incentive 
to carry out the necessary resemch. 
Thus the argument for business of this nature to be handled by specialized evahiating 
teams where such are available or be avoided altogethet. 
11 Ln terms of lendmg decisions versus hvestment decisions, how does the basic 
focus of the asesment change, if at a& when considering a loan to a kmwledge based 
venture which does not have s i g d ï c a n î  phpical assets rather than m a h g  an equity 
hvestment? 
In general terms, a traditional loan has a low net retum and therefore mwt be of low 
risk. 
The low r e m  also means that t h e  and effort in evaluation must be kept to a 
minimum or retum iS eliminated. 
Not ody the initial evaluation but a h  the ongo@ monitoring. 
The latter cm be o f k t  if the loan is m a sufficiently krge amount that the retum will 
still compensate for the extra effort hvolved. 
Also, a traditional loan requires reguiar interest payments otherwise the lender is 
penalized- 
Additonally a loan requires clear cut repayment arrangements 
Generalty over a relative@ short period of time or again the lender may be penali;red. 
Consequentiy, although the lender wiU look at cash flow as a source of payment of 
interest and princ'ipal, there is a tendency to support the loan by taxigr'ble assets 
especkdly for amount other than large figures. 
Loans supportecl primarity by cash flow such as project lemhg are usually c o h d  to 
large loans where the retuni permits the detailed assessment requird 
Generally speaking, loans are a high volume product, 
On the other hand, an investment is usually for the long term with no requirements for 
interest or repayment and in hope of a large return. 
Also, genedy speakÎng, investments are a low volume product. 
loans versus investments require a difEerent mindset. 
Loans are not mvestment and investments are not bans. 
Generaily speaking, lenders look back at pst performance, present position and look 
ahead for the short term. 
Investors look at the long term. possibly very long. 
Ah, sources of fimds for loans a d  mvestments are different, 
For most lenders, bans are lending out someone else's money that has been entnisted 
to them, 
Investon uuaily fuod bvestments - but not always- with funds devoted to this 
purPo=- 
Generally speaking, loans to a kmwledge bas4  venture - stand alone - represent high 
risk situations and are for a prnpose amich more properly should be represented by 
mvesûnent, 
As a venture becomes established and develops a track record, there may be room for 
a lender to participate for traditional pinposes. 
ie: purchase of equ9,menî or idbsûmture or h c i n g  accounts receivable, etc. 
ConsequentEy, fbmcing of lmowledge based ventures by lenders tends to be conhed 
to speciaiized lendmg teams or through venture capital affilisted and subsidiaries. 
12 Given the high level of ri& in lending to these ventures, especkiiy at an early 
stage, what attrriutes of the venture would bring this ri& into an 'acceptable' region for a 
lender? 
Generally speakmg, the ody practical way to reduce risk to a lender is to require a 
SUflticiently large mvestment or more likely require outside support by way of outside 
guarantees and or outside assets. 
Unfominately, a lot of this shiff is more an art than a science. 
Appendk E - Lending Espert Cognitive Maps 
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Table E.3 
Expert S2 
Concept Conneciion Matrix 
Table E-4 
Expert S3 








Trial Average Percent Average Percent Overall Percent 
Change for Change for change to @ 
Relationship &latr'onship Node Adding 
Weights Occurriug Weights Occurring Additional Subject 
with Frequency with Frequency 
Greater Thau 0.5 Less Than 0.5 
Appendix F 4enders and Viability Questionnaire 
Table F. 1 
Lender Questionnaire Data 
Siibject Xl X2 X3 X4 X5 X6 X7 X8 X9 XlO X11 X12 
Table F. 1 Continueci 
Lender Questionnaire Data 
Subject XI4 X15 X17 X18 XI9 X20 X21 Xl6 X22 X23 X24 X25 
1 4 4 5  4 3 4 2 5  2  5 4 5 
2  2 4 4  4 2 2  1 3 3 4  4  4  
3 2 5 4  2 2 2 1 5 2  5 4  5 
4 4 4 4  3 4 4  3 3 3 4 4 4 
5 3 5 5 2 3 2 2 3  3 4 4  4 
6 4 5 5 3 3 3 2 4  3 4 4 4 
7 5 4 3  4 2 4 4 2 3  4 4  4  
8 4 4 4  3 3 3 3 5 4 4 4  5 
9 3 5 5  3 3 2 2 3  4  3 4 4 
10 3 5 4  4  4  2  3 3 2  4  4  4 
11 4 4 4  3 3 3 2 3  2 4  4  3 
12 2 4  5 4 4 1 1 2  5  4 4  3 
13 3 4  5 4 4 3 2 4 4  3 
14 3 5 5 2 2 3  2  3 2 5 5 4 
15 4 5 3  4 2 2 2 3  2 4 5  3 
Table F.1 Conainuexi 
Lender Questionnaire Data 
Siibject Xî6 X28 X29 IBO X31 X32 334 X35 X36 X37 X38 X40 
1 5 2 2  3 5 4 4  3  4 2 4  1 
2  4 4 2  2 3 4  4  4 2 2 2 4  
3  3 1 2  1 2 4  2  4 2 3  3 2  
4 4  2  2  3 4  4 4  3 4 4 4  2  
5 4 2 2  2  4  3 2  2  2 2 3  3 
6 4 4 4 2 4  2  4  2  3 2 5  2 
7 4 3 2 2  4  3  2 3 2 3 3 2 
8  4 2 2  2 4 3  2 3 2 3 4  3 
9 5 2  1 2  2 3 3 3 2 4 4 2  
10 4 4 4 4 4 4  3 3 3  3 3 4  
11 4  2  1 2  4 3 3  2 4 4 2  2  
12 4  2  1 3 2  2  3 2 4 4 2 2  
13 4  3 2  1 4  4  3  3 3 3 2 2 
14 4  4 3 4 3 2  2 2 2  5 4  
15 2  2  4 3  2 2  2  3  1 2 
Table F. 1 Continueci 
Lender Questionnaire Data 
Subjezt X41 X42 X43 X44 X45 risk complex capable mgmt 
1 4 2 4 4  3  2  5 5 5 
2  4 2 4 2  2 4  2  4  4  
3 2 2 2  2  2  4  3 3 4  
4 4 4 4  3 3 
5 3 3 4  2 2  3 4  4  4  
6 2 2 2  5 3 3  2 5 4  
7 4 4 4  3 3 
8 4 4 4  3 3 4 3 4 4 
9 3  3 4 4  5 3 4 4 4 
1 O 4 4 4  3 4  
11 2  3 3 2 3 
12 4 2 2  2  2 
13 4  3 3 3 3 
14 4  3 4 4 
15 4 2 5  3 5 
Std Dev 0.83 0.83 0.92 0.93 1.00 0-76 1.1 l 0.69 0.38 
N 15 15 15 15 14 7 7 7 7 
F.l Questionnaire Variable Assignments 
Table F.2 
Questionnai.re - Variable Assignments 
Questionnaire Variables 
Absorptive Capacity (AC) XI, x2, xi, ;Y6 
Management Quality (MW 
Organhtional Effectiveness (OEFF) 
Techwlognal Complexity (TCMPLX) XII, &Y X I ~ Y  x22, SI, &Y x 3 ,  &s 
Note: Variable numbers begin at fkst questionnaire question after the demographics 
section. 
F.2 Lender Questionnaire Anaiysis Assum ptions 
Based on the results investor technological viability model analysis, the assumption 
will be made that the stnrctural mode1 has validity. 
Based on the design of the questionnaire, it is assumed that the questions used as 
measurement variables will factor to the mode1 variables as ercpectd. 
The correlation of these measurement variables to the model variables, that is the 
factor loading, would be sufnciently hi& tbat a simple un-weighted means 
aggregation c m  be used to develop the mode1 variables. 
Individu& who responded have had some eqerience wah early stage ventmes. This 
nnal assumption has some support based on the demographic idôrmation, given the 
size of venture and 10- involved. 
Table F.3 
Pearson Correlation Analysis 
Lender Questionnaite ~espondents' 
The questionnaire hcluded meastres for paceived managemeat quality and perceid capability to 
successfuily create thc propased prduct. These were intmded as measmes of perwived quality potential. 
However, the number of cases where thae was no respoase firom thc subject lowered the N of this questim 
to less than seven respoases and therefœe was not mcluded in the d y s k  The paceived risk of the 
venture was mcluded as a measure of viabrlity (assuming higher perceivecl risk mdicaîed lower perceivecl 
viabiity). 'Chis data is atS0 d t t e d  due to smali N, however, anaiysis indicated tbat the direction of 
Figure F.1 






Summary of Investors and Lendgs Signincaat Correlation 
Absorptive Capacity - Management Quality Ps8 0.5~"' 0.68"" 
Absorptive Capacity - Organktional EBectiveness pn 0.46"' - 
Management Quaiity - Technological Capability 0.60"" 0.67"' 
Organhtional Effectiveness - Techbgical Synergy B,., 0.4' - 
Absorptive Capacity - Technologid Synergy pl5 0.5"" 0.77"" 
Technologicai Synergy - Technologid Capabiiity P4 1 0.73"" 0.5 1'. 
Absorptive Capacity - Technologid Capability psi 0.57"" 0.83"'* 
* ps 0.1 
** p s  0.05 
*** psO.O1 
**** ps0.005 
F 3  Questionnaire Cover Letter 
The University of Waterloo's Lmtitute for Innovation- Research is currently 
undertaking research into the assessment of new, knowledge-intensive technology-based 
enterprises. These ventures present unique assessment issues, and the institute's research 
goal is to provide techniques and tools to aid in this endeavor. 
As part of this research program, we are undertaking to mode1 the decision 
process used when assessing this class of ventures at the early stages of their 
development. The objectives are to enhance derstanding of this process and to set the 
stage for the future development of intelligent decision support tools. 
To fùrther this research we are requesting your participation by completing the 
attached questionnaire. The questionnaite should take less îhan 30 minutes to complete 
and may be returned in the envelope supplied. This slwey has been revïewed and 
received ethics clearance through the Office of Research Ethics at the University of 
Waterloo. Any questions or concems about the study or your participation caa be dïrected 
to that office at 519-888-4567, Ext- 6005- 
AU completed questionnakes are anonynw,us, and the identity of participants wili 
remah confidential Ail results reported fiom this research WU be aggregated and no 
individual responses will be used Upon completion of this shidy, the results will be made 
available to the participants upon request. If you have any questions conceming this 
questionnaire or our research please contact Douglas Sparkes at (5 19) 888-4567 x 5381. 
Thank-you for your participation 
S incerely, 
Douglas Sparkes 
F.4 Lender Questionnaire 
Thank you for patticipatmg in this phase of our research into investment decision makiug. Your 
responses will remain confidentid and any report4 fhdings wili contain aggregated resuIts O*. 
Before beginning, please tell us a M e  about yourseK 
What is your highest level of&cation? 
HOW long have you beeai associated 
mgmhtioa? 
withthis 
How loag ago did you finish your fonnal 
e%hlcatim? 
~ L e s s h l ~ e a r  6toloYears 0 16to20Years 
Which area of study best descri'bes your 
educat id  background? 
0 6-10 peuple [7 21 - 50 people more than 75 
people 
What is the typical company size to which 
you provide Ioans? 0 15 11-20 people 0 51-75people 
How long have you been involveci in the 
evaiuatim of s m a ~  c o r n e e s ?  
How many srnail ventures do you assess in a 
@picai yeat? 
O ~essthaa 1 year 0. 3to5Yeats Loto LSYears 
(Small- a ~ u a l  sales less and $2 Million and 
l e s  than 20 employees) 0 to Cl ~ t 0 1 0 ~ e a r s  Omorethanl~ 
Years 
- - 
(Smd = annual Eals l a s  and $2 Million and 
less than 20 eniployees) - 25 0 51 -75 marettian 100 
What mdustry sector wodd you consider to be most typicai of the technology-based ventures tbat 
are i h i k  to you? 
In the following sections we wodd Like your opinion conceming a number of issues 
which may arise vhen assessing a (knowledge-based / techwlogy-based) venture. 
Please recail your most recent experience of assessing a (Imowledge-based / 
technology-based) veniure for the purpose of g r a m  a loan and indiCate your level 
of agreement with these statements or issues. 
A h ,  please keep in mind that we are &ereSfed in very sxnail, early stage venhires 
having few than 20 members and annuai sales Iess than $2 million. 
Ihe foliowing statements concefil the errpaience and srpatise h d  within (ventures). Please mdicate the 
level of impatanœ ycm blieve is associated with each of these statements by circling a number tfiat 
reflecb your opinion. 
Evidence that the venture has the requis& knowledge for the 1 2 3 4 5 0 
developmeat of 3s proposed .product(s). 
. . 
Broad distn'brrtim oftechnical knowledge within the venture, 
- -- -- - 
Evidence thnt the product(s) denlopment team has expehienced 1 2 3 4 5 a 
leadership. 
Evïdence thstthe venturehast6eknowledgerequired fordeplo~pimt 1 2 3 4 5 
and support of its proposed produd(s). 
Evidence that thae is experience behind îhe planning and colltroliing of 1 2 3 4 5 
the development projeqs), 
Idmtificatim of thme individuais who are critical to the design and 1 2 3 4 5 
development of the produd(s). 
Depth of senior management arperiaice and e x p t k  with the L 2 3 4 5 0 
tedmologies comprismg its propmed produd(s). 
Identification of me tsbnologies required fa the creation of the new 1 2 3 4 5 0 
venture's produd(s), 
~nminBig~eavailabil i tywithm&even~e oftherresurces required 1 2 3 4 5 
fa the creaîian ofthe venture's product(s), 
Deta - . g the maturity of the technologies mat wiu provide potential 1 2 3 4 5 
cornpetitive advantage. 

h terms of planning quality, please indic& yuur level of agreement with each of these slatemaits by 
citcling a n u m k  by CitcIing a number that reflects your op* 
- 
Wfiart a budget cmtrol scheme m piace diPmg pmdud(s) 1 2 3 4 5 
develapment, venture mvestment risk is unacceptable. 
C l d y  defiueû pmduct developmeut milestanes reduœ venture 1 2 3 4 5 
investarmt risk. 
A mamagenent proces for product(s) design and developmmt dsikions 1 2 3 4 5 
reduces ~e~ltine investmaitrïsk 
A proeess for documentatim management during product(s) design and 1 2 3 4 5 
development reduces venture hvestmeot risk. 
Involving mdividuals criticai to produd(s) development in otha pmjects 1 2 3 4 5 
at the same tîme inaeases venture mvestment risk 
Please amsider îhe foilowiug s&tanai+s about organhiOtlLil factors and indicate ycnn level of agreemeat 
with each of them by circüng the ninnber that best reflets your opinim. 
A bure8uQatic manageanent mueases venture mvestment risk, 1 2 3 4 5  0 
Over-extensicm of critical design and deveIopment team members 1 2 3 4  5 0 
mcreases vmture mvesbment risk. 
Theabiitomakedecisio~ls quicklyreduces venture mvestmentrkk 1 2 3 4 5 
The orgmhîîaa of the product(s) design and development tarm 1 2 3 4 5 0 
Cmtn'butes b cust overruns 
- -- - -- - 
The product(s) design and development team must be and to be 1 2 3 4 5 0 
effective. 
lac organizaton of the product(s) design and developmat team 1 2  3 4 5  
cocltrries to delays. 
Coooentrat imofpr~s)  technoIogyexperience andapdse  in the 1  2 3 4 5 
senior management mcreases venture mvestment n'isk. 
Aseniœmanagcmaitwhooftenmakes 'slap'dsisions increases the 1 2 3 4 5 
risk of Eailure. 
Havmg the technologies to support design, development and 1 2 3 4 5 
deployment of its pr&ct(s) has no impact on failme risk. 
Please amsida the foiiowhg statanaits regarding technologid complexity and mdicate yoia levei of 
agreement with each of them by circling a number whicb best refleds your opinia~ 
Ventures with prodiid@) based a new ~ o l o g i e s  have incressed 1 2 3 4 5 0 
investment risk, 
- - -- 
Vatiaes witb produd(s) havïng cdy a few key te&nologies have 1 2 3 4 5 O 
reduced luvestment risk 
-- - 
Ventures with produc@) based on estabLished technoIogies bave 1 2 3 4 5 
reduced investment risic 
To maintain their ampetitive advanîage, ventures must aüocaîe as 1 2 3 4 5 
many resources as possible to researdi and development 
The nitmber of technologies required to create a venture's product(s) is 1 2 3 4 5 
an mdicatim of mvestment risk 
F M y ,  please coatinue to recaii your most recent expaience of assessing a (ventiae) fOr the purpa6e of 
granhg a loan as you ans- the foiiowing Questions. 
How would you rank the risk of this venture? 
Did you amsider the venîue's poduct or &ce to be technically 1 2 3 4 5 
camplex? 
Did you consider the venttae to have the capabilities to aease the 1 2 3 4 5 
proposed product or service? 
HOW would yorr descn'be the overail management quaiity of the venture? 1 2 3 4 5 I 
Thank you for participating in QW study. 
Recently, the InstiMe for hovation Research sent you a q u e s t i o n ~ e  as part of our 
investigation into new venture assessment practices. W e  would greatly appreciate your 
response witbin the next two weeks in order to be included in this shidy. 
If you have atready wmpleted and retumed this questionnaire, please disregad this note 
and accept our tbanks. 
Doug Sparkes 
Appendix G Ventures and Viabiiity 
To begin the discussion of ventures and viability, some concepts nom control 
tèeory are discussed. The primary interest when considering a system is the relationship 
between the inputs and outputs in order to deternine i f  system go& are king achieved 
(Brogan, 1982). Mathematically, a system may be considerd as a mapping or 
transformation W u + y. 
A cornman approach for descn'bing cornplex, multiple input, multiple output 
(MIMO) systems is through the use of state-variables, s . These are the minimum set of 
parameters that completely define a system's statu  at any instant of tirne (Brogan, 1982). 
Therefore, ïfat any time, t~ ET, the d u e s  of the state variables, q (b) are known, then 
the system output, y (b) and the values Xi (t) can be uniquely determined provided the 
input u[a,q (t) is known. 
The implication of this is thai there are transformations, g and h, which maps the 
elements (h, ti, x(k), u[t~,t~]) to the state variables and outpas, 
x(tr) = g(t0, tl, x(to), u[to,t 11) 
~ ( t l )  =h(tb x(t1),u(f1)) 
It can be shown (e.g.: Bajpai et aL, 1980; Brogan, 1982) that the state of a system 
at any time, t, is the state at t~ plus the state û-ajectory (the graph of x(t) versus t) for the 
period [to, t]. This leads to the cornmon representation of a systern, 
here the term u = U(x) represents the inclusion of feedback in the system, where state 
variables are being feed k k  to the inputs. 




where A is a matrix defining the system structure and B is a vector defining the system 
inputs. Efforts to conml such a system are based on a control law (e.g.: Palm, 1983) 
typically expressed as u = fi. Simply stated, for a hear, constant coe5cient system, 
there exkh a control strate=, K, satisfling u = Kx That is, input u (or inputs is the case 
of MiMO systems) can be determineci fi0111 the control law K and meamment of the 
systems current states tbat will resuit in a stable system. Optimal control theory is based 
on determining the control law solution th& optimizes a +omÿince index, such as 
minimizing energy or time. 
In practice, aU states of a system may not be available for measurement and 
incorporation into the controL In other words, these states may be said to be 
unobservable. Thus, development of a control must also iaclude the creation of an 
'observer' or 'estimator' thaî is used to derive the unobsemed states. For example, if a 
system requires position and velocity as  states, but only velocity is observable then 
position can be estimateci by integrating velocity. 
In essence, the estimator attempts to mode1 the system's dynamics such that Ïts 
friture states can be deterrnined for application in the controL As can be seen, the control 
strategy for a system, K, can have may values, depending on what is observable, what is 
estimateci and the performance criteria Therefore, there e>gsts a set of potential controls, 
sometimes referred to as regdators, that d e h e  a regdation space, &, where & = {Ki). 
In ternis of optimal control, the choice of control strategy becornes one of determinhg 
the optimum strategy fiom this space. 
Nonlinear Systems 
So fkr the discussion has focussed on simple linear systems, however, in reality 
most systems are nonlinear. Therefore the issue of control must be extended to nodinea. 
systems of arbitmry complexity, represented as x' = f (x,u,t) . Further, the control 'gain' 
used in the constant coefficient, linear system control law may now themselves be 
nonlinear elements. 
There are many properties of linear systems which do not extend to nonlinear 
systems (Shinners, 1983)- 
Superposition, ifCl(t) is the respome of a linear system to input ri(t), and Cz(t) is the 
response to n(t), then alr1(t)+a2r2(t) + alCi(t)+a2C2(t). This property does not apply 
to nonluiear systems. 
Stabiiity. Stability in Linear systems may be shown to be dependent only on the 
system's parameters. In the case of nonlinear systems, stability is a more complex 
concept and may depend on initiai conditions and input characteristics as weil as the 
system Parameters'. T'us, a nonlinear system that exhibits stability with one type of 
input may not exhiiit stability with another. Further, these systerns may exhibit 
oscillations of fked amplitude and period, wtuch dependhg on convergence or 
divergence may be wnsidered to be stable or unstable. Often stability mut  be 
considered in tem~s of acceptable levels of lima cycles. 
In Lin- systems, interchanging the position of cascaded elements does not affect 
system behaviour. Hence a linear is relatively insensitive to its stnicture. This is wt 
the case for nonlinear systems wtiere the rearrangement of nonlinear cascadecl 
elements may have a major impact on the system's behaviour. 
1 niiS leads to the concept ofstability as defined by Liapunov. (Altanate spehg Lypunov) 
4. Hysteresis. U d y  associated with different system trajectories dependent on the 
'direction' of the input@). A special case is when the response of the system to a srnail 
change in input may lead to a discontinuous change in the system behaviour2. 
The Notion of-Trajectories 
#en considering the dynamics of a system, linear or nonhear, the concept of 
trajectories emerge. If a system's dynamics are represented by x' = f (x,u,t) then at any 
time, t, it may be completely dehed by its states,.~ (whethesobservableor mt). Thus,. at 
time the state of a system is defhed by & = { xlm,x2'0,. ..,>hto}. In terms of the 
systemrs state-space this debes a point in that space. As the system evolves in t h e ,  a 
series of state points are generated, denning the systern's state trajectory. 
A common approach to examining these trajectories is through phase portraits, as 
shom for example in Figure G.I. A phase plane is denoed as the plot of a state variable 
againsr its velocity. 
Figure G. 1 
Typical Traj ectory. 
ThiS is relaîed to bifincatims and catastrophes. 
As discussed, for simple linear systems, the concept of stability is relatively 
sbaightforward. However, when considering complex nonlinear systems the concept of 
stability must also be revisited. A common approach to d g  stability is through the 
application of Liapunov stabiiity criteria. This approaîh is based on determining the 
stability of a dynamic system through generalization of energy requirements. There are 
two general methods attri'buted to Liapmv. 
Tée fbst method is for cases where a d8fferential equation of the system can be 
solved. In t'bis case, stability of the system is determined nom the solution The second 
method aims to determine stabiiity without having to solve differential equations, an 
important feature for highly wmplex systems. 
For Liipunov's second method, a function of the state variables is formed that has 
special properties. This function uin then be compared to the sum of kuietic and potential 
energy and the derivative of the fûnction with respect to t h e .  If the tirne denvative of 
this fùnction c m  be shown to be negative then the system is referred to as 
"asymptotidy stable". 
Viable Systems 
So iàr the discussion of system dynamics has considered systems that are not 
evolving over time. In 0th- words, the system parameters are not in themselves changing 
over time. Most d y s i s  d e s  the implicit assumption that the structure of the system 
under consideration is tirne invariant. ViabïlÏty theory (Aubin, 199 1) examines the case 
on which the system itself is evolving over time under conditions of ullcerfainty. In te- 
of stabiiity, this implies that a system that is stable at k, may case to be stable at time ti. 
Furthe, the nature of the systemfs evolution may not be h o w n  
As discussed by Aubin (1991), viability theory provides a mathematical 
h e w o r k  for examinaiion of the evohûion of macro-systems (large-SC&, complex 
systems). These systems have three common features. 
They have a non-detenninistic engine of evoiution. In other words, the paths of 
evolution for the system are not known in advance and at any instant several potentid 
evolutioaary paths may ex& 
V i a K i  is concerne- with systems that mmt obey constraints at each instant. 
Violation of these constraints WU result in a 'death penalty' for the system 
The inertia principle stating that coirtrols for the system are changed only when the 
viabiiity (re: death penalty) of the system is threatened. 
The main purpose of viability theory is to explain the evolution of a system, govemed 
. . by n o n - d e t e d c  dynamics and viability constraints. Like Liapunov's second method, 
v i a b w  theory a t t q t s  to determine a system's viability constrauits and regions *out 
a c W y  having to solve the system. When considering a system nom the point of view of 
viability theory, Ît is important to consider as viability conshaints. Considering a system 
defined as; 
*'(O = f (~(l), ~ ( 0 )  
u(t) E W m )  
the fi& equation defines how the Siput to the system, u(t), results in the state of the 
system. These States are regarded as king the outputs of the system. The second 
equation, referred to as an inclusion, defines how the state output is feed back to the 
system input. This results in a set-valued map, U: X+Z referred to as an 'a priori 
feedback'. Z is a finite dimensional space defining the range of the control u(t). This 
describes ths state-depedent ooflstraints on the controls of the system under 
consideration. A soiution to this system is a hc t ion  t+ x(t), satisSing tbis system for 
some control t+u(t). 
Viabüity woshaints are described by a closed subset, K, of the state space. These 
are intended to descn'be the viabïlity of the system because outside of K, the state of the 
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system is no longer viable. This subset is viable d e r  the conîml system descri'bed by f 
and U, if for every initial state, a E K, there exists at least one soluîion to the systern 
starting at a that is viable in the since that tlt 2 O,x(t) E K Therefore, the first pmblem is 
to characterize these subsets, and to have some value this must be achieved without 
solving the system and testing each solution's viability- 
When considering a system d e s c r i  by f and U, and having viability constraints 
K, there ensts a regdation map & that maps any state, x, to the subset &(x) comisting 
of controls ueU(x). Iç for every XEK there exists at lezut one viable control UE&(X), it 
can be said that K is the viability domain of the system, 
To iUuSfrafe this iÙrther, consider the earlier discussion of hear systems and 
stabiiity. It was pointed out that a set of controls exkt defining a conirol Law, u=Kx 
Relaîed to this is the concept of stability, in which the system output must be bounded to 
be considered as stable. Thus for the system there e W  a range of states, x(t), for which 
the system will be stable, hence viable. Similady, the range of controls wiU included in 
the regdation map & 
Ventures as Systems 
The fïrst question to be considered is whether a venture may be viewed fiom the 
perspective of viabrlity theory. Many authors (e.g.: Bea, 1980) have discussed 
organktions as systems. Further, these systems may be viewed as interacting with their 
environments, e.g.: markets, suppliers, govenunent regulations, and having many 
fdback paths. From the various intemal and extemal interactoos associated with a 
venture, Ït can easily be seen that a venture system will have very high complexity and 
many non-lineanties. The interactions of the various individuah within the venture alone 
will introduce complexity and nonlinearity to the extent that the system may be viewed as 
iritractable in terms of modehg. 
From a theoretical perspective, a venture viewed as a cornplex, wnlinear -O- 
system having several interaction subsystems. Overail this system may be represented as 
x' = f (x,u,t) where xf is the system velocity, r d i n g  in a trajectory for the venture, 
and x are the venture-system states and u are the inputs into this venture-system. The idea 
of venture trajectories is not imlike those proposed by Abernathy and Utterback (1988) 
and Dosi (1982) among o h .  
Having assumed that at a conceptuai Ievel a venture-system may be represented as 
a fùnction of state variables, the next question that arises is if this type of system has 
characteristics common to viability problems. Retuming to Aubin's (1991) features of 
macro-system exhibithg viability characteristics, venture's can be exadne& 
. . 1. Existence of a non-detemiinistic engine of evohrtioa By non-det erministic it is 
implied that at each instant there are several adab l e ,  feasible, evolutions that 
depend upon the present state of the system and possibly its evolutionary history. 
Unlike the detemiinistic p d g m  that asserts that the evolution of macro-systems 
c m  be predicted, this view concedes the existence of non-det enninistic disîurbances 
and mors on the system resulting fiom incornplete information. 
In the case of both established and early-stage ventures, the entire concept of strategy 
formulation (e.g. Porter, 1991) lies in the belief that at any point in time there are 
opporhinities andior tbreats that provide the venture with several availabk and 
feasible future development paths. Furcher, these paths are subjected to many non- 
determiaistic fàctors, for example cornpetitor and consumer reactions to actions taken 
by the venture. In the case of new early-stage ventures, this is f i d e r  wmpounded by 
the uncertainties introduced by evolving intemal relationships. 
2. The second characteristic, the 'de& penalty' feature is obvious in the case of 
ventures- At each instant there are cuastraints, either known or imknown, which must 
be obeyed by the venture-system. The penaity for not remaining within the viability 
region defined by these constrallnts is that it may case operaiions aadlor becorne 
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insolvent, Le: go into bankruptcy. In the case of ventures, there are amther group 
anecdotally refmed to as the 'living dead'. These ventures may costinue to operate, 
but seem to be constantly within the reaches of colIapse. An interesthg speculation is 
that these ventures exist at or neat the viabiiity region boundary. 
3. The third characteristic to be considered is the so-ded 'inertia principle'. This stata 
that the controls of a system are changes only when system viability (recall the death 
penalty) is threatened. In terms of venture-systems, it wodd be very uncornmon to 
have operational policies and stmtegies chaaging rapidy. The level of codùsion and 
effort that this wodd require would surely lead to the venture's demise. Rather7 
venture policies and strategies t y p i d y  remain constant with periodic re-views. These 
rewiews only result in changes when conditions, either intemal or extemal, indicate 
that change is required in the best interests of the venture. 
An interesthg implication of the inertia principle may be seen in the iiterature on 
venture evolution. Several authors (e-g.: Zimmerer and Scarborough, 1996) have 
descrii the periods of tumil ventures pass through as they evolve. Ofien, if a 
venture is to successfidiy pass through these transition points7 and survive, major 
interna1 changes to the management, intenial operational policies and strategies are 
required, 
Early-Stage Ventures and Assessrnent 
Of particular interest in this research is the assesment of early-stage technology- 
based ventures. In terms of assessing such a venture-system's viability the 'tracking 
properS' of viability theory has some interesting implications. 
The Tracking Principle 
As discussed by Aubin (199 l), wnsider a system of two Werential inclusions; 
w b m  F maps F-X x Y+X and G X  x Y+Y. Firctber, cornida that there e>usts a map, 
H:X+Y refmed to as an observation map. The tracking property of viabiüty theory may 
be sîated as: 
For every XQE Dom 0 and every y0 E H(xo) there exists solutions (x(),yO) to 
this systern of differential inclusions such that Vt 2 O, y(t) E H(x(f)) .  
Viab* theory firrther states tbat the tracking property is equivalent to the kt 
that the graph of H is a viability domain of (%y) +F(xJ) x G(x,y). The trackulg property 
is therefore equivalent to s a . g  that H is a solution to the system of partial differential 
inclusions. As fùrther d i s c d  by Aubin (1991), since there are Links between F, G, and 
H they can be used in several ways. 
Knowing F and h d  G or selections of g of G such that the tracking property 
holds. This is the so-called 'observation' problem. 
Kwwing G, sometimes refmed to as the exo-system, find F or selections f of F such 
that the tracking property holds. This is the so-ded Iracking' problem. 
Knowing F and G, h d  the obsewation map, H, that satisfies the tracking property. 
Further, the tracking property states that there e>tists a solution to the 'reduced' 
differential inclusion xr(t) E F(x(t),),h(t)) such that (x0,yO: = h(x0)) is a solution to the 
initial system of differential inclusions. Thus, knowIedge of the observation map, H, 
permits the system to be sub-divided. 
Observation and Deamposition 
The idea of the observation problem, as described by Aubin (1991), is to observe 
solutions of a complex system, x'(t) E F(x(t), y@)) by a system, yr(t) E GO>@)) .,where 
G: Y+Y provides simpler dynamics. This permits highly complex systems, with high 
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dimensionaiity, to be observeci by simpler systems. This simpler systern (the system 
model) is created to provide exphmations of the evolution of the unknown systern, and 
can be shown to be valid tbrough the tracking pr~perty~ (See Aubin (1991) Chapter 8). 
From this point of view, evoIution of knowledge about a system defined by 
x'(t) E F(x(t),y(t)) amounts to increasing the observation space and modifying or 
replacing the observation model, y'(t) E G(y(t)) . 
The tracking property is also of iuterest in that it p e r d s  the decomposition or 
systems and the hierarchy of subsystems. Hierarchical decomposition can occur 
whenever the observation map is a composition product of several subrnaps, determining 
successive levels of hierarchy. The evohxtion of each level is Iinked to the -te of the 
Iower level, and is regulated by controls depending upon the evolution of the lower level 
state controL 
The Tricking Principle and Venture Assessrnent 
The tracking property of viability theory has interesthg implications for venture 
assessment and questions related to the use of assessrnent criteria In terms of the 
observation property, this provides insight into the use of different sets of assessment 
Criteria by various assessors In essence each of them has constnicted a model of the 
actuai venture-system which attempts simplify the systems dynamics and make it 
manageabk. As the assessor increases the level of knowledge about the venture-system, 
the model can also be modifl.ed. As there is no unique observation model or observation 
map between the cornplex venture-system and the model created by the assessor, it is not 
surprishg that there wiu be Merent sets of criteria involved for individual maps. 
Another aspect of the tracking property that of interest when considering the 
assessrnent of new early-stage ventures is decomposition, As the venture-system bas high 
dimensiodity and consists of complex set of interactions, it is important to be able to 
decompose the system and assess viabiîity at lower levels. In the case of eatly-stage 
technology-based ventures there is Iiterature that indicates that technological viabiiity is a 
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critical consideration whw assessing these venture. The decomposition pmperty permits 
examination of this aspect of viability, while acknowledging that there will be other 
aspects of the systern which are important, 
EarBy-S tage Venture Viability 
To determine tbe viability constraints, it is necessary to have a =del of the 
venture-system Beginning with the project execution mode1 (KG. Cooper, 1993), 
extensions may be made that provide insigbî into new venture viability assesment. For 
simplicity, it is assumed throughout this andysis that the various evolutiomry phases 
occur sequentialfy, with withle comurrency, for ventures of the size and age being 
wnsidered here. A finther assumption is that the product or service definition at the end 
of the formulaton pbase is stable enough that the amount of effort can be identifïed. 
With this mode1 as a basis, several concepts may be idenîined that will have a significant 
development phase impact. Spec%caliy, techwlogical capability, technological 
complexity a d  quaiay p o t e n .  
Cooper's mode2 Figure G.2, implies that as rework is diçcovered in the systern it 
is simply feed back for re-execution. This appears to overlook the tendency for increased 
task interdependence as techno logical complexity increases, and hence the potential for 
the rework to have a kipple' effect thmugh the development pmcess. In the proposed 
model, this is represented by rework effort penalty, wwhich accounts for the additional 
effort as the discovery of rework is delayeci. 
Based on the issues identifie4 the following relationships may be identined in the 
development phase modeL 
Required Effort + f (complexiQ) 
Execiuion Rate +f(oomplexity, capabilities) 
Execution Quaüty + f (complexity, capabilities, quality potential) 
Rework Ratio -+ f(complexity, capabilities, quality po tential) 
Figure G.2 
Development Phase Execution Mode1 
As iadicated by these relationships, technological viability is defiued as consisting 
of three major wmponents; technological capability, technological complexity and the 
venture's pote* to execute a hi& quality development phase, referred to here as 
development quality potentid In tenns of systems anxi viability theory, these components 
rnay be considered to define sets of state variables and associated constraints that must be 
estimatecl when determïning system technological viability. 
The first of these components, technological capabiüty, rnay be decomposed into 
three interrelated issues; technologid synergy, absorptive capacity, and technobgical 
vulnerabiiay. 
Technological Capability + g (technological synergy, absorptive capacity, technological 
vulnerability) 
Technological Complexity + g(technologica1 variety, technologid maturity) 
Quality pote& is dehed as the ability of the venture to develop a product with 
minimal energy, and hence is a fùnction of the organization's effectiveness and efficiency 
in resource allocation and usage. Therefore it is defined as having two dimensions, 
management quality and o r g ~ i o n a l  effectiveness. 
Summa y of Viabüity Postdates 
In summary, four basic postdates have been put fonvard that serves as the basis for 
developïng a viabitity assessnent fkamework. 
1. A venture can only evolve dong trajectories that are viable witbin its technological 
capabilities. In other words, a venture cannot follow paths that require technological 
capabilities that it does not possess or cannot sustain 
2. A venture can only rernain viable as long as the technologies upon which Ït is baseci 
reniiiin viable. 
3. As system coqlexity increases, and hence system uncertainty, the number of 
potential techwlogical trajectories also increases, with the possibility of a venture's 
movement ouiside its viability region. 
4. A venture can remain viable only if it has the capabiiïty to control the allocation of 
resources and effort such that total energy is minimized. In other words, this is a 
fünction of the efficiency and esectiveness of the venture in tenns of its development 
process. 
Based on these postdates and the relationships identifïed in the development 
stage venture model, the following set of viability constraints is proposed. For this 
discussion, it WU be assumed that ventures may be descri'bed by what Aubi. (1991) 
d e m i  as 'fuectional viabiliiy'. 
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As discussed, system evoiution is defined by a set of differential equations or 
inclusions, which descrï'be the velocity of the states at each instant of time. F&r, this 
velocity is dependent upon the system state at that very instant. In some cases, referred to 
as fbctional differential inclusions, the state velocity also depends upon the history of 
the system's evohition up to a point in tirne. This approach permits the inclusion of 
system events and characteristics such as delays, anticipation, cumulated consequences 
into its dynamics From the perspective of venture assesment, this h c W e s  the 
inclusion of many venture characteristics, for example the cumulative effect of poor 
hiring decisions. 
In terms of hctional viabilÏty, viability consttaints are also dependent upon the 
history of the evolution of the system. As discussed by Aubin (1 99 l), this leads to the 
characterization of a system's viability by a 'hctional tangentid condition'. This states 
that for any pst evohition there exists at least a velocity tangent to the set of evoiutions 
satisfjing the hcti0na.l viability constraints. In practical tenns, what does this mean in 
terms of venture assesment? 
Consider the nrst viability postulate: a venture can only evolve dong trajectories that 
are viable within its technological capabilities. In other words, a venture cannot follow 
paths that require technological capabilities3 that it does not possess or cannot sustain. 
Based on the model, this requires the folIowing initial conditions for a venture. 
1. Synergy: for t = Q: Available Technology Base 1 Required Technology Base 
2. Absorptive Capacity: for t = t,-:
Available Kwwledge Base r Required Knowldge Base 
As the systern evolves, the available kwwledge and technology base must remain at 
least 'tangent' to the requirements. This resuh-s in the next set of constraints: 
d(Available - Tech - Base) , m e  quired -Tech - W e )  3. Synergy: - 
at a 
Within these required tedmology and knowledge is define- as the minimum set essential for 
produdredkatioa. 
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Note that whüe no initial condition is specifïed for techmlogical vulnerability, it does 
appear as an evolutionary constraïnt. This implies tbat initially the venture must have 
aaxss to its required technologies, then as it evolves any associated vulnerabiiity must 
not be iweasing. This condition is closely related to the techmlogy base c o d  in 
that an increasing vulnerabiiity in all likelihood will also be refiected in problems 
. . .  
rmmbmmg the required technology base. 
The next set of constraints implied by the =del is associated with technological 
complexity and its risk &ors. These indicate that di viable trajectones require that these 
complexity fàctors be tangent or decreasing. Inhiitively, no venture-system m y  remain 
viable for long ifthese requirements are increasing over t h e .  
6. Complexity: 
ô(Breakrhrough - Risk) so a 
7. Complexîty: 
a(1ntegration - Risk) 
,<O 
at 
d(0bsolecence - Risk) 
8. Complexity: s O 
The final set of constraints relates to quality potentiai. In terms of initial conditions, 
the venture-system requires a minimum level of quaIity potential, hence its components 
must be greater tban a minimum, non-zero, Ievel. As the venture evolves, the constraints 
require tbat the effectiveness of the venture in terms of resource allocation and 
communications be increasing over time. Simüarly, the management quality must also be 
increasing over t h e .  
10. Quality Potential: for P b: MmgementQuuIity 2 min(MimugemenfQzïaIity) > O 
1 1. Quality Potential: 
12. Quality Potentid: 
Mode1 Deveiopment 
To explore the concept of viability M e r ,  a simulation model of an early-stage 
venture is created and examined. A problem which is apparent when considering this 
model is the subjective nature of the key variables. That is, they are easily expressed 
linguisticaily but are d.if35cu-k to qiiantifir. To facilitate this investigation, a fbny model 
was developed, and hplemented in Matlab. 
At this stage, the mode1 assumes that the three principle inputs, technologïcai 
capabiiity, complexity and quality potential, are t h e  invarient. This model simplincation 
does not impede the examination for viability regions, which was run for a several 
thousand iterations over the input range. 
To assess system viability, it is necessary to develop a performance measure 
which c m  be used to determine venture-system stabiiity and the viability region 
Basically a Tenture which is d e d  to be unstabIe,using excessive energy, is defined as 
being not viable. The viability index developed for these expairne- compares the 
energy co~lsumed by a venture, g@), to that of an ideal venture, h(), Le. perfect 
capabilities, quality potentd, and no discovery detays or rework peaalties. FinalLy, the 
work a c t i o n  is mapped to [O, 11 using an exponential. 
The overall block diagram of the simutation model is shown in Figure G.3. Each 
of these major blocks inchdes a fuly associateive memory (FAM) defining its input- 
output rules. Typical surnice plots for these F M  are showun in Figure G.4 and Figure 
Figure G.3 
Venture Mode1 Block Diagram 
A simplification was made in implimentation of this model. As shown in Figure 
G.3, the discavery ratios are modelled as three types, immediate, typical, pessimistic. 
While this may be modelled probilisticly, this approximation of a beta distrifiution (e.g.: 
ref) was used because it was considered to more accurately reflect the way individuah 
view the prubiem. Further, this was considered to be relevant for friture data collection 
for future model development 
Figure G.4 
hunediate Rework Discovery FAM Rules 
Figure G-5 
Tmmediate Discovery Penalty FAM Rules 
Simulation Results 
The resulting simulation mode1 was iterated over the range of input variables, 
with the output king the energy function When this output is exstmined, plots simüar to 
Figure G.6 may be creatd This plot indicates the regions that would be considerd 
viable and not viable on the quality potential-techoological capability plane. As can be 
seen, this plot indicates that the viability region is associated with technological 
capabiüty and quality potential greater than a minimm The greatest energy expenditure 
occurs in the region having low quality potentid and relatively high technological 
capability. This is anecdotally supported, and has been observed in situations where 
ventures have signincant technical talent but no direction. 
Figure G.6 
Sample Mode1 Output (Energy) 
Prototype Venture Assessment Tool 
Introduction 
The objective of this tool is to provide a fhmwork for assessing and screening early-stage, 
techwlogy-based ventures. To this end, the aîtached scorecard and graphics are intended as 
a diagnostic, providing an assesment of the venture's potential to successfiilly develop its 
proposed product or service. 
The Assessment and Screening Process 
This tool is intended for use M e  reviewing the venture's business plans andor during 
interviews with the individuals involved in the proposed venture. 
The scorecard consists of three major sections; Technological Capab*, Technological 
Complexity and Quaiity Potential. Please see the foilowing section for definitions of these 
and other terms. Each section has a set of subsections that focus on a specific aspect of the 
venture. For each subsection &ere are a list of comrnon indicators. This is not an 
exhaustive list, rather it is a guide to the types of issues to be considerd 
For each subsection, there is a 7-point scde to rate the proposeci venture. These scales 
range fiom most favorable (7) at the top to 1east fàvorable at the bottom (1)- 
Upon reviewing the proposed venture, provide a rating for each of the subsections. Based 
on the scores in each group, provide an overail score for the section- To assess venture 
viabiiity, wnvert the section scores O\echnological Capability, Technological Cornplex* 
and Quality Potential) to range fiom O to 1- Plot the relative position of each section score 
on the graphs providd 
Each graph is divided into three regions; 'viable', 'marginaiiy viable' and 'not viable'. 
Ventures tbat are consistently in the 'viable' region may be expected to success~y 
complete the product development phase. Ventures that are indicated as 'non-viable' have 
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serious deficiencies that make it unlikely that they wil l  successfiilly complete prodm 
development. 
Those ventures indicated to be in the 'marginally viable' region rnay be expected to 
complete product development but with signincant delays and associated cost overruns. 
The areas of marginal viability indiate where remedial action rnay be required 
It is recommended that this tool be used throughout the product development phase to 
maniîor the venture's progres arsd idente potential changes that threaten its ab* to 
reach product launch, 
Definition of Key Concepts 
1. Technological Capabilities: 
The physical technologies, howledge, skills and hfkstructure embodied by the venture 
that provides it with the capacity to create its proposed product(s). 
1.1 Technological Synergy : 
The 'goodness-of-M' between the proposed productls requûed technological 
capabilitieq and those available within the venture. This not only includes the 
required physical techndogks, knowledge and skills, but aiso supporting 
technologies, fàcilities and equipment. 
1.2 Absorptive Capacity: 
Absorptive capacity is related to the prior experience contained within the venture. 
It provides a basis for recognizing the value of new information, as weli as its 
assimilation and application. This includes knowledge of the most recent scientSc 
and technological developments relevant to the development of the venture's 
proposed produds. 
13 Technoiogical Vuinerability: 
The degree of control the venture has over the d i c a l  technologies, knowledge and 
skills necessas. for the creation of its propsed product(s). This also entails the 
potential impact on the venture if access to a cntical technology or knowledge 
resource becomes ufls~vailable to the venture. 
2. Technological Corn plerity : 
The degree of unceaainty related to the creation of the venture's proposed product(s) due 
to fâctors ieciuding the newness of the technologies, the number of technologies and the 
novelty of theu application. 
2.1 Breakthrongh Risk: 
The degcee to whîch technologid or scientinc advancement is fequired to realize 
the creation of the venture($ proposed produc@). 
2.2 Integration Risk: 
The degrees to which technologies are king interrelated or combined in new and 
wvel ways to create a venture's proposed product(s). These technologies may be 
eaher new or relatively mature in themselves, while their coorninated application is 
critical to the product(s) creation. 
2.3 ObsoIescenceRisk: 
The degree to which the critical technologies that fonn the basis of the venture's 
proposed product(s) may be replaced by a competing technology. These competing 
technologies may be newer, or may represent another possible implementation with 
greater potential bene*. 
3. Quality Potential: 
The venture's capacity to create its proposed product(s), such that iî is ready for market 
launch, within an expected period of time and with its available resources. 
3.1 Management Quality: 
The experience and capacity of the venture's management team to successfÙUy lead 
the venture through development of its proposed product and into market 
introduction 
3.2 Organizational Effectïveness: 
The venture's ability to efficiently and effectively communicate and ailocate critical 
knowledge and bfktmcture resources to the developmznt of its proposed pmduct, 
u o strong Availability of Suppon technologies. 
Teehno]ogical O S Slightly Above Average 
O 4 Average 
O 3 Slightly Below Average 
h rr . . r - - î -  Overall Rating 
O 7 Exceptionally Strong 
O 6 Strong 
O 5 Slightly Above Average 
O 4 Average 
O 3 Slightly Below Average 
O 2 Weak 
O 1 Exceptionally Weak 
u L weaK 
O 1 Exceptionally Weak 
Available key rirchitecnual howledge, 
Availability of supporthg howledge. 
Knowledge distribution 
Knowleâge redundancy . 
O 5 Slightly Above Average 
O 1 Exceptionally Weak 




O 7 Exceptionally High 
O 6High 
O 5 Slightly Above Average 
0 4 Average 
O 3 Slightly Below Average 
0 2 h w  
O 1 Exceptionally Low 
O 5 Slightly Above Average Breakthrough - . . 
Risk - U 4 Average O 3 Slightly Below Average { 
O 7 Exceptionally High Technology development requirement, Emerging key technologies, 
06High  Novelty of technology applicfltition, 
0 2 L o w  
0 1 Exceptionally Low 
Emerging or new key technologies. 
Novelty of technology application. 
b------ 0 4 Average 
1 O 1 Exceptionally Low 
Risk U 4 Average { O 3 Slightly Below Average 
0 2 L o w  
O 1 Exceptionally Low 
Quality Potential O 7 Exceptionally Strong A Resence of key development 
Overall Rating 
0 7 Exceptionally Strong 
0 6 Strong 
O 5 Slightly Above Average 
O 4 Average 
O 3 Slightly Below Average 
O 2 Poor 
O 1 Exceptionall y Poor 
Management O 5 Slightly Above Average Resence of budget control meames, 
Ability to control design dedsions. 
Presence of a qwality control plan. 
O 3 Slightly Below Average Design process documentation plan. 
Design team leadership experience, 
O 1 Exceptionally Poor 
O 7 Exceptionally Strong 
Organizational O 5 Slightly Above Average Organizationat communfcations 
Effectiveness O 4 Average 
O 3 Slightly Below Average 




Appendix 1 - Case Assessrnent Data 
1.1 Bell (1991) Short Cases 
Subject Rr Analytica Gensym Gaîeway Cimis MASPAR Ovation 
Tech.complexitr: Breakthrough risk 5 5 4 5 6 5 
Inteption risk 5 6 5 4 6 5 
Obsolescence risk 6 4 1 1 4 2 
Ovetallrating 53 5 4 4 6 4 
- - 
Quality patentid: Management qydity 1 3 6 6 6 2 
Org. &ectiveness 3 4 5 5 4 1 
Overall rating 2 3 5 5 5 1.5 
- - - 
Analytica Gensym Gateway Cirrus MASPAR Ovation 
Tech. capability Tech. synergy 5 6 6 6 4 2 
Absorptivecapacity 4 6 6 6 5 2 
Tech. MiInerability 3 5 6 6 3 5 
Overall rahg  5 6 6 7 4 2 
Tech. ccnnplexity: Breakîhrough rïsk 4 5 5 6 6 5 
Megration risk 5 4 4 5 5 6 
Obsolescencerisk 4 3 4 3 5 4 
O v d  ratmg 5 4 5 5 5 5 
Subject S2: Analyîica Geasym Gateway Cimis MASPAR Ovation 
Tech c a p a b i i  Tech,synergy 5 7 7 6 6 1 
Absmptivecapacity 4 6 7 6 6 2 
Tech, vuhi- 3 2 6 4 4 3 
O v d r a t i t ~ g  4 5 7 5 5 2 
-- -- 
Tech. ccmiplexity= Breakthrougb risk 6 6 5 6 7 6 
Integraticm risk 6 6 5 5 5 7 
ObsoIescence risk 6 6 4 6 6 6 
Overall raîing 6 6 5 6 6 6 
Quality pdentid: Management quality 2 4 5 6 6 2 
Org. effediveness I 6 7 6 6 1 
Overall raîing 1 5 6 6 6 1 
Tech. apabiiity: Tech. synergy 5 6 7 7 7 1 
Absorptive capacity 5 6 6 6 6 2 
Tech,vulaetabiiity 4 6 6 6 6 1 
Overall raîing 5 6 6 6 6 1 
Tech. comple?city: Breakthrough risk 4 5 3 3 6 6 
Integratim risk 7 7 3 3 7 7 
Obsolescence risk 6 6 2 2 2 5 
Overall raîiug 6 6 4 3 5 6 
Qualitypotentiai: Management quality 1 3 7 7 7 3 
Org. effdveness 1 4 7 7 7 1 
Oveealltating 1 4 7 7 7 2 
Subjed S4: Analytica Gensym Gateway Cimis MASPAR Ovation 
- - - -  - -  - - - - 
Te& capabiliîy Tech. synergy 2 6 7 5 5 2 
Absorptive capacity 2 6 7 4 6 3 
Tech. vdnerabiiity 2 5 6 6 6 4 
O v d  raihg 2 6 6 5 6 3 
Tech. canplexity Bredcibough risk 6 5 3 3 5 6 
Integratim risk 6 5 2 4 6 6 
Obsolescence ri& 6 6 3 6 5 6 
6 v d  ratmg 6 5 3 4 5 6 
Quality potential: Management quality 2 6 6 4 6 2 
Org. effectiveness 1 6 7 5 7 2 
Overall rating 2 6 6 5 6 2 
1.2  Case A Assessrnent 
Technologid capabiiity: Technological synergy N N N 
Absorptive capacity N N N 
Technologicai whaability N N N 
Overail rating 6 4 2 
Technolgical cumplexity: Break$hougb risk N N N 
Integration ri& N N N 
Obsolescence risk N N N 
Overall rating 2 6 6 
Qu&y potential: Management @ty N N N 
O r ~ c m a i  effectiveness N N N 
Overail ratiag 6 4 2 
-- . - -  . 
Initial Supplement A Supplemeot B 
-. - 








Subject S3 : Initial Supplement A Supplemait B 





Management quality 3 
Subject S4: Initiai SuppIanent A Supplemait B 
Technologid capabiiity: Technologid synergy 7 5 
Absorptive capacity 6 5 
Technologid vulaerability 7 3 
Ovdrat ing  6 4 
Technologid cornpl* Breakthrough risk 5 7 7 
Integratimrisk 6 7 7 
Obsolescenœ risk 2 5 5 
Overail rating 5 6 6 
Quaiity potentid: Management guality 5 3 2 
Organhtimal effediveness 5 3 2 
OveraiI rating 5 3 2 
Subject S5: Initial Supplement A Supplemait B 
Technologicai capabiliîy Technological synergy 6 
Absorptive capacity 5 
Technological vuinerability 4 
Overall rating 5 
- - 
Technological çomplexity: Breakthrough risk 
Obsolescence risk 
Overail rating 
Technologid c a p a b i  Technologicai synergy 3 2 2  4 1 
Absorptive capacity 3 3 2 3 2 
Technologid vulnaability 2 1 2 1 1 
O v d r a t i n g  2 2 2 3 I 




1 . 4  Case B Assessment Comments 
Major Assessment Commenîs 
R Requires expertise inbio-informatics. 
Signincant genetics and bioche- R&D. 
S o h e  and web development required. 
Do they have the statistics background? 
Will they get patents on software? 
Gene-chips seem critical brd no cantml by company. 
Website would aiso be controlled e x t e d y ?  
What is the status of gene-chips and testing technology? 
Deaüng with Eairly new techaology, what are the cornpetitors? 
No biologists in the development team and no scientinc perso~el  
currently in place. 
No preliminary R&D data to indicate viabw. 
No evidence of supporthg scientific kaowledge, some seems to exkt 
with the CEO? 
Very dificuit to visualize the RBtD steps. 
Entire venture depends on a presently unlcnown t e -  or alliance with 
appropriate scientinc research gmup. 
They have ideas of who they would approach but no connection yet 
solidifie& 
Unclear how they really successfbi when go@ to "oirtmaneuver" huge 
cornpetition. 
A huge advancement of R&D requited to create the venture- 
The idea seems reasonably novel with reasonable consideration of due 
process requireâ 
Uncertain how they would make the required leap fiom genome map to 
oral intake- 
Plenty of room to move by mature companies - ifthey idea is viable I 
dont see how they would survive (conpetition). 
Miaybe the business ends are covered but overseer of RdZD absent - how 
wiil they get off the ground? 
The knowledge required is not apparent fiom the CVs - molecular 
bio logists 
Siochemists dominate the pharmaceutid market but this involves 
genetic knowledge. 
1s making the chip possible? No information available on this ahhough 
it is key to successfùl product. 
What is their interpretation s o h e  based on? 
The knowledge within the current team is minimal to non-existent, but 
wilhg to hire experts. 
Not quite clear to what extent the chip reader and gene chip have to be 
developed or are an available standard technology. 
If not available yet, and solely dependent on this technology with no 
alternat ives. 
Not demonstrating any hwledge  that links genetic informatian to 
nutrient requirements. 
It seem that there might be a substantial amount of research required to 
establish even the evidence of such a link 
Linking genetic information to nutrient requirements seems to be a new 
idea, but not developed any M e r  or supportai by any available 
information. 
Approach may be replaced or already covered by companies that base 
this evaluation of supplementary needs of their customers on factors 
such as general health, diet, Mestyle, etc. 
The technology used to make gene chips might already be quite mature. 
No infiormation given regarding product development - highly organized 
in terms of business strategy. 
Team very young with no pmduct development experience. 
No milestones presented in temu of product development 
No explanation of budget requirements for product development- 
18 months for complete product development seems to be quite 
optllnistic - hiring a large number of experts (10 PhD.s in genetics and 
biochemktry) does not necessarily speed up R&D since prior 
information is ofien IKeded for next research step. 
S3 Do wt co~itrol the chip or updates. 
Rely on competition for partnerships. 
Once consumers know what supplements are required they can purchase 
them anywhere. 
Char& for follow-ups may cause a problem 
Ali directors and CE0 inexperienced. 
T e c h  logy cornplex. 
S4 They have no technological capabilities 
Minimal background in area 
Hope to partner or hue to gain aIl needed technology, sküls, etc. 
My understandhg is thaî derstanding what DNA sequences do is a 
big, hard problem 
Knowledge is growing fàst i8 this area 
No nianagement experience, marketing VPs experience is as a lifeguard 
Proposed strategic aUiances are nearly impossible to execute. 
1s this a tecblogy  company or a marketing one? 


Business Plan Does the company have a wriîten 5-year plan that is working and realistic and emphasizes the 
and Vision company's next two years of operations? 
Does the business plan provide an integrated overview of al1 aspects of the firm? 
Does the business plan identQ the coprate vision and mission? 
Does the business plan identw what the lasting tdu~ological advantages of the company? 
Does the business plan specify a product strategy? 
Does the business plan identQ market segmentation and associated cornpetitive market positions? 
Does the business plan iâentify the people and reward stnicture within the company? 
Does the business plan ideiitifl the financial and financing requirements of the company? 
I 
l j l  
1 
1 i O  
1 
category R sz ss ~4 imority 
1 
I 
Marketing Does the company have a marketing plan that identifies what the products are? 1 1 1 1 / 1  
l 
Does the marketing plan identify who the customers will be? 1 1 1 I l l  
I 1
Does the marketing plan identiQ how customers will use the product? 
Does the marketing plan identiij why the customers will choose the company's products over the 
cornpetition? 
Does the marketing plan ident0 where the company's prodwcts will be sold and what distribution 
channds will be used? 
Does the marketing plan identifj the time ftame and cost mode1 for selling the company's 
producîs? 
Does the marketing plan contain a detailed plan for supporting product marketing? 
Does the marketing plan outline the resources required to market the company's products? 
Does the marketing plan include a schedule with milestones for implementing the company's plan? 
Does the company have a marketing organization and leader that can implement the marketing 
plan? 
o i o  
I 
4 
Sales Does the company have a highly motivated sales force? O O O O \ O  
I 
I 
Does a proven leader head the sales group? O O O O i O  
I 
Does the sales group have experience in the target markets? O O O O O 


1.6 Overall Acceptance Questionnaire 
Question Concept 
The ttiree major factors identifid in the methodology are important for assessing the likelihood Appropriate 5 6 6 6 6 7  N 
that these ventures will survive, 
In terms ofassessing the technological viability of these ventures the proposed methoâology is Appropriate 5 3 5 3 5 5 5 
complete. 
The 'subconcepts' associated with the three major factors are importait for assessing the Appropriate 5 6  6 Ci 7  6  5  
likelihood that these ventures will survive, 
The grriphical interpretation of the results agreed with my perception of the venture's technological Appropriate 6  6 6 4 5 6 6 
viability, 
The definitions accompanying the methodology worksheet were clear. Clarity 6 6 6 5 4 6 5  
The scales used with each concept are appropriate, Clarity 4 6 6 5 6 6 5  
The graphical interpretation of the results is easily understood, Clality 7 6 6 5 6 7 7  
The graphical interpretation of the results is a useful approach, Usefulness 5 5 5 6 6 7 6 
The proposed methoâology would provide a usefil assessrnent twl when conside~g these Usefilness 5 6 6  6  6  6  6 
venhrres, 
The proposed methodology would be useful tool only after simcant modifications. Usefulness 6 2 2 N 2 2 2 
Vinbility Plots 
As part of the proposed assessment tool, plots of the viability regions are 
supplied. The process involved in the creation of these grapbs is outlined here. 
Step 1: 
The proposed mode1 simulation was iterated over the range of each of the @ut 
variables. This d e d  in a 1000 data point file indicatin. combinations of inputs and 
calcuiated energy. These plots are not based on the viability index 
Step 2: 
The file was partitioned into three regions, viable, margiual and not viable. This 
partition was arbitrary and is based on an assessment of the phase plots associated with 
different energy levels. 
Step 3: 
For each of the input variable pairs, the log(energy) was plotted as a 3D scatter 
plot and examined- 
Step 4: 
Individuai scatter plot for bot viable', 'marginal' and 'viable' regions were plotted 
for each input variable pair. Unambiguous 'viable' and hot viable' regions were identified 
on each scatter plot. Direction of 'increasing energy' noted on each plot. 
Step 5: 
Each of the 'not viable' scatter plots was examined using 'slices' of the third 
VariabIe. For example, the teclmologicd capabiiity-quality potential pair was cut using 
technological complexity. Points Waere influence of the third variable became significant 
were noted. The point at which the cut variable began to have less inauence on the plot 
was set as the upper bound on 'not viablef. Similarly, the 'lower bolnrdaq' for viable 
region was set. Remainllig area was definecl as marginal. As the boundaries for viable, 
marginal and not viable were a r b W y  assignai, areas of apparent overlap when 
examininnj the regions were dehed as rnargi.miL 
Additional Plot Modifications. 
In the case of the technological complexity - technological capabilïty plot it was 
noted that the not viable region tended to expancl in the upper bft quadrant as the quality 
potential cut decreased Further, the themarginal viabiiity te& to have 'increasing en=& 
for low capability. As a ES&, the hot viablet region was extended to the lower le& 
quadrant at Technological Capacity of 0.1. This also corresponds with theoretical 
requirement for a minimum, non-zero technological capability to exkt for viability. 
Similarly, a a m i n i m i m i ,  non-zen, qu&y potential is expected for quaüty potential and this 
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